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ABSTRACT 
 
SELF-MASTERY IN PLATO 
 
Brian Reese 
 
Susan Sauvé Meyer 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation addresses an interpretive puzzle involving Plato’s apparently 
incompatible accounts of psychic conflict. I argue that a better understanding of the soul 
helps to resolve this puzzle, and that we can properly understand Plato’s conception of the 
soul by focusing on his account of self-mastery (Ĳઁ țȡεȓĲĲȦ ਦαȣĲȠ૨). Self-mastery is a 
concept well-suited to this project because it is treated consistently across Plato’s dialogues 
and features centrally in discussions of psychic conflict. 
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Searching for you, but if there’s no one,  
what am I searching for? Still you. Some  
sort of you. Not for myself? Am I you?  
Need I search for me? For myself?  
Is my self you? I know: Self.  
Is that you? Is it me? 
 
 
Robert Lax, 21 Pages 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first Alcibiades, Socrates distinguishes the self from its various possessions. 
He provisionally identifies the self with the soul, and counts the body as among its 
possessions (129d1–130c2). The self, or soul, is said to possess the body by ‘ruling’ or 
‘mastering’ it (130a13). Socrates then suggests that the self is to be identified, not simply 
with the soul, but only with the rational or intellectual part of it (133b2–c2). Finally, he 
claims that the rational or intellectual part of the soul is divine (133c4). This results in a 
surprising claim about self-knowledge: it turns out that to know yourself is to know 
something divine (133c6). 
 While these claims are striking, scholars are quick to point out that we should not 
be too hasty in assigning such radical views to either the historical Socrates, or to the 
Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. For it must be remembered that these claims are found in a 
work whose authenticity has been a matter of dispute since at least the nineteenth century, 
when Schleiermacher first called it into question.1 Since then, the first Alcibiades has been 
largely neglected in surveys of Socrates and Plato. Indeed, even the limited scholarship 
 
1 Schleiermacher (1836) pp. 328–336. Nobody thought the first Alcibiades was dubious until Schleiermacher 
decided that it was too “insignificant and poor” to be attributed to Plato. As Annas (1985) pp.113–114 writes: 
“The influence of Schleiermacher’s judgement is surprising considering the total absence of grounds given 
other than taste. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher is in fact ambivalent […]; after insulting every aspect 
of the dialogue’s form and content he concludes that after all the Alcibiades contains some fine parts worthy 
of Plato. He is the first of many scholars to entertain fantastic hypotheses such as that Plato wrote parts of it; 
wrote a dialogue spoiled by somebody else; improved someone else’s inferior dialogue, and so on. The 
desperation of these moves suggests that the basic problem is inability to make sense of the dialogue as a 
whole in terms of some leading theme.” 
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that has engaged with it during the last two centuries has tended to concentrate on questions 
of authenticity, rather than on questions of philosophical content. 
 I mention the first Alcibiades, however, only to lay it aside. This dissertation is in 
no way a contribution to that neglected literature. Nevertheless, the following pages will 
reveal that each of the striking claims canvassed above are in fact rigorously argued for 
elsewhere in Plato, in dialogues widely recognized as canonical. This fact can be more 
readily appreciated, I submit, by focusing—not on these more controversial claims directly, 
but rather on the seemingly more plausible and familiar claim that the soul, provisionally 
identified with the self, is to be understood as a kind of ruler or master (130a13). This 
dissertation thus undertakes a sustained examination of the concept of self-mastery (τઁ 
κρείττω ਦαυτο૨). 
I argue that Plato offers a consistent account of self-mastery across dialogues: we 
are self-mastered whenever reason rules. This, in itself, is not a groundbreaking revelation. 
However, scholars have not sufficiently appreciated how central self-mastery is to Plato’s 
philosophical psychology, nor has this concept been examined systematically—and so this 
dissertation fills a rare lacuna in more contemporary Platonic scholarship. Not only is self-
mastery a central concept in Plato, but the fact that it is treated consistently across dialogues 
makes it an indispensable tool for addressing a whole nexus of concepts, questions and 
scholarly debates. In short, self-mastery serves as an organizing concept, which can help 
scholars to navigate a wide range of topics. It also helps to reveal new insights and latent 
resources in the works of Plato. 
Not only does an examination of self-mastery help to reveal new insights and 
resources, but these insights and resources in turn shed light on many entrenched scholarly 
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debates. This dissertation takes off from one such entrenched debate, which turns on a 
question about the soul: is it simple or composite? While this question putatively concerns 
Plato’s metaphysical psychology, the answer has substantive implications for long-
standing debates in Plato’s moral psychology. I begin, then, with an entrenched debate 
about psychic conflict in the Protagoras and the Republic. 
 
§1 THE DEBATE 
 
Plato seems to countenance the possibility of psychic conflict for a composite soul, 
but deny it for a simple one. Considered independently, each of these views is reasonable: 
the internal complexity of a composite soul seems to allow for the possibility of conflict, 
while a simple soul seems to lack the internal complexity that would render it capable of 
conflict. A puzzle arises, however, when attempting to explain how (or whether) Plato can 
coherently endorse both conceptions of the soul. 
The prevailing interpretation resolves this puzzle by maintaining that Plato’s 
account of the soul develops over the course of his written works. Perhaps Plato is merely 
recording the Socratic view in dialogues like the Protagoras, where he seems to treat the 
soul as simple and reinterprets putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance; 
perhaps Plato himself only later came to recognize, in dialogues like the Republic, that the 
soul is something composite. Whatever the explanation, most adherents of this interpretive 
strategy think that Plato’s account develops for the better, at least insofar as the composite 
soul seems better-suited to explain the phenomenon of psychic conflict.2 
 
2 Cooper (1984) p. 91 captures the common view well when he writes: “That Plato in the Republic is self-
consciously rejecting this Socratic theory is by now well accepted; and most philosophical readers no doubt 
agree that the Republic’s theory is a distinct improvement.” Other proponents of this ‘common view’ include 
Brickhouse and Smith (1994), Bobonich (2007), Irwin (1977, 1995), Lorenz (2006), Moss (2014), Penner 
 4 
  
The thesis that Plato’s account of the soul develops over the course of his written 
works is characteristic of so-called ‘developmentalist’ readings of Plato. According to 
developmentalist readings, Plato’s views significantly develop over the course of his life, 
and these developments in his thought are recorded in his writings. Such developmentalist 
readings are often contrasted with so-called ‘unitarian’ readings of Plato, according to 
which his views remain more-or-less consistent throughout his life and throughout his 
writings.3 Since developmentalist readings rely on certain orderings of the dialogues, a 
brief word on chronology is in order. 
 
§2 CHRONOLOGY 
 
The first comprehensive study of stylistic changes in the works of Plato was 
completed by Lewis Campbell in 1896.4 This study assigned every dialogue to one of three 
groups on the basis of measurable stylistic differences. These stylistic differences were also 
believed to have chronological significance. Dialogues most closely resembling the Laws 
in style were placed in the ‘late’ group, while those dialogues most closely resembling the 
Republic in style were placed in the ‘middle’ group.5 All other dialogues were placed in 
the ‘early’ group. But within each of these three groups no further attempt was made to 
order the dialogues, as there was considered to be no principled way to do so. These early 
 
(1992), Reeve (1992), and Vlastos (1988). 
3 In addition to developmentalist and unitarian readings, some scholars recognize ‘revisionist’ readings. Frede 
(2017) helpfully disambiguates these three readings as follows: “Whereas unitarians regard the dialogues as 
pieces of one mosaic, and take the view that Plato in essence maintains a unified doctrine from his earliest to 
his latest works, revisionists maintain that Plato’s thought underwent a fundamental transformation later in 
his life, while developmentalists hold that Plato’s views evolved significantly throughout his career.” 
4 See Kahn (2002) for an excellent discussion of the history, merits, and limitations of Platonic chronology. 
5 Diogenes Laertius (III.37) suggests that the Laws was the last work Plato ever wrote. The significance of 
the Republic is taken to be that it is a dialogue on an entirely new scale. 
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stylometric results were later bolstered by scholars such as Ritter, Dittenberger, and more 
recently, Brandwood.6 
However, the analysis of stylistic development in the dialogues of Plato has not 
been the sole method for determining chronology. Other scholars have attempted to order 
the dialogues by grouping them according to what they believe to be philosophical 
developments in Plato’s thought. It is this latter method that is more characteristic of 
modern developmentalist readings—and so it is worth distinguishing this method from the 
former. While these latter sorts of developmentalist chronologies, like the former stylistic 
chronologies, group the dialogues according to a threefold division of early, middle and 
late—their pronouncements about ordering are far more substantive. This is because they 
attempt to order the dialogues within each grouping, according to what they take to be 
certain philosophical developments in Plato’s thought. In this regard, such chronologies 
are far more substantive, and far outstrip the measurable stylometric results that had served 
to justify the original threefold grouping.7 
Now, although my own reading of Plato leans unitarian, I am prepared to concede 
at least this much to the developmentalist: in the pages that follow, I assume and adopt an 
uncontroversial ordering of canonical dialogues. By this I mean that all of the dialogues 
that I engage with are widely held to be genuine works of Plato, and the order in which I 
engage with them is consistent with any commonly accepted developmentalist 
chronology—of either the stylistic or philosophical variety. I also wish to be clear that I 
 
6 See Brandwood (1990). Again, see Kahn (2002) for an excellent discussion of the history of stylometry. 
7 Kahn (2002) p. 96: “the traditional developmentalist who recognizes that the stylistic division is 
chronological must simply accept the fact that Plato’s stylistic and philosophical developments do not 
proceed at the same pace.” 
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will not be endeavoring to read ‘later’ dialogues back into ‘earlier’ dialogues; I only aim 
to demonstrate that the accounts found in the various dialogues I examine are not 
inconsistent or incompatible with one another. 
By taking these developmentalist assumptions on board, I aim to forestall any 
objection to the effect that my interpretation has been built upon the sand: that I have fatally 
erred, or at least committed a serious interpretive faux pas, by adopting a haphazard or 
heretical ordering; that I have naively assumed that the dialogues can be unproblematically 
interpreted synchronically; or that I have failed to provide (or worse, fail to possess) 
sufficient justification for analyzing them in the order that I do. But, in having made this 
concession, I also wish to shift the interpretive burden away from the unitarian and toward 
the developmentalist by demonstrating that my reading not only makes better philosophical 
sense of the texts in question, but also dispenses with the need to attribute any change of 
mind to Plato. If there is anything to recommend in Shorey’s proposal that we “assume 
contradiction or serious alteration in Plato’s thought only in default of a rational [...] 
explanation of the variation in the form of its expression,”8 then, in having provided such 
an explanation, I will have thereby undermined the chief consideration favoring a 
developmentalist reading.9 The developmentalist can no longer maintain that their reading 
is the most charitable way of interpreting Plato. 
Against the developmentalist, then, I argue that Plato’s account of the soul did not 
undergo any sort of radical development, and that his various treatments of psychic conflict 
 
8 Shorey (1903) p. 5: “If we are anxious to find out inconsistencies in appearance, we shall find them in 
abundance.” 
9 Annas (1985) p. 7: “I have found more and more to doubt in the orthodox modern ways of reading Plato 
[…] There are many signs that the orthodox, developmental reading of Plato is crumbling in places and losing 
its unquestioned dominance.” 
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are not incompatible. This can be seen most clearly by focusing on his account of self-
mastery, which features centrally in virtually all such discussions. My examination of self-
mastery helps to explain why Plato variously treats the soul as simple and composite, but 
it also eventuates in a deeper understanding of his account of the self and of self-
knowledge, and yields substantive insights into the so-called Socratic Paradoxes: that 
virtue is wisdom or knowledge, and that all of the virtues form a unity. 
 
§3 OVERVIEW 
 
In chapter one, I focus on self-mastery as it is treated in the Protagoras, the Phaedo, 
and the Republic. I argue that Socrates consistently maintains that someone is self-mastered 
whenever they are ruled by reason. Although Socrates does not explicitly treat the soul as 
something composite in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo, the discussion of self-mastery 
in the Republic leads directly to the suggestion that the soul has parts (430e6–431b1). 
While this might seem like a genuine (and perhaps inconsistent) development, I go on to 
argue that it is not. 
In the final book of the Republic, Socrates corrects what he thinks could have been 
an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite structure. The 
account of various ‘parts’ is only perspicuous, Socrates now claims, when the soul is 
analyzed in its embodied state. When the soul is disembodied, its true nature, and whether 
it is something simple or composite, promises to become manifest. What Socrates strongly 
suggests is that the disembodied, immortal soul is simply the rational part of the embodied 
soul (611e1–612a8). If this suggestion is correct, then the account of the soul found in the 
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Republic is not as obviously incompatible with the view of the soul found in the Protagoras 
or the Phaedo as many scholars have supposed. 
In chapter two, I focus on the Timaeus, where the tantalizing suggestion from the 
final book of the Republic is taken up and further developed. The lower two parts of the 
embodied soul are now explicitly said to be mortal, while the rational part alone is said to 
be both divine and immortal (69c6–70b9). I proceed to unpack the way in which the 
immortal rational soul is ultimately identified with a divine intellect (νο૨ς). This divine 
intellect not only rules the entire cosmos, but should ultimately come to rule in each human 
soul (42a2). I subsequently outline the way in which the human soul is supposed to 
assimilate itself to this divine intellect, and so become self-mastered. 
In chapter three, I bring the analysis of the previous two chapters to bear on the 
discussion of self-mastery in Plato’s final work, the Laws. Self-mastery is once again 
glossed as the rule of reason—but self-mastery is now also said to issue in virtue (645b1). 
After discussing a related dilemma about virtue that has exercised recent commentators, I 
provide a novel resolution to it that turns on a careful analysis of self-mastery and the virtue 
of moderation. I subsequently argue that the account of the soul that Plato develops in this 
final work is consistent with his earlier treatments by examining an additional set of 
arguments that aim to establish that the immortal rational soul is both the natural ruler of 
all things, and ultimately who we really are (959a4). 
In chapter four, I return to the Protagoras. The analysis undertaken in the prior 
chapters helps to illuminate many of the issues surrounding the discussion of virtue and 
self-mastery in this dialogue. In particular, it helps to shed light on why Socrates argues 
that all of the virtues form a unity, and why the difficulties Protagoras raises ultimately 
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occasion an argument that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. It also explains why Socrates 
would claim that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom or knowledge (358c3). With 
all of this place, it is finally possible to answer the interpretive question with which we 
began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of 
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance, and what happens to this account in light of the 
argument for soul-partitioning found in the Republic? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
SELF-MASTERY & PSYCHIC CONFLICT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Republic, Socrates divides the soul into three parts: appetite, spirit, and 
reason. He tells us that whenever we find ourselves pulled in opposing directions with 
respect to one and the same thing, it is because these parts of our soul are engaged in 
conflict (439c5). To help illustrate this point, he relates the story of Leontius, who happens 
upon a pile of corpses lying near the side of the road (439e8). Leontius has an appetite to 
look at these corpses, but he reasons that this appetite is base and should not be indulged 
(439e9). Obedient to reason, he persists for a time in averting his eyes. Eventually, 
however, he is overcome by his perverse appetite (440a1).10 Upon looking at the corpses, 
Leontius angrily reproaches himself. 
This story is supposed to illustrate a paradigm case of psychic conflict: Leontius 
both wants to look and does not want to look at the corpses. He is conflicted: he is described 
as struggling with himself (439e10) and fighting an internal civil war (440b2).11 This is 
supposed to be because his appetite and his reason are pulling him in opposite directions.12 
But the mere fact that Socrates is prepared to countenance this sort of psychic conflict in 
the Republic is puzzling. It is puzzling because in another well-known dialogue, the 
Protagoras, Socrates works hard to reinterpret such putative cases of psychic conflict as, 
instead, cases of ignorance (353c5–357e10). 
 
10 Appetite is described as “forcing (βιάζωνταί) him contrary to reason (παρ੹ τઁν λογισμόν)” (440b1). 
11 Cf. Laws 644d7–645b1 
12 Cf. Republic 431a6–b1 
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How should we handle this apparent inconsistency? For the better part of a century, 
most commentators have simply embraced it by adopting a ‘developmentalist’ reading of 
Plato.13 According to this sort of reading, the accounts found in Protagoras and the 
Republic are indeed inconsistent. One reason for this inconsistency is supposed to be that 
Plato’s view of the soul develops. In the Protagoras, the soul seems to be presented as 
though it were something simple, and so incapable of internal conflict.14 In the Republic, 
by contrast, the soul is presented as something composite. The partitioning of the soul is 
supposed to be what allows Socrates to finally countenance the possibility of psychic 
conflict: the various parts of the soul can now conflict with one another, in just the way 
that the story of Leontius illustrates. 
I wish to reject this developmentalist reading of Plato. I argue, instead, that Plato’s 
account of the soul remains consistent across dialogues. I demonstrate this by undertaking 
a sustained examination of self-mastery (τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨). Self-mastery is a concept 
well-suited to this project because it is treated consistently across dialogues, and features 
centrally in discussions of psychic conflict. In this chapter, I focus on self-mastery as it is 
treated in the Protagoras (§1), the Phaedo (§2), and the Republic (§3).15 I demonstrate that, 
in all three dialogues, Socrates consistently describes the person who exhibits self-mastery 
as someone ruled by reason or knowledge. Although Socrates does not explicitly treat the 
soul as something composite in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo, the discussion of self-
 
13 Brickhouse and Smith (1994) pp. 90n25, 98n35; Bobonich (2007) p. xv; Cooper (1984) p. 3; Irwin (1977) 
p. 191, (1995) p. 209; Lorenz (2006) p. 28; Moss (2014) p. 36; Penner (1992) p. 129; Reeve (1992) pp. xi, 
113n9; and Vlastos (1988) pp. 105–6. Notable exceptions include Shields (2001, 2007); Gerson (2006, 2014); 
Kahn (1987, 2004); and Carone (2001) 
14 Cf. Frede (1992), p. xxx 
15 Cf. Phaedo 80a1; Protagoras 353c5; Republic 431d3 
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mastery in the Republic leads more-or-less directly to soul-partitioning. While this might 
seem like a departure from the earlier Socratic view, I go on to demonstrate that it is not. 
In the final book of the Republic, Socrates corrects what he thinks could have been 
an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite structure. The 
account of various ‘parts’ is only perspicuous, Socrates now claims, when the soul is 
analyzed in its embodied state (612a6). When the soul is stripped of its corporeal 
accretions, its true nature, and whether it is something simple or composite, promises to 
become manifest (612a5). What Socrates strongly suggests is that the disembodied, 
immortal soul is simply the rational part of the embodied soul (611e1–612a8). If this 
suggestion is correct, then the account of the soul found in the Republic is not as obviously 
incompatible with view of the soul found in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo as many 
scholars have supposed. 
 
§1 THE PROTAGORAS 
 
In the Protagoras, Socrates famously claims that those who possess knowledge will 
unfailingly act on it. However, he does not think that the majority of people will agree. He 
offers the following description of what most people think about knowledge: 
 
Most people think this way about it, that it is not powerful (ο੝κ ੁσχυρόν), neither a master 
nor a ruler (ο੝δ’ ਲγεμονικઁν ο੝δ’ ἀρχικઁν εੇναι). They do not think of it in that way at all, 
but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a person, what rules (ਙρχειν) 
them is not knowledge but rather anything else, sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, 
sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of it as being utterly dragged 
around by these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to 
you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing, capable of ruling a person, and 
that if someone were to know what is good and bad, then they would not be forced by 
anything to act (πράττειν) otherwise than knowledge dictates (ਥπιστήμη κελεύૉ), and 
wisdom (φρόνησιν) would be sufficient to save them? (352b3–c7)16 
 
16 δοκε૙ δ੻ το૙ς πολλο૙ς περ੿ ਥπιστήμης τοιο૨τόν τι, ο੝κ ੁσχυρઁν ο੝δ’ ਲγεμονικઁν ο੝δ’ ἀρχικઁν εੇναι· ο੝δ੻ 
੪ς περ੿ τοιούτου α੝το૨ ੕ντος διανοο૨νται, ἀλλ’ ਥνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπ૳ ਥπιστήμης ο੝ τ੽ν ਥπιστήμην 
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Protagoras grants that the many think of knowledge in this way, but he sides with Socrates, 
against the popular view, in maintaining that “wisdom and knowledge (σοφίαν κα੿ 
ਥπιστήμην) are the most powerful (κράτιστον) forces in human activity” (352d1).17 
Socrates proceeds to explain why the majority of people will remain unconvinced: 
 
They maintain that most people are unwilling to do (ο੝κ ਥθέλειν πράττειν) what is best, 
even though they know what it is and are able (ਥξઁν α੝το૙ς) to do it. And when I have 
asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are 
being overcome (ਲττωμένους) by pleasure or pain or are being mastered (κρατουμένους) 
by the things I referred to just now. (352d4–e2)18 
 
 
Socrates and Protagoras maintain that if someone possesses knowledge, then they cannot 
be forced to act against its decrees. The many deny this by appealing to an ostensibly clear-
cut case of psychic conflict: one can know what is best and be capable of acting on that 
knowledge, while nevertheless remaining unwilling to do it. They describe this failure to 
act on their knowledge as the experience of ‘being overcome.’ What they mean by this, 
Socrates conjectures, is that they are “being mastered (κρατούμενοι) by pleasant things like 
food, drink and sex, all the while knowing that these things are ruinous” (353c5). 
 
α੝το૨ ਙρχειν ἀλλ’ ਙλλο τι, τοτ੻ μ੻ν θυμόν, τοτ੻ δ੻ ਲδονήν, τοτ੻ δ੻ λύπην, ਥνίοτε δ੻ ਩ρωτα, πολλάκις δ੻ 
φόβον, ἀτεχν૵ς διανοούμενοι περ੿ τોς ਥπιστήμης ੮σπερ περ੿ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν ਙλλων 
ਖπάντων. ਛρ’ ο੣ν κα੿ σο੿ τοιο૨τόν τι περ੿ α੝τોς δοκε૙, ਲ਼ καλόν τε εੇναι ਲ ਥπιστήμη κα੿ οੈον ਙρχειν το૨ 
ἀνθρώπου, κα੿ ਥάνπερ γιγνώσκૉ τις τἀγαθ੹ κα੿ τ੹ κακά, μ੽ ਗν κρατηθોναι ਫ਼πઁ μηδενઁς ੮στε ਙλλ’ ਙττα 
πράττειν ਲ਼ ਘν ਥπιστήμη κελεύૉ, ἀλλ’ ੂκαν੽ν εੇναι τ੽ν φρόνησιν βοηθε૙ν τ૶ ἀνθρώπ૳;  
All Greek texts sourced from Burnet (ed.) Platonis Opera, 7 vols. (1900–7) and compiled by the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae. Translations: Protagoras (1992) Lombardo and Bell; Phaedo (2002) Grube, revised by 
Cooper; Republic (1992) Grube, revised by Reeve; Timaeus (2000) Zeyl; Sophist (1993) White; Laws I-II 
(2015) Meyer; Laws III-XII (2016) Schofield, and occasionally (1970) Saunders. Translations often altered 
for consistency with terminology in the present work. 
17 πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εੇναι τ૵ν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων 
18 ἀλλ੹ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τ੹ βέλτιστα ο੝κ ਥθέλειν πράττειν, ਥξઁν α੝το૙ς, ἀλλ੹ ਙλλα πράττειν· κα੿ 
੖σους δ੽ ਥγઅ ਱ρόμην ੖τι ποτε α੅τιόν ਥστι τούτου, ਫ਼πઁ ਲδονોς φασιν ਲττωμένους ਲ਼ λύπης ਲ਼ ੰν νυνδ੽ ਥγઅ 
਩λεγον ਫ਼πό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους τα૨τα ποιε૙ν τοઃς ποιο૨ντας. 
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Socrates recognizes that if he is to defend the efficacy of knowledge, then he must 
provide an alternative account of the experience that the many call ‘being overcome.’ The 
importance of this alternative account should not be understated: Socrates claims that “it is 
upon this very point that all the arguments rest” (355a1). Central to this account is Socrates’ 
claim that someone cannot act against what they take to be best at the very moment they 
choose to act: 
 
[N]o one who knows (εੁδώς) or believes (οੁόμενος) there is something else better than what 
they are doing, something possible, will go on doing what they have been doing when they 
could be doing what is better. Self-defeat (τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι) is nothing other than ignorance 
(ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία). 
(358b8–c5)19 
 
 
This point is simply an application of Socrates’ more basic conviction that: 
 
[N]o one goes willingly (ਦκઅν ਩ρχεται) toward the bad or what they believe (ο੅εται) to be 
bad; neither is it in human nature (ਥν ἀνθρώπου φύσει) to wish (ਥθέλειν) to go toward what 
one believes (ο੅εται) to be bad instead of toward the good. (358c10–d3)20 
 
If it is not ‘in human nature’ to go toward the bad rather than the good, then if someone 
recognizes that their chosen course of action was worse than some other course of action 
available to them (which is the experience the many call ‘being overcome’) it is because 
they did not actually know or believe it was worse. Far from their reasoned judgement 
being overcome by some opposing psychic force, their experience seems better described 
as a case of ignorance.21 Yet in order to respect the undeniable fact that it surely seems as 
 
19 ο੝δε੿ς ο੡τε εੁδઅς ο੡τε οੁόμενος ਙλλα βελτίω εੇναι ਲ਼ ਘ ποιε૙, κα੿ δυνατά, ਩πειτα ποιε૙ τα૨τα, ਥξઁν τ੹ 
βελτίω· ο੝δ੻ τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι αਫ਼το૨ ਙλλο τι το૨τ’ ਥστ੿ν ਲ਼ ἀμαθία, ο੝δ੻ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨ ਙλλο τι ਲ਼ σοφία. 
20 ਡλλο τι ο੣ν, ਩φην ਥγώ, ਥπί γε τ੹ κακ੹ ο੝δε੿ς ਦκઅν ਩ρχεται ο੝δ੻ ਥπ੿ ਘ ο੅εται κακ੹ εੇναι, ο੝δ’ ਩στι το૨το, 
੪ς ਩οικεν, ਥν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ਥπ੿ ਘ ο੅εται κακ੹ εੇναι ਥθέλειν ੁέναι ἀντ੿ τ૵ν ἀγαθ૵ν· 
21 Cf. Protagoras 358c7 
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though people often do other than what they know or believe to be best, Socrates grants 
that people must believe that there is some better course of action both before and after the 
regretted action is performed. 
This seems to be the account: at some time prior to the moment of action, a person 
correctly believes that X is better than Y. However, when certain pleasures related to Y are 
close at hand, this person succumbs to them. They now believe that Y is better than X, and 
they act on this belief. At some later time, after the action is performed, they regain the 
correct belief that X is better than Y, and so come to regret the completed action.22 On this 
sort of account, no one acts against what they believe to be best—it is just that, at the very 
moment of action, people often substitute a correct belief about what is best for an incorrect 
belief about what is best.23 
Why do we lose correct beliefs at the crucial moment of action? Socrates suggests 
that it is because different (and even incompatible) actions can seem or appear best to us at 
different times. I might think that going to the gym early tomorrow morning is the best 
course of action now, but I might think that sleeping in is the best course of action tomorrow 
morning, when my bed is comfortable and warm, and the room is chilly. What this suggests 
is that our temporal proximity to the pleasures and pains related to certain courses of action 
can impact our beliefs about which of them is best. Socrates bolsters this suggestion by 
likening our experience of things at a temporal distance to our experience of things at a 
spatial distance: 
 
22 Brickhouse and Smith (2002, 2005), Devereux (1995), Penner (1996, 1997) Shields (2001, 2007) and 
Singpurwalla (2006) all endorse this interpretation of Socrates’ re-description of ‘being overcome.’ 
23 Scholars have also distinguished between synchronic and diachronic akrasia (Brickhouse and Smith, 
Penner, Price), between narrow akrasia and implementation failure (Shields), and between knowledge-
akrasia and belief-akrasia (Penner). 
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Do the same magnitudes appear to our sight larger when close at hand, smaller when farther 
away, or not? [...] And similarly for thicknesses and pluralities? And equal sounds seem 
greater when close at hand, and lesser when farther away? (356c5–8)24 
 
 
Socrates thinks that just as things that are far away can appear smaller than they really are, 
the pleasures or pains related to some distant action can appear less potent than they really 
are; and just as objects that are closer to us can appear larger than they really are, the 
pleasures or pains related to some present action can appear more potent than they really 
are.25 These sorts of distortions can (and often do) affect our views about which course of 
action is best. 
How is knowledge supposed to save us from these sorts of distortions? Well, 
Socrates insists that people who have a measuring craft, which he characterizes as a kind 
of knowledge (357b4), won’t be deceived by these distortions, since their knowledge will 
prevent them from ever mistaking the way things appear for the way they really are.26 The 
thought is simple: if we measure, say, the size of some object, we will not be deceived into 
thinking that it is larger than it really is when it happens to be near at hand, or smaller than 
it really is when it happens to be far away. Possessing this knowledge of measurement 
would effectively remove the power of appearances. As Socrates puts the point: 
 
If our doing well consisted in doing and taking large quantities, and avoiding and not doing 
small ones, what would be the salvation for our life? The measuring craft (ਲ μετρητικ੽ 
τέχνη) or the power of appearance (ਲ το૨ φαινομένου δύναμις)? The power of appearance 
makes us wander and exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret our 
actions and choices with respect to the large and the small. But the craft of measurement 
would make the appearance powerless by showing the truth (τઁ ἀληθές), and remaining in 
 
24 φαίνεται ਫ਼μ૙ν τૌ ੕ψει τ੹ α੝τ੹ μεγέθη ਥγγύθεν μ੻ν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δ੻ ਥλάττω· ਲ਼ ο੡; […] Κα੿ τ੹ παχέα 
κα੿ τ੹ πολλ੹ ੪σαύτως; κα੿ αੂ φωνα੿ αੂ ੅σαι ਥγγύθεν μ੻ν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δ੻ σμικρότεραι; 
25 Cf. Singpurwalla (2006) p. 246: “the temporal proximity of pleasures or pains often distorts our estimation 
of their worth.” 
26 I am indebted to Singpurwalla (2006), Moss (2008), and Callard (2014) for this general point. 
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the truth the soul would have peace, and so this craft would save our lives. (356c8–e1)27 
 
 
Socrates thinks that knowledge guarantees that we hold on to correct beliefs in the face of 
appearances which conflict with them.28 So individuals with knowledge will never have 
the experience of losing—at the crucial moment of action—the correct belief about which 
course of action is best. 
 But what about those who lack this knowledge? If only those who possess the 
measuring craft are immune to the power of appearance, then anyone lacking the 
knowledge of this craft would be susceptible to their distorting effects. Indeed, appearances 
are said to be so powerful that anyone failing to possess the measuring craft will inevitably 
“exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret [their] actions and 
choices.” What Socrates seems to suggest is that, while being taken in by deceptive 
appearances is impossible for those who possess knowledge, it is a ubiquitous experience 
for those who lack knowledge. 
What cognitive state is ascribed to those without knowledge? Recall that, on 
Socrates’ account, everyone unfailingly acts in accordance with what they either know or 
believe to be best (358c3, 358d1). Socrates argues that knowledge is so powerful because 
it infallibly discerns what is actually best, and so renders those who possess it immune to 
the distorting power of appearances. Knowledge is thus sufficient for right action, or virtue 
(356e1). So it follows that what the many are unreflectively describing as their knowledge 
 
27 Εੁ ο੣ν ਥν τούτ૳ ਲμ૙ν ਷ν τઁ ε੣ πράττειν, ਥν τ૶ τ੹ μ੻ν μεγάλα μήκη κα੿ πράττειν κα੿ λαμβάνειν, τ੹ δ੻ 
σμικρ੹ κα੿ φεύγειν κα੿ μ੽ πράττειν, τίς ਗν ਲμ૙ν σωτηρία ਥφάνη το૨ βίου; ਛρα ਲ μετρητικ੽ τέχνη ਲ਼ ਲ το૨ 
φαινομένου δύναμις; ਲ਼ α੢τη μ੻ν ਲμ઼ς ਥπλάνα κα੿ ਥποίει ਙνω τε κα੿ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν τα੝τ੹ 
κα੿ μεταμέλειν κα੿ ਥν τα૙ς πράξεσιν κα੿ ਥν τα૙ς αੂρέσεσιν τ૵ν μεγάλων τε κα੿ σμικρ૵ν, ਲ δ੻ μετρητικ੽ 
ਙκυρον μ੻ν ਗν ਥποίησε το૨το τઁ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δ੻ τઁ ἀληθ੻ς ਲσυχίαν ਗν ਥποίησεν ਩χειν τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν 
μένουσαν ਥπ੿ τ૶ ἀληθε૙ κα੿ ਩σωσεν ਗν τઁν βίον; 
28 Knowledge is not said to remove the appearances; it simply makes them powerless. 
 18 
  
being overcome is, in fact, something else. The only other cognitive state Socrates seems 
to countenance is belief.  
Now belief, unlike knowledge, is fallible. Someone who merely possesses belief 
would thus be susceptible to the distorting power of appearances. For example, suppose 
that someone possesses the (true) belief that going to the gym tomorrow morning is the 
best course of action. In the morning, however, they succumb to the pleasure of their warm 
bed and so ‘exchange’ the (true) belief that going to the gym is the best course of action 
for the (false) belief that remaining in bed is the best course of action. They later regain 
their (true) belief that going to the gym was in fact best, and so regret sleeping in.  
Yet even if this experience could be properly described as ‘being overcome’ by the 
pleasure of a warm bed, the fact remains that whenever someone acts on a false belief about 
what is best, they are not in that moment conflicted, but simply mistaken (357d9). At the 
crucial moment of action, they were ignorant.29 Regardless of whether people possesses 
belief or knowledge, then, absolutely no one can be described as acting in one way while 
simultaneously thinking that they should act in another way. No one, that is, can act against 
their reasoned judgement of what is best at the very moment they act.30 
 
29 Cf. Protagoras 358c7: “Well, then, do you say that ignorance is to have a false belief and be deceived 
about matters of importance?” See also Protagoras 357e3: “So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’ 
is—ignorance in the highest degree.” 
30 Insofar as someone can properly be described as being conflicted, it can only be before they choose to act. 
When they act, they believe the chosen course of action is best. But before they act, being conflicted might 
be glossed in several ways. (1) It might be that they are vacillating between beliefs about different, and 
possibly incompatible, courses of action. Yet this is a somewhat implausible explanation, since the closer 
pleasures are in time, the larger or more potent they seem to become. It is not as though the pleasures would 
vacillate between appearing smaller and larger since—insofar as they are approaching in time—they are only 
getting larger. (2) It might instead be that we can hold on to our true belief that the pleasure should be avoided 
for a while, lose that belief for a moment, regain it at some later moment, and then lose it again. But there is 
no principled explanation, as far as I can see, for why that should be the case. (3) More plausibly, it might be 
that we can stand firm in our belief that the pleasure should be resisted for a time, begin to lose credence in 
that belief as the pleasures related to an alternative course of action appear to get larger or more potent, and 
finally succumb to the pleasure and so lose our true belief. If this is correct, then Socrates would seem to (a) 
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So we now have a better sense of why Socrates thinks that ‘self-defeat’ is nothing 
other than ignorance and ‘self-mastery’ is nothing other than wisdom (358c3). On the one 
hand, since beliefs are susceptible to the distorting power of appearances, they can 
sometimes be false or mistaken. Whenever someone is self-defeated, it will turn out that 
they were acting on a false or mistaken belief: they acted from ignorance. On the other 
hand, since knowledge is immune to the distorting power of appearances, someone who 
possesses knowledge will never be taken in by them. Whenever someone is self-mastered, 
it will turn out that they were either acting from knowledge, or at least from true belief.31 
Finally, it is worth reemphasizing that, on such an account, all actions are the result of 
reasoned judgements of one variety or another.32 Socrates thus appears to argue in the 
Protagoras as if the soul were simple or wholly rational.33 As we will see in the next 
section, Socrates continues to argue this way in the Phaedo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
deny both synchronic knowledge-akrasia and synchronic belief-akrasia, (b) countenance diachronic belief-
akrasia, and (c) deny diachronic knowledge-akrasia. 
31Indeed, in the Meno (98b1–c1), knowledge and true belief are said to be equivalent in their practical effects 
on behavior. However, Socrates in the Republic (506c7) offers us a clue about why he might have neglected 
this option in the Protagoras: “Haven’t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are shameful and ugly 
things? The best of them are blind—or do you think that those who express a true belief without knowledge 
are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?” In a word: although someone would 
indeed be self-mastered whenever they act on a true belief, their self-mastery would not be worth very much. 
This is because true beliefs have a tendency to wander off, and so the sort of self-mastery exhibited by such 
a person would not be reliable. Much more will be said about this in the chapters that follow. 
32 Even if all actions are the result of reasoned judgments, it may nevertheless be the case that desires attend 
those reasoned judgments. See Kahn (1987), Moss (2008), and Singpurwalla (2018) for convincing 
arguments that desires attend reasoned judgments about value. If they are right about this, and I think that 
they are, then Socrates countenances both cognitive and motivational conflict in the Protagoras, even if he 
is not prepared to countenance psychic conflict. 
33 Cf. Frede (1992) p. xxx 
 20 
  
§2 THE PHAEDO 
 
According to developmentalist readings of Plato, the Phaedo was likely written 
some time after the Protagoras.34 The Socrates of the Phaedo continues to treat the soul as 
though it were simple or wholly rational (78c1, 80b8). Unlike the Socrates of Protagoras, 
however, the Socrates of the Phaedo now marks a distinction between the embodied and 
disembodied soul.35 This distinction, it should be noted, is worked out in contexts where 
discussions of self-mastery are again at the fore. As I will demonstrate, an examination of 
the soul and of self-mastery in the Phaedo not only helps to shed light on the account of 
the soul found in the Protagoras, but also turns out to be propaedeutic to the argument for 
soul-partitioning found in the Republic. 
 
2.1 Soul & Body 
In the Phaedo, Socrates offers a sustained argument for the immortality of the soul. 
He notes that the primary aim of those who practice philosophy correctly is preparation for 
death. Death, according to Socrates, is nothing other than the separation of the soul from 
the body (64c5). One way in which philosophers, or lovers of wisdom, prepare for death is 
by actively “turning away from the body toward the soul” (64e4). Evidence of this ‘turning 
away’ can be found in their lack of interest in the attainment and enjoyment of bodily 
pleasures, the chief examples of which are the pleasures of food, drink and sex (64d3–7). 
These, of course, are the very same pleasures that the many had claimed to be ‘overcome 
 
34 It is often credited as the earliest dialogue to contain what F.M. Cornford (1957) famously dubbed the 
‘twin pillars’ of Platonism: the doctrine of the forms and the immortality of the soul. The presence of these 
doctrines are often taken as evidence of a genuine philosophical development in the Phaedo—indicating that 
it was written after the Protagoras, which contains no explicit treatment of, or reference to, either doctrine. 
35 The contrast between soul and body can also be found in the Protagoras. Cf. Protagoras 312c1, 313a2–
314b3, 326b1, 337c1, 351a2 
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by’ in the Protagoras (353c5). In the Phaedo, however, these pleasures are now relegated 
to the body. 
Such bodily pleasures, and indeed the body itself, are considered by the lovers of 
wisdom to be a positive hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge (65b1). There are two 
reasons for this. First, there is no truth in the bodily senses: they are inaccurate, imprecise 
and often deceptive. Second, knowledge can be grasped by reason alone, which is now said 
to belong exclusively to the soul (65b7–c2). Indeed, Socrates claims that “the soul reasons 
best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, 
but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and, as far as possible, having no 
contact or association with it in its search for being” (65c5). The body is presented as a 
hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge, in part, because the bodily senses are incapable 
of grasping the truth (66a1) and, in part, because the pleasures of the body, which are 
enjoyed through the senses, often distract the soul in its pursuit of knowledge (66a5). These 
sorts of considerations lead philosophers to reason as follows: 
 
There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as 
long as we have a body (τઁ σ૵μα ਩χωμεν) and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall 
never adequately attain what we desire (ο੝ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ੂκαν૵ς ο੤ ਥπιθυμο૨μεν), 
which we affirm to be the truth (τઁ ἀληθές). The body keeps us busy in a thousand ways 
[…] It fills us with wants (ਥρώτων), desires (ਥπιθυμι૵ν), fears (φόβων), all sorts of illusions 
(εੁδώλων παντοδαπ૵ν) and nonsense, so that, as it is said both in truth and in fact no 
wisdom (φρονોσαι) of any kind ever comes to us from the body […] and it is the body and 
the care of it, to which we are enslaved (δουλεύοντες). (66b2–d2)36 
  
  
 
36 Κινδυνεύει τοι ੮σπερ ἀτραπός τις ਥκφέρειν ਲμ઼ς [μετ੹ το૨ λόγου ਥν τૌ σκέψει], ੖τι, ਪως ਗν τઁ σ૵μα 
਩χωμεν κα੿ συμπεφυρμένη ઝ ਲμ૵ν ਲ ψυχ੽ μετ੹ τοιούτου κακο૨, ο੝ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ੂκαν૵ς ο੤ 
ਥπιθυμο૨μεν· φαμ੻ν δ੻ το૨το εੇναι τઁ ἀληθές. Μυρίας μ੻ν γ੹ρ ਲμ૙ν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τઁ σ૵μα […] ਥρώτων 
δ੻ κα੿ ਥπιθυμι૵ν κα੿ φόβων κα੿ εੁδώλων παντοδαπ૵ν κα੿ φλυαρίας ਥμπίμπλησιν ਲμ઼ς πολλોς, ੮στε τઁ 
λεγόμενον ੪ς ἀληθ૵ς τ૶ ੕ντι ਫ਼π’ α੝το૨ ο੝δ੻ φρονોσαι ਲμ૙ν ਥγγίγνεται ο੝δέποτε ο੝δέν. […] δι੹ τઁ σ૵μα, 
δουλεύοντες τૌ τούτου θεραπεί઺ 
 22 
  
The body is now held to be the source of the passions that distract us in a thousand ways 
and even enslave us. Philosophers throw off the shackles of embodiment by “separating 
the soul as far as possible from the body” (67c6). They do this by “accustoming it to gather 
itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can” 
(67d1). This concerted effort to separate the soul from the body is the kind of ‘death’ that 
philosophers actively pursue while they are alive. 
This active pursuit of death is contrasted with the sort of pursuits that people who 
avoid and resent death engage in—the pursuit of things like money or fame. Socrates refers 
to the people who pursue such things as the lovers “of wealth or of honor, either or both” 
(68c1). In the Republic, of course, the lover of wisdom, the lover of honor, and the lover 
of wealth show up as three distinct character-types corresponding to the three distinct parts 
of the soul (435d7–436a2). Here in the Phaedo, however, the lovers of wealth and the 
lovers of honor are jointly characterized as ‘lovers of the body’ (68c1). So much for an 
initial unpacking of the distinction between soul and body. 
 
2.2 Disembodiment & Embodiment 
When Socrates later returns to his examination of the relationship between soul and 
body (79b1), he is mainly concerned to distinguish the soul in its disembodied state from 
the soul in its embodied state. This distinction is cashed out in both ontological and 
epistemological language: 
 
When the soul investigates itself by itself (α੝τ੽ καθ’ αਫ਼τήν) it passes into the realm of 
what is pure, eternal, immortal and unchanging, and being akin (੪ς συγγεν੽ς ο੣σα) to this, 
it always stays with it whenever it is itself by itself (α੝τ੽ καθ’ αਫ਼τήν) and can do so; it 
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ceases to stray and it remains in the same state, as it is in touch (ਥφαπτομένη) with things 
of the same kind, and its experience is what we call wisdom (φρόνησις). (79d1–5)37 
 
 
When the soul leaves behind the body in its investigations and passes “itself by itself” into 
the realm of what is immortal, it is then in touch with an unchanging reality. Its grasp of 
this pure, unchanging reality is characterized as wisdom or knowledge. However, when the 
soul “makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or 
some other sense” (79c3) it is dragged down by the body toward things which are never 
the same, and so the soul becomes confused, as though it were drunk (79c8). Its cognitive 
grasp of this impure, ever-changing world is characterized as belief.38  
So both knowledge and belief are characterized as cognitive states of the soul, much 
as they were in the Protagoras. Here, however, we learn that knowledge is the result of the 
reasoning that the soul engages in ‘itself by itself’ (65b7–c2, 79d1), while belief is the 
result of the type of reasoning that the soul engages in when it ‘makes use of the body’ 
(65b1, 66a4, 79c8).39 The epistemic superiority enjoyed by the soul that possesses 
knowledge (as a result of its contact with a pure and unchanging reality), allows Socrates 
to make a related point about the sovereignty of the soul over the body: 
 
When the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled 
(δουλεύειν κα੿ ਙρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master (ਙρχειν κα੿ δεσπόζειν). Then 
again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think 
that the nature of the divine is to rule and to master (ਙρχειν τε κα੿ ਲγεμονεύειν), whereas 
that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject (ਙρχεσθαί τε κα੿ δουλεύειν)? (80a1–6)40 
 
37 ੜταν δέ γε α੝τ੽ καθ’ αਫ਼τ੽ν σκοπૌ, ਥκε૙σε ο੅χεται εੁς τઁ καθαρόν τε κα੿ ἀε੿ ੓ν κα੿ ἀθάνατον κα੿ ੪σαύτως 
਩χον, κα੿ ੪ς συγγεν੽ς ο੣σα α੝το૨ ἀε੿ μετ’ ਥκείνου τε γίγνεται, ੖τανπερ α੝τ੽ καθ’ αਫ਼τ੽ν γένηται κα੿ ਥξૌ 
α੝τૌ, κα੿ πέπαυταί τε το૨ πλάνου κα੿ περ੿ ਥκε૙να ἀε੿ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ੪σαύτως ਩χει, ਚτε τοιούτων ਥφαπτομένη· 
κα੿ το૨το α੝τોς τઁ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; 
38 Cf. Phaedo 65a9, 83d7, 84b1 
39 See Fine (2016) for an argument that the sort of ‘Two Worlds’ view I am advancing here is not, despite 
the apparently overwhelming evidence to the contrary, operative here in the Phaedo. 
40 ੜρα δ੽ κα੿ τૌδε ੖τι ਥπειδ੹ν ਥν τ૶ α੝τ૶ ੯σι ψυχ੽ κα੿ σ૵μα, τ૶ μ੻ν δουλεύειν κα੿ ਙρχεσθαι ਲ φύσις 
προστάττει, τૌ δ੻ ਙρχειν κα੿ δεσπόζειν· κα੿ κατ੹ τα૨τα α੣ πότερόν σοι δοκε૙ ੖μοιον τ૶ θεί૳ εੇναι κα੿ 
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Given that the soul is the natural ruler and master of the body, it is not at all surprising to 
find Socrates claiming that only the true practitioner of philosophy—the lover of wisdom, 
who actively seeks to separate the soul as far as possible from the body while alive—is 
capable of wholly mastering the body and its attendant desires: 
 
No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not 
completely pure when they depart from life, no one but the lover of learning (φιλομαθε૙). 
It is for this reason […] that those who practice philosophy in the right way (οੂ ੑρθ૵ς 
φιλόσοφοι) keep away from all bodily desires (σ૵μα ਥπιθυμι૵ν), endure (καρτερο૨σι) 
them and do not surrender themselves to them. (82c1–5)41 
 
 
Philosophers more than anyone else exhibit self-mastery because they more than anyone 
else have worked to separate the soul from the body. This separation enables the soul of 
the philosopher to assume its natural place as ruler and master: 
 
The soul of the philosopher achieves calm from all bodily desires (ਥπιθυμι૵ν); it follows 
reason and is always in this state (κα੿ ἀε੿ ਥν τούτ૳ ο੣σα), contemplating the true and the 
divine (τઁ ἀληθ੻ς κα੿ τઁ θε૙ον), which is not the object of belief (ἀδόξαστον). (84a2–b1)42 
 
Recall that Socrates had claimed in the Protagoras that “self-mastery is nothing other than 
wisdom” (358c3). This claim is now fleshed out by the account that Socrates develops in 
the Phaedo. Wisdom, defined as the possession of knowledge by the soul (itself by itself), 
is attained by actively separating the soul as far as possible from the body while alive. The 
 
πότερον τ૶ θνητ૶; ਲ਼ ο੝ δοκε૙ σοι τઁ μ੻ν θε૙ον οੈον ਙρχειν τε κα੿ ਲγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τઁ δ੻ θνητઁν 
ਙρχεσθαί τε κα੿ δουλεύειν; 
41 Εੁς δέ γε θε૵ν γένος μ੽ φιλοσοφήσαντι κα੿ παντελ૵ς καθαρ૶ ἀπιόντι ο੝ θέμις ἀφικνε૙σθαι ἀλλ’ ਲ਼ τ૶ 
φιλομαθε૙. ἀλλ੹ τούτων ਪνεκα […] οੂ ੑρθ૵ς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τ૵ν κατ੹ τઁ σ૵μα ਥπιθυμι૵ν ਖπασ૵ν κα੿ 
καρτερο૨σι κα੿ ο੝ παραδιδόασιν α੝τα૙ς ਦαυτούς 
42 ἀλλ੹ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ਦπομένη τ૶ λογισμ૶ κα੿ ἀε੿ ਥν τούτ૳ ο੣σα, τઁ ἀληθ੻ς κα੿ τઁ 
θε૙ον κα੿ τઁ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη κα੿ ਫ਼π’ ਥκείνου τρεφομένη 
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soul, because it is akin to the immortal and divine, also turns out to be the natural ruler and 
master of the body (80a4). As the soul comes to possess wisdom, so too does it come to 
possess greater mastery over the body. But how exactly does the soul come to possess 
wisdom and so master the body? It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
2.3 Conflict 
 
Socrates claims that the soul comes to master the body by continually opposing the 
desires that arise from it, using both harsh and gentle methods (94d1). Socrates deploys a 
striking example in order to illustrate what he has in mind: 
 
Of all things in a human being, is there anything other than the soul that you say is the 
ruler, and especially a wise soul? Does the soul rule by acquiescing (συγχωρο૨σαν) to the 
body’s passions (κατ੹ τઁ σ૵μα πάθεσιν) or by actually opposing (ਥναντιουμένην) them? 
What I mean is something like the following. When the body is hot and thirsty the soul 
pulls (ਪλκειν) it in the opposite direction, to not drinking; when the body is hungry, to not 
eating, and we see a thousand other ways the soul opposes the things of the body 
(ਥναντιουμένην τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν το૙ς κατ੹ τઁ σ૵μα). (94b5–c1)43  
 
 
This example is striking, in part, because exactly the same example is later deployed in the 
argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic.44 Indeed, this example makes clear that at 
least some of the opposition to the soul’s rule over the body is specifically motivational. 
When thirst is present, for example, the soul opposes the body’s desire for drink; it pulls in 
the opposite direction, toward not-drinking (94b10). The soul and the body thus stand in 
conative or motivational conflict. In the Phaedo, then, bodily desires are characterized in 
exactly the kind of language that had been missing in the Protagoras—language that 
 
43 τ૵ν ਥν ἀνθρώπ૳ πάντων ਩σθ’ ੖τι ਙλλο λέγεις ਙρχειν ਲ਼ ψυχ੽ν ਙλλως τε κα੿ φρόνιμον; Πότερον 
συγχωρο૨σαν το૙ς κατ੹ τઁ σ૵μα πάθεσιν ਲ਼ κα੿ ਥναντιουμένην; λέγω δ੻ τઁ τοιόνδε, οੈον καύματος ਥνόντος 
κα੿ δίψους ਥπ੿ το੝ναντίον ਪλκειν, τઁ μ੽ πίνειν, κα੿ πείνης ਥνούσης ਥπ੿ τઁ μ੽ ਥσθίειν, κα੿ ਙλλα μυρία που 
੒ρ૵μεν ਥναντιουμένην τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν το૙ς κατ੹ τઁ σ૵μα 
44 Republic 439b3; Cf. Laws 644d7–645b1 
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emphasizes the motivational pull of such states in the direction of their target objects or 
activities.45 
But it is important to remember that, here in the Phaedo, this kind of conflict is 
explicitly treated as a felt manifestation of the soul’s embodiment. The soul itself is not 
conflicted. The conflict is rather between the soul and the body. And we should also 
remember that the philosopher attempts to free themselves from such conflict by separating 
their soul as far as possible from their body. Socrates even goes so far as to suggest that 
the soul holds “converse with desires and passions and fears (ਥπιθυμίαις κα੿ ੑργα૙ς κα੿ 
φόβοις) as if it were one thing talking to something different (੪ς ਙλλη ο੣σα ਙλλ૳ πράγματι 
διαλεγομένη)” (94d5). He bolsters this suggestion with yet another example that shows up 
in the argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic. This example is taken from Homer’s 
Odyssey, where Odysseus is given to rebuke his heart and command it to endure its 
passionate anger for a time. Socrates now asks: 
 
Do you think that when he composed this the poet thought that his soul was […] a thing to 
be directed by the passions of the body (ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν το૨ σώματος παθημάτων)? Did he not 
rather regard it as leading and mastering them (ਙγειν τε τα૨τα κα੿ δεσπόζειν), being itself 
a much more divine thing? (94d7–e4)46 
 
  
Notable, of course, is that what Socrates will eventually call the ‘rational part’ of the soul 
when this same passage is deployed in the Republic is here in the Phaedo simply referred 
to as the ‘soul.’ Similarly, what Socrates will eventually call the ‘spirited part’ of the soul 
when this same passage is deployed in the Republic is here in the Phaedo simply referred 
 
45 See Singpurwalla (2018) for an excellent discussion of the target objects and activities of each of the three 
parts of the soul in the Republic. That account I take to be consistent with what Socrates says here. 
46 ਛρ’ ο੅ει α੝τઁν τα૨τα ποιોσαι διανοούμενον ੪ς […] α੝τોς ο੡σης κα੿ ο੆ας ਙγεσθαι ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν το૨ σώματος 
παθημάτων, ἀλλ’ ο੝χ ο੆ας ਙγειν τε τα૨τα κα੿ δεσπόζειν, κα੿ ο੡σης α੝τોς πολઃ θειοτέρου τινઁς πράγματος 
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to as the ‘body.’ I will return to these points in section three below. 
 
2.4 Soul & Self 
 
Before turning to the Republic, however, it is worth noting that coming to see the 
body and its attendant affections as not properly belonging to oneself is an explicit and 
philosophically significant theme in the Phaedo. This theme is front and center at the 
conclusion of the dialogue, when Socrates reproves Crito for continuing to conflate him 
with the body that will be buried or burned after death (115c5). Indeed, Socrates had just 
finished explaining to Crito that everyone who has “purified themselves sufficiently by 
philosophy will live in the future altogether without a body (ਙνευ τε σωμάτων ζ૵σι)” 
(114c4). Part and parcel of the purification achieved through philosophy is coming to view 
the pleasures and other passions of the body as belonging, not to oneself, but to something 
foreign (94d5, 114e1).47 
The Phaedo can thus be seen to unpack at least two of the more significant claims 
originally introduced in the Protagoras. We now have a better sense of what that wisdom 
is which had been said to be nothing other than self-mastery: it is the knowledge belonging 
exclusively to the soul, which is the natural master or ruler of the body. Despite being the 
natural master or ruler of the body, however, the soul is initially said to be “imprisoned in 
and clinging to the body, forced to examine other things through it as though in a cage and 
not by itself, wallowing in every kind of ignorance” (82e3).48 This, of course, also gives us 
 
47 Phaedo 114e: “That is the reason why people should be of good cheer about their souls, if during their life 
they have ignored the pleasures of the body (ਲδον੹ς τ੹ς περ੿ τઁ σ૵μα) and its ornamentation as of no concern 
to them and as doing them more harm than good, but instead have seriously been concerned with the pleasures 
of learning (μανθάνειν). 
48 After philosophy gets a hold of the soul, it is slowly freed from its imprisonment in the body (83a1–b4). 
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a better sense of what that ignorance is which had been said to be nothing other than self-
defeat: it is the result of false beliefs that belong to the soul which is imprisoned in the body 
and forced to investigate things through it. 
Not only this, but the whole host of passions by which the many had claimed to be 
overcome in the Protagoras are now, in the Phaedo, relegated to the body. Once again, 
they are characterized in the kind of language that had been missing in the Protagoras—
language that emphasizes the motivational pull of such states. By unpacking the distinction 
between soul and body, the Socrates of the Phaedo thus introduces the suggestion that the 
soul and the body can stand in motivational conflict. Yet the soul remains in the Phaedo, 
just as it was in the Protagoras, something simple and essentially rational. 
Properly speaking, then, we still do not have psychic conflict; the soul can only be 
said to conflict with the body. So it seems that Socrates of the Phaedo does not actually 
countenance ‘psychic’ conflict any more than had the Socrates of the Protagoras: while 
the soul may be deceived when it is forced to investigate things through the body (and so 
acquire false or mistaken beliefs), it is still the case that everyone acts only on the basis of 
what they know or believe to be best (99a4–b4).49 It is also still the case in the Phaedo that 
the soul in possession of knowledge (reasoning itself by itself) is wise, while the soul in 
possession of belief (reasoning through the body) is ignorant whenever its beliefs turn out 
to be false or mistaken.50 
 
 
49 As Butler (2019) p. 16 notes, Socrates in not only making a general point that applies to all human action, 
but also defends this claim in propria persona. 
50 Pleasures and pains are said to rivet the soul to the body so that the soul “shares the beliefs of the body 
(το૨ ੒μοδοξε૙ν τ૶ σώματι)” (83d7). Cf. Butler (2019) p. 15: “the power of bodily desire and pleasure is 
always described as working by securing the cooperation of the soul’s capacity for choice rather than by 
motivating actions directly or by overriding the soul’s concurrent choices or beliefs.” 
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§3 THE REPUBLIC 
 
According to the prevailing developmentalist story, the Socrates of the Republic is 
no longer the historical Socrates, at least as Plato understood him or chose to present him 
in dialogues like the Protagoras. He is now something resembling the mouthpiece of Plato, 
himself, who is prepared to advocate for philosophical ideas and positions which may not 
have been endorsed by the historical Socrates.51 This is supposed to explain why Plato has 
the Socrates of the Republic rehabilitate the phenomenon of ‘being overcome’ against its 
purported denial by the Socrates of the Protagoras. Since Plato now recognizes that the 
soul is composite (in a way that he had not entertained in either the Protagoras or the 
Phaedo) he is now finally in a position to countenance the possibility of psychic conflict. 
Turning to the Republic, we are prepared to resist this sort of reading. 
 
3.1 Soul Partitioning 
Just before the argument for soul-partitioning, Socrates is discussing the virtue of 
courage.52 In the Protagoras, courage had been so problematic that it had prompted 
Socrates to re-characterize ‘being overcome’ as ignorance, and to claim that such ignorance 
is nothing other than self-defeat, while wisdom is nothing other than self-mastery. It is 
precisely at this juncture in the Republic that Socrates once again takes up a discussion of 
self-mastery and self-defeat. But he now observes that such phrases seem absurd because 
the same thing is both doing the mastering and getting defeated. This absurdity is what first 
 
51 See Bobonich and Destrée (2007) for an excellent discussion of what they refer to as ‘the standard story.’ 
52 Glaucon is made to distinguish the sort of true beliefs about courage possessed as the result of education 
and law from the sort of true beliefs about courage “which you find in animals and slaves (θηριώδη κα੿ 
ἀνδραποδώδη) and which is not the result of education” (430b6). Socrates says that the former is merely his 
“account of civic (πολιτικήν) courage” (430c3). See chapters three and four for more on this general point. 
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leads him to suppose that the soul has parts. The passage is instructive: 
 
Yet isn’t the expression ‘self-mastery’ ridiculous (τઁ μ੻ν κρείττω αਫ਼το૨ γελο૙ον)? He who 
is stronger than himself would also presumably be weaker than himself, and he who is 
weaker than himself, stronger, since the same person is induced by all these expressions (੒ 
α੝τઁς γ੹ρ ਥν ਚπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται). […] Nonetheless, the expression seems to 
me to mean that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse part and 
that, whenever the naturally better part is in control (ਥγκρατές) of the worse, this is 
expressed by saying that the person is self-mastered (τઁ κρείττω αਫ਼το૨). At any rate, one 
praises someone by calling them self-mastered. But when the smaller and better part is 
overpowered by the larger part, because of bad upbringing or bad company (τροφોς κακોς 
ਵ τινος ੒μιλίας), this is called being self-defeated (ਸ਼ττω ਦαυτο૨). (430e6–431a3)53 
 
He suggests that the absurdity of these phrases can be mitigated by supposing that the soul 
has a better part and a worse part—and that whenever the ‘naturally better’ part masters 
the worse, this is what most people mean when they claim that someone is self-mastered. 
This is the very first instance in the Republic where Socrates suggests that the soul is 
composite—a suggestion that had not been made in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo.54 
Socrates finally seems prepared to countenance the sort of ‘being overcome’ that he had 
worked so hard to reinterpret as ignorance in the Protagoras. How can we explain this? 
 
3.2 Appearance & Reality 
 
In the final book of the Republic, in a passage that directly recalls a familiar 
discussion from the Protagoras, Socrates notes that one and the same thing can appear to 
be different sizes depending on whether it is viewed from close up or from far away: 
 
 
53Ο੝κο૨ν τઁ μ੻ν κρείττω αਫ਼το૨ γελο૙ον; ੒ γ੹ρ ਦαυτο૨ κρείττων κα੿ ਸ਼ττων δήπου ਗν αਫ਼το૨ ε੅η κα੿ ੒ ਸ਼ττων 
κρείττων· ੒ α੝τઁς γ੹ρ ਥν ਚπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται. […] φαίνεταί μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ο੤τος ੒ λόγος 
੮ς τι ਥν α੝τ૶ τ૶ ἀνθρώπ૳ περ੿ τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν τઁ μ੻ν βέλτιον ਩νι, τઁ δ੻ χε૙ρον, κα੿ ੖ταν μ੻ν τઁ βέλτιον φύσει 
το૨ χείρονος ਥγκρατ੻ς ઝ, το૨το λέγειν τઁ κρείττω αਫ਼το૨ ਥπαινε૙ γο૨ν. ੖ταν δ੻ ਫ਼πઁ τροφોς κακોς ਵ τινος 
੒μιλίας κρατηθૌ ਫ਼πઁ πλήθους το૨ χείρονος σμικρότερον τઁ βέλτιον ੕ν, το૨το δ੻ ੪ς ਥν ੑνείδει ψέγειν τε κα੿ 
καλε૙ν ਸ਼ττω ਦαυτο૨ 
54 It is implicitly there, however, as Singpurwalla (2006) notes. 
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The same magnitude seen from close at hand and from far away does not appear equal 
[...] and the same thing appears bent when looked at in water and straight when out of it 
[...] and it is clear that every confusion (ταραχή) of this sort is in our souls. (602c6–12)55 
 
 
Socrates goes on to note that measuring, now said to be the work of the rational part of the 
soul (602d6), would help to ensure that we do not succumb to the way that things appear.56 
He also notes that even when the reasoning part has shown us the truth about how things 
really are, the appearance to the contrary may nevertheless remain: a stick submerged in 
water still appears bent, even when we are aware that it is straight. This is now taken to be 
further evidence for the view that the soul is composite: 
 
But many times when this part has measured and indicated that some things are larger or 
smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears to it at the same time concerning 
these same things [...] Didn’t we say that it is impossible for the same thing to believe 
opposites about the same things at the same time [...] Then the part of the soul that believes 
contrary to the measurements could not be the same as the part of the soul that believes in 
accordance with the measurements [...] But the part that believes in measurement and 
calculation (λογισμ૶) would be the best part of the soul [...] So what opposes it would be 
something inferior in us (τ૵ν φαύλων ਙν τι ε੅η ਥν ਲμ૙ν). (602e4–603a8)57 
 
 
Socrates likens the conflict between appearances and the conflict between beliefs to the 
conflict between actions, and presumably the sort of reasoned judgements that generate 
them: “just as in matters of sight [a person] was at war with themselves and held opposite 
beliefs at the same time concerning the same things, so in matters of action they are at war 
 
55 τα੝τόν που ਲμ૙ν μέγεθος ਥγγύθεν τε κα੿ πόρρωθεν δι੹ τોς ੕ψεως ο੝κ ੅σον φαίνεται [...] Κα੿ τα੝τ੹ 
καμπύλα τε κα੿ ε੝θέα ਥν ੢δατί τε θεωμένοις κα੿ ਩ξω [...] κα੿ π઼σά τις ταραχ੽ δήλη ਲμ૙ν ਥνο૨σα α੢τη ਥν τૌ 
ψυχૌ 
56 Cf. Sophist 235e ff., Statesman 285b ff., and Philebus 41e ff. 
57 Τούτ૳ δ੻ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι κα੿ σημαίνοντι μείζω ਙττα εੇναι ਲ਼ ਥλάττω ਪτερα ਦτέρων ਲ਼ ੅σα τἀναντία 
φαίνεται ਚμα περ੿ τα੝τά [...] Ο੝κο૨ν ਩φαμεν τ૶ α੝τ૶ ਚμα περ੿ τα੝τ੹ ਥναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εੇναι [...] 
Τઁ παρ੹ τ੹ μέτρα ਙρα δοξάζον τોς ψυχોς τ૶ κατ੹ τ੹ μέτρα ο੝κ ਗν ε੅η τα੝τόν [...] ਝλλ੹ μ੽ν τઁ μέτρ૳ γε 
κα੿ λογισμ૶ πιστε૨ον βέλτιστον ਗν ε੅η τોς ψυχોς [...] Τઁ ਙρα τούτ૳ ਥναντιούμενον τ૵ν φαύλων ਙν τι ε੅η 
ਥν ਲμ૙ν. 
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and fight against themselves” (603d1).58 This presents us with some additional evidence 
for thinking that—in both the Protagoras and the Republic—the sort of conflict that 
Socrates has in mind is a conflict between two reasoned judgements. But note that even 
when these reasoned judgements diverge or conflict, it is still the case that—whatever 
choice we make—we will be acting in accordance with our all-things-considered view of 
what is best.59 Even here in the Republic, then, Socrates seems to maintain that one always 
acts in accordance with what one either knows or believes to be best.60 
 Now, it is worth pointing out that Socrates claims that “the part of the soul that 
believes contrary to the measurements (τઁ παρ੹ τ੹ μέτρα ਙρα δοξάζον τોς ψυχોς) could 
not be the same as the part of the soul that believes in accordance with the measurements 
(τ૶ κατ੹ τ੹ μέτρα ο੝κ ਗν ε੅η τα੝τόν).” What we have are two conflicting beliefs, with 
absolutely no mention of knowledge, and—as had been made clear in both the Protagoras 
and the Phaedo—belief is epistemically inferior to knowledge. Socrates is nowhere more 
explicit about this fact than here in the Republic: 
 
Haven’t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge (τ੹ς ਙνευ ਥπιστήμης δόξας) are 
shameful (αੁσχραί)? The best of them are blind (αੂ βέλτισται τυφλαί)—or do you think that 
those who have a true belief without knowledge (οੂ ਙνευ νο૨ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες) are 
any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road? (506c6–9)61 
 
 
The best of our beliefs are blind. Without knowledge, it seems, even true beliefs are not 
 
58 See Singpurwalla (2006) and (2018) for excellent discussions of this point. 
59 Cf. Singpurwalla (2006) p. 255 
60 While Socrates thinks that most people in most domains of life are perfectly content to “act, acquire and 
form their beliefs” (505d7) simply on the basis of what appears best to them, they are not content with 
appearances when it comes to the good: “Nobody is satisfied to acquire what is believed good, but they seek 
out the reality, and everyone disdains belief (δόξαν) here.” Cf. Protagoras 358d1 
61 ο੝κ છσθησαι τ੹ς ਙνευ ਥπιστήμης δόξας, ੪ς π઼σαι αੁσχραί; ੰ ν αੂ βέλτισται τυφλαί, ਲ਼ δοκο૨σί τί σοι τυφλ૵ν 
διαφέρειν ੒δઁν ੑρθ૵ς πορευομένων οੂ ਙνευ νο૨ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; 
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worth all that much. Returning to the case of Leontius, we are prepared to see why. 
 
3.3 Leontius Revisited 
 
Leontius, recall, is conflicted: he is struggling with himself (439e10) and fighting 
an internal civil war (440b2). According to Socrates, this is because his appetite and his 
reason are pulling him in opposing directions. The rational part of his soul believes that he 
should not look at the corpses, while the appetitive part of his soul believes that he should 
look at the corpses.62 
It is here worth recalling the example from section one, involving an early morning 
workout.63 I am now going to describe the case of Leontius in the same terms I used to 
describe that case. Suppose that Leontius possesses the (true) belief that not looking at the 
corpses is the best course of action. As he approaches them, however, he succumbs to his 
appetite.64 He thus ‘exchanges’ the (true) belief that not looking is the best course of action 
for the (false) belief that looking is the best course of action. After looking at the corpses, 
he regains the (true) belief that not looking was in fact best, and so regrets his action and 
reproaches himself. Now, note that even if this case could be properly described as 
Leontius’ reason ‘being overcome’ by his appetite, the fact remains that when he acted on 
his false belief about what was best, he was not in that moment conflicted, but simply 
 
62 Some scholars have suggested that the desires of appetite are non-rational in the sense that they are bare, 
blind, brute, or simple urges. For example, see Penner (1990, 1996). See Moss (2015) for an extremely 
convincing argument that this is not how Republic 437e4–5 should be read. See also Carone (2001) and 
Lorenz (2004) for interpretations that reject the ‘bare urge’ view. 
63 Suppose that someone possesses the (true) belief that going to the gym tomorrow morning is the best course 
of action. In the morning, however, they succumb to the pleasure of their warm bed and so ‘exchange’ the 
(true) belief that going to the gym is the best course of action for the (false) belief that remaining in bed is 
the best course of action. They later regain their (true) belief that going to the gym was in fact best, and so 
regret sleeping in. 
64 Reeve (1992) p. 115: a fragment of comedy “tells us that Leontius was known for his love of boys as pale 
as corpses.” If this is correct, then Leontius’ appetite could be understood as a desire for sexual gratification. 
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mistaken.65 At the crucial moment of action, he was ignorant. 
We are now prepared to see that the case of Leontius should be described this way. 
For Socrates still maintains in the Republic that no one can act against their reasoned 
judgement of what is best: “Every soul (ਚπασα ψυχή) pursues the good and does everything 
for its sake (κα੿ τούτου ਪνεκα πάντα πράττει)” (505d7–e1).66 If this thesis is operative in 
the present context, as it seems to be, then the case of Leontius simply cannot be described 
or interpreted as Leontius’ reason being overcome by his appetite if ‘being overcome’ 
means what the many had meant by it in the Protagoras—namely, that one can know what 
is best and be capable of acting on that knowledge, while nevertheless remaining unwilling 
to do it.67 Leontius cannot, while either believing or knowing that not looking at the corpses 
is the best course of action, choose to look at them (353c5).68  
Since the belief that looking is the best course of action and the belief that not 
looking is the best course of action are opposites, and Socrates grants that it is possible to 
hold both beliefs simultaneously, it follows that they belong to two different parts of the 
 
65 Cf. Protagoras 357d9 
66 ਗ਼ δ੽ διώκει μ੻ν ਚπασα ψυχ੽ κα੿ τούτου ਪνεκα πάντα πράττει 
67 Some scholars have thought that Socrates introduces ‘good independent’ desires at Republic 438a1–5. For 
example, see Penner (1990), Reeve (1988) and Woods (1987). The phrase ‘good-independent’ is due to Irwin 
(1977). However, Irwin himself does not seem to use this phrase to indicate what subsequent scholars have 
taken it to indicate—namely, desires that depend in no way on an agent’s evaluation of their objects as good. 
Rather, what Irwin seems to have in mind when he claims that appetitive desires are ‘good-independent’ is 
that they are unconcerned with the overall good of the whole soul or person. For example, the desire to smoke 
counts as a good-independent desire for Irwin. The thought, presumably, is that smoking is unhealthy and so 
not in one’s overall best interest. Indeed, anything “unrelated to deliberation about the good of the whole 
soul” (1977 p. 193) will count either as good-independent (e.g. appetitive desires) or as only partly good-
dependent (e.g. spirited desires) for Irwin. All of this is simply to say that the subsequent literature does not 
seem to deploy this phrase in a way that Irwin himself would endorse. He is even more explicit about this in 
later work (1995), p. 208. This fact, as far as I can tell, has not been flagged in the literature. At any rate, see 
Carone (2001), Moss (2015), and Weiss (2008) for entirely convincing arguments that appetitive desires—
and indeed all desires—are in some way ‘good-dependent.’ 
68 Both Callard (2017) and Kamtekar (2006) refer to this as the ‘desire thesis.’ Some scholars have taken the 
thesis to be that people desire what appears good to them, while others have taken the thesis to be that people 
desire what is really good. On either interpretation, my point holds. 
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soul. Leontius is thus experiencing genuine psychic conflict. But while he can certainly 
hold these two opposing beliefs (and, presumably, the correspondingly opposed desires 
that attend them) simultaneously, it is still the case that he can only act on one of them. He 
must therefore make a choice about which course of action is best—about which belief 
(and perhaps corresponding desire) to act on.69 His action will ultimately reveal his choice. 
Leontius, of course, turns out to be self-defeated; he made the wrong choice. 
So although the Republic is indeed the first place where this sort of case can 
properly be described as ‘psychic’ conflict, the sort of cognitive and motivational struggle 
that it captures is familiar, and seems to have been countenanced somewhat implicitly in 
the Protagoras (in the discussion of the distorting power of appearances) and somewhat 
more explicitly the Phaedo (when the soul is described as standing in conative or 
motivational conflict with the body). Indeed, as we will now see, Socrates is also prepared 
to maintain in the Republic that the person who possesses knowledge will simply not 
experience conflict—psychic or otherwise. 
 
3.4 When Knowledge Rules 
 
Recall that, in the Protagoras, Socrates had claimed that someone who possesses 
knowledge would never be taken in by the distorting power of appearances and so would 
never come to regret their actions. In the Republic, too, those who are ruled by knowledge 
possess an astonishing degree of psychic peace.70 When discussing the sort of individual 
 
69 Cf. Singpurwalla (2018): “Indeed, the cognitive character of the parts explains the motivational character 
of the parts: it is because the rational part forms its desires on the basis of calculation that it desires the things 
that it does, and it is because the appetitive and spirited parts forms their attitudes on the basis of what merely 
appears good or bad that they desire the things that they do.” 
70 The rational part of the soul is said to possess “knowledge of what is advantageous for each part, and for 
the whole soul” (442c5). It is this fact that makes it the natural ruler of the entire soul, since “it is really wise 
and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul” (441e3). Cf. Cooper (1984), p. 6 
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who corresponds to the ideal city (i.e. the individual wholly ruled by knowledge or 
wisdom), Socrates tells us: 
 
They set in place what is really their own and rule themselves (τ૶ ੕ντι τ੹ οੁκε૙α ε੣ θέμενον 
κα੿ ਙρξαντα α੝τઁν αਫ਼το૨). They put themselves in order, are their own friends, and 
harmonize the three parts of themselves like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, 
low, and middle. They bind together those parts and any others there may be in between, 
and from having been many they become entirely one (κα੿ παντάπασιν ਪνα γενόμενον ਥκ 
πολλ૵ν), moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα੿ ਲρμοσμένον). Only then do they act 
[…] regarding as wisdom (σοφίαν) the knowledge (ਥπιστήμην) that oversees such actions. 
(443d3–e6)71 
 
 
These individuals join what had previously been three into one, binding them together in 
such a way that, from having been many, they become “entirely one (παντάπασιν ਪνα).” 
Such people, as the diction here seems to imply, are so radically unified that the several 
parts of their composite soul become a single whole.72 For the composite soul that is ruled 
by knowledge, then, psychic conflict is no more possible than it had been for someone 
ruled by knowledge in the Protagoras. The self-mastery they display is simply an 
expression of their wisdom. 
Any suggestion, then, that the views of the Republic and the Protagoras are in 
tension with respect to psychic (or even cognitive or motivational) conflict is at best 
oversimplifying and distorting. On the one hand, when knowledge rules in the composite 
soul, such a person enjoys exactly the sort of psychic peace that Socrates had claimed they 
would in the Protagoras (356e1). On the other hand, anyone who does not possess 
 
71 ἀλλ੹ τ૶ ੕ντι τ੹ οੁκε૙α ε੣ θέμενον κα੿ ਙρξαντα α੝τઁν αਫ਼το૨ κα੿ κοσμήσαντα κα੿ φίλον γενόμενον ਦαυτ૶ 
κα੿ συναρμόσαντα τρία ੕ντα, ੮σπερ ੖ρους τρε૙ς ਖρμονίας ἀτεχν૵ς, νεάτης τε κα੿ ਫ਼πάτης κα੿ μέσης, κα੿ εੁ 
ਙλλα ਙττα μεταξઃ τυγχάνει ੕ντα, πάντα τα૨τα συνδήσαντα κα੿ παντάπασιν ਪνα γενόμενον ਥκ πολλ૵ν, 
σώφρονα κα੿ ਲρμοσμένον, ο੢τω δ੽ πράττειν ਵδη […] σοφίαν δ੻ τ੽ν ਥπιστατο૨σαν ταύτૉ τૌ πράξει 
ਥπιστήμην 
72 As Shields (2007) p. 13 notes: “his diction implies something closer to the activity of a carpenter or joiner, 
who fits pieces together so that they are smoothly dovetailed and seamlessly fused, thus forming a fully 
unified entity.” 
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knowledge “wouldn’t be entirely free from civil war within themselves, and wouldn’t be 
one, but rather in some sense two” (554d9–e1). Plato thus continues to presuppose the 
hypothetical impossibility of acting against knowledge. In both the Protagoras and the 
Republic, knowledge is sufficient for virtue. But what are we to make of the fact that the 
soul is now treated as composite, rather than simple? Is this a genuine development? 
 
3.5 Immortality Revisited 
 
Soul partitioning comes at a cost. One such cost is indicated in the final book of the 
Republic, where Socrates turns once again to an argument for the immortality of the soul. 
In the Phaedo, Socrates had noted that anything composite is “by nature liable to be divided 
up into its component parts, and only that which is incomposite, if anything, is not liable 
to be divided up” (78c). So if the soul turns out to be composite, that would raise serious 
doubts about its immortality. Socrates now rehashes this worry in the Republic. He notes 
that “it isn’t easy for a composite of many parts to be immortal […] yet this is how the soul 
now appeared to us” (611a9). 
How could it have been that the Socrates of the Phaedo saw no reason to think that 
the soul was composite, especially when he had evidently accepted the possibility of 
motivational conflict? Indeed, the Socrates of the Phaedo had utilized two of the same 
examples that the argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic rely on. He appealed to 
the same example of thirst, which is used to distinguish reason from appetite—and to the 
same passage from the Odyssey, which is used to distinguish spirit from reason.73 But the 
 
73 Cf. Phaedo 94d6–e4; Republic 441b3–c1 
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Socrates of the Phaedo had not assigned appetitive or spirited desires to the soul, but only 
to the body.  
Still there can be little doubt that Plato recognized that for a body to give rise to 
desires it must be ensouled, and that there must therefore be some way in which the soul is 
responsible for even the lower desires that, in the Phaedo, are simply assigned to the body. 
Nevertheless, the Socrates of the Phaedo had not regarded conflicts between the body and 
the soul as any reason to think that the soul ‘itself by itself’ was something composite. 
Perhaps surprisingly, neither does the Socrates of the Republic. In a striking passage, 
Socrates now considers what the soul might look like in its disembodied state: 
 
Yet our recent argument and others as well compel us to believe that the soul is immortal 
(ἀθάνατον). But to see the soul as it is in truth (ਥστ੿ν τૌ ἀληθεί઺), we must not study it as 
it is while it is maimed by its association with the body and other evils—which is what we 
were doing earlier—but as it is in its pure state, that’s how we should study the soul, 
thoroughly and by means of reasoning (λογισμ૶). We’ll then find that it is a much finer 
thing than we thought [...] What we’ve said about the soul is true of it as it appears at 
present. But the condition in which we’ve studied it is like that of the sea-god Glaucus, 
whose original nature (τ੽ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν) can’t easily be made out by those who catch 
glimpses of him. Some of the original parts have been broken off, others have been crushed, 
and his whole body has been maimed by the waves and by the shells, seaweeds, and stones 
that have attached themselves to him, so that he looks more like a wild animal than his 
natural self (੮στε παντ੿ μ઼λλον θηρί૳ ਥοικέναι ਲ਼ οੈος ਷ν φύσει). The soul, too, is in a 
similar condition when we study it, beset by many evils. That, Glaucon, is why we have to 
look somewhere else in order to discover its true nature [...] To its love of wisdom (Εੁς τ੽ν 
φιλοσοφίαν α੝τોς). We must realize what it grasps and longs to have intercourse with, 
because it is akin to the divine and immortal and what always is (੪ς συγγεν੽ς ο੣σα τ૶ τε 
θεί૳ κα੿ ἀθανάτ૳ κα੿ τ૶ ἀε੿ ੕ντι), and we must realize what it would become if it followed 
this longing with its whole being, and if the resulting effort lifted it out of the sea in which 
it now dwells, and if the many stones and shells (those which have grown all over it in a 
wild, earthy, and stony profusion because it feasts at those so-called happy feasting on 
earth)74 were hammered off it. Then we’d see what its true nature (ἀληθો φύσιν) is and be 
able to determine whether it has many parts or just one (ε੅τε πολυειδ੽ς ε੅τε μονοειδής) and 
whether or in what manner it is put together. But we’ve already given a decent account, I 
 
74 Cf. Republic 519a7–b4: “However, if a nature of this sort [one that is vicious but clever] had been 
hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened 
to it by feasting, greed and other such pleasures and which, like leaden weights, pull its vision downwards—
if being rid of these, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would 
see these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards.” 
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think, of what its condition is and what parts it has when it is immersed in human life (ਥν 
τ૶ ἀνθρωπίν૳ βί૳). (611b7–612a8)75 
 
Socrates is here comparing the embodied soul to the sea-god Glaucus, whose is covered 
with shells, seaweed, and stones that have attached themselves to him while submerged 
under the sea, so that he looks more like “a wild animal than his natural self” (611d4).76 
According to this image, these stones and shells attach themselves while Glaucus is 
submerged under the sea. To grasp his true nature, we must lift him out of the sea and 
hammer off these accretions.  
So too for the soul. We must think what it would be like if (1) it entirely followed 
its love of wisdom, (2) that effort lifted it out of the sea in which it now dwells, and (3) its 
 
75 ੜτι μ੻ν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, κα੿ ੒ ਙρτι λόγος κα੿ οੂ ਙλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ਙν· οੈον δ’ ਥστ੿ν τૌ ἀληθεί઺, 
ο੝ λελω βημένον δε૙ α੝τઁ θεάσασθαι ਫ਼πό τε τોς το૨ σώματος κοινωνίας κα੿ ਙλλων κακ૵ν, ੮σπερ ν૨ν ਲμε૙ς 
θεώμεθα, ἀλλ’ οੈόν ਥστιν καθαρઁν γιγνόμενον, τοιο૨τον ੂκαν૵ς λογισμ૶ δια θεατέον, κα੿ πολύ γε κάλλιον 
α੝τઁ εਫ਼ρήσει […] ν૨ν δ੻ ε੅πομεν μ੻ν ἀληθો περ੿ α੝το૨, οੈον ਥν τ૶ παρόντι φαίνεται· τεθεάμεθα μέντοι 
διακείμενον α੝τό, ੮σπερ οੂ τઁν θαλάττιον Γλα૨κον ੒ρ૵ντες ο੝κ ਗν ਩τι ૧઺δίως α੝το૨ ੅δοιεν τ੽ν ἀρχαίαν 
φύσιν, ਫ਼πઁ το૨ τά τε παλαι੹ το૨ σώματος μέρη τ੹ μ੻ν ਥκκεκλάσθαι, τ੹ δ੻ συντετρ૙φθαι κα੿ πάντως 
λελωβોσθαι ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν κυμάτων, ਙλλα δ੻ προσπεφυκέναι, ੕στρεά τε κα੿ φυκία κα੿ πέτρας, ੮στε παντ੿ μ઼λλον 
θηρί૳ ਥοικέναι ਲ਼ οੈος ਷ν φύσει, ο੢τω κα੿ τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν ਲμε૙ς θεώμεθα διακειμένην ਫ਼πઁ μυρίων κακ૵ν. ἀλλ੹ 
δε૙, ੯ Γλαύκων, ਥκε૙σε βλέπειν. […] Εੁς τ੽ν φιλοσοφίαν α੝τોς, κα੿ ਥννοε૙ν ੰν ਚπτεται κα੿ ο੆ων ਥφίεται 
੒μιλι૵ν, ੪ς συγγεν੽ς ο੣σα τ૶ τε θεί૳ κα੿ ἀθανάτ૳ κα੿ τ૶ ἀε੿ ੕ντι, κα੿ ο੆α ਗν γένοιτο τ૶ τοιούτ૳ π઼σα 
ਥπισπομένη κα੿ ਫ਼πઁ ταύτης τોς ੒ρμોς ਥκκομισθε૙σα ਥκ το૨ πόντου ਥν મ ν૨ν ਥστίν, κα੿ περικρουσθε૙σα 
πέτρας τε κα੿ ੕στρεα ਘ ν૨ν α੝τૌ, ਚτε γોν ਦστιωμένૉ, γεηρ੹ κα੿ πετρώδη πολλ੹ κα੿ ਙγρια περιπέφυκεν ਫ਼πઁ 
τ૵ν ε੝δαιμόνων λεγομένων ਦστιάσεων. κα੿ τότ’ ਙν τις ੅δοι α੝τોς τ੽ν ἀληθો φύσιν, ε੅τε πολυειδ੽ς ε੅τε 
μονοειδής, ε੅τε ੖πૉ ਩χει κα੿ ੖πως· ν૨ν δ੻ τ੹ ਥν τ૶ ἀνθρωπίν૳ βί૳ πάθη τε κα੿ ε੅δη, ੪ς ਥγભμαι, ਥπιεικ૵ς 
α੝τોς διεληλύθαμεν. 
76 Cf. Phaedrus 230a ff., but especially Republic 588c ff., where Plato has Socrates offer another image of 
the composite soul: “Well, then, fashion a single kind of multicolored beast with a ring of many heads that it 
can grow and change at will—some from gentle, some from savage animals. […] Then fashion another kind 
of animal, that of a lion, and one of a human being. But make the first much the largest and the other second 
to it in size […] Now join the three of them into one, so that they somehow grow together naturally […] 
Then, fashion around them the image of a human being so that anyone who sees only the outer covering and 
not what’s inside will think it is a single creature, a human being […] Our words and deeds should insure 
that the human being within this human being (το૨ ἀνθρώπου ੒ ਥντઁς ਙνθρωπος) has the most control 
(ਥγκρατέστατος); second, that he should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does his animals, 
feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; and third, that he 
should make the lion’s nature his ally, care for the community of all his parts, and bring them up in such a 
way that they will be friends with each other and with himself…” At 589d1–e2, Socrates twice notes that the 
‘human’ part of our nature is perhaps better described as divine. 
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various accretions were hammered off. What would the soul look like then? The sea 
presumably stands for the visible world of becoming, or for embodied life, while the soul’s 
accretions might simply stand for the desires of appetite and spirit—or perhaps for the 
appetitive and spirited parts of the soul themselves. But in either case, these accretions are 
removed as a result of the soul wholly following its love of wisdom.77 Glaucus seems like 
an animal, but he is in fact a god. What does this imply about the human soul? 
As we will see in the next chapter, the Timaeus unpacks many of these intriguing 
suggestions. The two lower parts of the embodied soul turn out to be mortal, while only 
the rational part is immortal (69c6–70b9). At death, the rational part of the soul will be 
separated from the lower two parts of the soul. Much as in the Phaedo, the disembodied 
soul is treated in the Timaeus as something simple and essentially rational (41d–42a). So 
while Plato sees good epistemic or pragmatic reasons to pursue the study of the soul 
immersed in human life in the Republic²as a kind of complement to the study of the 
immortal, rational soul carried out in the Phaedo—the views defended in the Phaedo and 
the Protagoras have not been left behind.78 Indeed, they return in the Timaeus, to which 
we will now turn. 
 
 
 
 
77 The apparent reference to the Phaedo that is embodied in this recommendation suggests that the moral 
psychology of that dialogue remains a live option even at the end of the Republic. This suggestion is further 
supported by the fact that in passages focusing on the soul of the philosopher, concepts and claims familiar 
from the Phaedo reappear, such as the concept of purification (527d5–e2), and the claim that the philosopher 
simply abandons bodily desires and pleasures rather than seeking harmony with them (485d10–e1). 
78 It is a further (interesting) question as to whether Plato had this view worked out when he wrote the 
Protagoras. I think my reading certainly allows for this, though I do not argue for that controversial thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SELF-MASTERY & APOTHEOSIS IN THE TIMAEUS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Socrates consistently describes the person 
who exhibits self-mastery as someone ruled by reason or knowledge. I explored some of 
the psychological facets of this rule, but I now want to turn squarely to the epistemological 
and metaphysical side of things. In order to do this, I will again be drawing on the Republic, 
where Plato most directly and explicitly links his epistemology and ontology. While I will 
also briefly discuss the Phaedo and the Sophist, the bulk of this chapter will be focused 
squarely on the Timaeus—for it is in the Timaeus that Plato makes explicit what had only 
been implicit at the conclusion of the Republic. Namely, that the immortal soul is just the 
rational part of the embodied soul. As I will demonstrate, a better understanding of Plato’s 
metaphysical and epistemological commitments will allow us to better appreciate what the 
soul ultimately amounts to on his account. 
That the Timaeus is dramatically linked to the Republic is made clear in the initial 
framing of the dialogue, where Socrates alludes to a discussion about politics held on the 
previous day (17c3). In giving a brief reprisal of that discussion, he references not a few of 
the arguments that had been uniquely rehearsed in the Republic (17e1–19a5).79 Moreover, 
 
79 The discussion was about the sort of political structure a city should have (17c2, cf. 369a1). The city should 
be subdivided into three classes (17c7, cf. 434b8). Each person within the city is to do the one job for which 
they are best suited (17d2, cf. 397e1). The guardians are supposed to act gently toward their own subjects 
and harshly toward foreigners (18a2, cf. 440d5). They are to have both physical and cultural training (18a9, 
cf. 376e2). They are to live communally and hold property in common (18b2, cf. 416e3). Women, too, have 
a corresponding share in all occupations and aspects of life in the city (18c1, cf. 454d9). Children and spouses 
are also to be held in common (18c9, cf. 457c9). All citizens within the same generation are to be considered 
brothers and sisters, so that everyone in the city believes that they are part of a single family (18d1, cf. 461d2). 
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that the Timaeus is dramatically linked to the Phaedo is made clear when, in the ensuing 
discussion, it is argued that intellect (νο૨ς) is the supremely good demiurge or craftsman 
of the sensible cosmos, and that this divine craftsman “wanted all things to come to be, as 
much as possible, like itself” (29e3). Many commentators have understood this argument 
to be part and parcel of Plato’s attempt to provide the sort of cosmogony that a young 
Socrates had hoped to find in the writings of Anaxagoras; a hope which was ultimately 
dashed when, as Socrates puns in the Phaedo, he discovered that Anaxagoras “did not use 
intellect (νο૨ς)” (97c1), but instead offered strictly mechanistic explanations for natural 
phenomena. What emerges from the account developed in the Timaeus is that the rational 
part of the human soul is patterned after this intellect (νο૨ς). 
In the present chapter, I unpack the way in which Plato ultimately identifies the 
disembodied soul with intellect.80 Armed with this account, a partial explanation for why 
so many commentators have insisted on a philosophical break between the view of the soul 
offered up in the Protagoras and the Republic will be ready-to-hand: by focusing more-or-
less exclusively on Plato’s moral psychology, such commentators have failed to adequately 
appreciate Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological commitments—commitments which 
remain firmly in place throughout the dialogues under discussion, and which directly 
inform his psychology. As I will demonstrate, it is precisely these commitments which both 
shape and inform his view of the soul. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, the 
account of the soul that Plato develops in his very last work, the Laws, is entirely 
compatible with the accounts found in the Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic and Timaeus. 
 
Marriages will be secretly arranged, so that the best natures are bred together (18e1, cf. 459d5). Finally, 
children are to be carefully watched in order to identify which of them have the best natures (19a2, cf. 536e4). 
80 Cf. Timaeus 42a2: intellect turns out to be our own ‘superior’ nature. 
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With all of this in place, we will then be furnished with a comprehensive account of the 
soul, which will finally allow us to reconcile Plato’s seemingly incompatible positions vis-
à-vis psychic conflict in the Protagoras and the Republic. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. After first introducing and explaining the central 
epistemological and metaphysical commitments common to both the Phaedo and the 
Republic, I show that these very same commitments remain firmly in place throughout the 
Timaeus (§1). I then take up an examination of craftsmanship, with the aim of 
demonstrating the way in which it is distinguished from other modes of production. As the 
craftsman who is said to produce the cosmos is ultimately identified with ‘νο૨ς,’ I explore 
some possible translations of this term before arguing that ‘intellect’ should be the 
preferred translation (§2). I then briefly turn to the Sophist in order to help explicate the 
relationship between intellect, soul, and knowledge. Following a general examination of 
soul, I turn to a treatment of the human soul, in particular (§3). In the final section, I outline 
the way in which the human soul is supposed to assimilate itself to this intellect and so 
become self-mastered (§4). 
 
§1 EPISTEMOLOGY & ONTOLOGY 
 
Plato links his epistemology and ontology by making forms, or beings, the objects 
of knowledge. As Socrates explains in the Republic: “what is completely (παντελ૵ς ੖ν) is 
completely knowable (παντελ૵ς γνωστόν) and what is in no way is in every way 
unknowable” (477a2).81 Consequently, what is most real for Plato are not sensible things, 
 
81 Plato is here following Parmenides. Cf. Parmenides, On Nature, B 8.34–36: “The same is for thinking and 
for being. For not without being, to which it is betrothed, will you find thinking (τα੝τઁν δ’ ਥστ੿ νοε૙ν τε κα੿ 
ο੢νεκεν ਩στι νόημα. ο੝ γ੹ρ ਙνευ το૨ ਥόντος, ਥν ੰι πεφατισμένον ਥστιν, εਫ਼ρήσεις τઁ νοε૙ν).” 
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but the forms that characterize them and that can be grasped in thought.82 The complete 
being of the forms is what renders them completely knowable.83 
Sensible things, on the other hand, are less than completely real because they are 
constituted as multiple appearances of singular forms—apprehended not by knowledge, 
but by belief. As appearances or ‘images’ of forms (476c5), sensible things are said to lie 
in between that which completely is and that which completely is not, so that “if something 
should appear such as at once to be and not be, this will lie in between that which purely is 
and that which wholly is not, and neither knowledge nor ignorance will be about it, but 
again what appears between ignorance and knowledge” (478d8)—namely, belief. For 
example, the form of beauty would be grasped by knowledge, while the many beautiful 
things—sensible particulars like Socrates, Glaucon and Alcibiades—would be grasped by 
belief (479a1). Although Glaucon might be beautiful when compared to Socrates, he is 
certainly not beautiful when compared to Alcibiades. Glaucon is thus at once both beautiful 
and not beautiful.84 
Now it is worth noting that—much as in the Protagoras—belief remains a fallible 
cognitive power in the Republic, while knowledge remains an infallible cognitive power 
(477e4).85 It is also worth noting that the various degrees of being are perfectly correlated 
to the degrees of cognitive apprehension: knowledge is of forms and is infallible because 
 
82 Aristotle is even more explicit on this point. Knowledge, he repeatedly insists, is identical to that which is 
known. See especially De Anima 430a20 and Metaphysics 1072b20–23, 1075a1–4 
83 This claim recurs throughout the Platonic corpus. Cf. Phaedo 78d ff.; Republic 477a ff., 525b ff.; 
Theaetetus 170a ff., 183a ff.; Parmenides 132b ff., 135b ff.; Sophist 258b ff.; Timaeus 29c ff., 51a ff. 
84 See Fine (2003) for a sustained rejection of the ‘Two Worlds’ reading I am advancing here. 
85 Republic 477e4: “How could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power (τ૶ μ੽ 
ἀναμαρτήτ૳) is the same as an infallible (ἀναμάρτητον) one?” Cf. Gorgias 454d9: “Well now, is there such 
a thing as true and false knowledge (ਥπιστήμη ਥστ੿ν ψευδ੽ς κα੿ ἀληθής)? Not at all (Ο੝δαμ૵ς).” See also 
Republic 508d4. 
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forms are stable beings and do not change (479e6–7), belief is of sensible things and is 
fallible because sensible things are forever in flux: they are constantly changing, or 
becoming (478d6, 480a1). Ignorance, of course, is of nothing (477a2).86 
 Many of these same points are echoed in the Phaedo, where Socrates claims that 
“if we are ever to really have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe 
things in themselves” (66e1). As we saw in the previous chapter, sensible things are 
grasped through the body, while intelligible forms are grasped through the soul.87 This 
point is made even more clear when Socrates explicitly contrasts the ontological status of 
forms with the ontological status of sensible particulars: 
 
[A]re they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; 
can the equal itself, the beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real (τઁ ੕ν), ever be affected 
by any change (μεταβολήν) whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform 
itself by itself (ਲ਼ ἀε੿ α੝τ૵ν ਪκαστον ੔ ਩στι, μονοειδ੻ς ੓ν α੝τઁ καθ’ αਫ਼τό), remain the same 
and never in any way tolerate any change whatever? […] What of the many beautiful 
particulars […] Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one 
might say, never remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? […] These 
latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always 
remain the same can be grasped only by rational thought (τ૶ τોς διανοίας λογισμ૶)? 
(78d2–79a2)88 
 
 
86 See especially Kahn (1981). As he notes, Aristotle (Metaphysics 1017a31) lists truth as one of the four 
philosophically relevant senses or uses of the verb ‘to be.’ 
87 Cf. Phaedo 79c4–d2: “for to investigate something through the body is to do it through the senses—it is 
dragged by the body to the things that are never the same… But when the soul investigates itself by itself 
(α੝τ੽ καθ’ αਫ਼τ੽ν σκοπૌ) it passes into the realm of what is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchanging (ਥκε૙σε 
ο੅χεται εੁς τઁ καθαρόν τε κα੿ ἀε੿ ੓ν κα੿ ἀθάνατον κα੿ ੪σαύτως ਩χον).” 
88 πότερον ੪σαύτως ἀε੿ ਩χει κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਲ਼ ਙλλοτ’ ਙλλως; α੝τઁ τઁ ੅σον, α੝τઁ τઁ καλόν, α੝τઁ ਪκαστον ੔ ਩στιν, 
τઁ ੕ν, μή ποτε μεταβολ੽ν κα੿ ਲντινο૨ν ਥνδέχεται; ਲ਼ ἀε੿ α੝τ૵ν ਪκαστον ੔ ਩στι, μονοειδ੻ς ੓ν α੝τઁ καθ’ αਫ਼τό, 
੪σαύτως κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χει κα੿ ο੝δέποτε ο੝δαμૌ ο੝δαμ૵ς ἀλλοίωσιν ο੝δεμίαν ਥνδέχεται; […] Τί δ੻ τ૵ν 
πολλ૵ν καλ૵ν […] ਛρα κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χει, ਲ਼ π઼ν το੝ναντίον ਥκείνοις ο੡τε α੝τ੹ αਫ਼το૙ς ο੡τε ἀλλήλοις 
ο੝δέποτε ੪ς ਩πος εੁπε૙ν ο੝δαμ૵ς κατ੹ τα੝τά; […] Ο੝κο૨ν τούτων μ੻ν κਗν ਚψαιο κਗν ੅δοις κਗν τα૙ς ਙλλαις 
αੁσθήσεσιν α੅σθοιο, τ૵ν δ੻ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਥχόντων ο੝κ ਩στιν ੖τ૳ ποτ’ ਗν ਙλλ૳ ਥπιλάβοιο ਲ਼ τ૶ τોς διανοίας 
λογισμ૶ 
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As we will now see, these very same distinctions are also operative in the Timaeus.89 
 
1.1 A Consistent Account 
 
The Timaeus is a work that offers an account of the formation of the cosmos, and 
an elaborate explanation of its order and goodness. Before launching into that explanation, 
however, Timaeus first offers up a brief ‘overture’ (27d5–29d2). In this overture, he takes 
pains to mark the very same distinctions which are now familiar from both the Phaedo and 
Republic. Namely, the distinction between “that which always is and has no becoming” 
and “that which becomes but never is” (28a1). He unpacks the distinction between being 
and becoming as follows: 
 
The former is grasped by intellect, which involves an account (τઁ μ੻ν δ੽ νοήσει μετ੹ λόγου 
περιληπτόν). It always is (ἀε੿ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ੕ν). The latter is grasped by belief, which 
involves unreasoning sense perception (τઁ δ’ α੣ δόξૉ μετ’ αੁσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν). 
It comes to be and passes away but never really is (γιγνόμενον κα੿ ἀπολλύμενον, ੕ντως δ੻ 
ο੝δέποτε ੕ν). (28a1–3)90 
 
Timaeus claims that the cosmos has come to be. This is because “it is both visible and 
tangible and it has a body—and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we have 
shown, perceptible things are grasped by belief, which involves sense perception. As such, 
they are things that have come to be” (28b10).91  
 
89 Cf. Republic 507b10: “And we say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible 
(੒ρ઼σθαί φαμεν, νοε૙σθαι δ’ ο੡), while the forms are intelligible but not visible (ੁδέας νοε૙σθαι μέν, ੒ρ઼σθαι 
δ’ ο੡).” See also Gorgias 474d5, where Socrates references the lovers of sights and sounds. 
90 τઁ μ੻ν δ੽ νοήσει μετ੹ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀε੿ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ੕ν, τઁ δ’ α੣ δόξૉ μετ’ αੁσθήσεως ἀλόγου 
δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον κα੿ ἀπολλύμενον, ੕ντως δ੻ ο੝δέποτε ੕ν. 
91 Cf. Timaeus 52a1: “[W]e must agree that that which possesses form (εੇδος ਩χον), which has not been 
brought into being and is not destroyed (ἀγέννητον κα੿ ἀνώλεθρον), which neither receives into itself 
anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible—
it cannot be perceived by the senses at all—and it is the role of understanding to study it (το૨το ੔ δ੽ νόησις 
ε੅ληχεν ਥπισκοπε૙ν). The second thing is that which shares the other’s name and resembles it. This thing can 
be perceived, and it has been begotten. It is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and 
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Since the sensible cosmos has come to be, this implies that it was made. Timaeus 
claims that it was made by a god whom he characterizes as a “craftsman (δημιουργός)” 
(29a3). Rather than immediately launching into an examination this divine craftsman, 
however, Timaeus suggests that they first examine the “paradigm’ (παραδείγματος)” 
(29b4) on which the sensible cosmos was modeled, and to which the divine craftsman was 
looking when it was produced. However, Timaeus is careful to note that the account of the 
eternal paradigm and the account of the sensible cosmos formed in its likeness will differ 
in the following respects: 
 
Accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to intellect (μετ੹ νο૨ καταφανο૨ς) 
are themselves stable and unshifting (μονίμους κα੿ ἀμεταπτώτους). We must do our very 
best to make these accounts as irrefutable (ἀνελέγκτοις) and invincible (ἀνικήτοις) as any 
account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be 
a likeness of that reality (πρઁς μ੻ν ਥκε૙νο ἀπεικασθέντος), since they are accounts of what 
is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e. 
what being is to becoming, truth is to belief (੖τιπερ πρઁς γένεσιν ο੝σία, το૨το πρઁς πίστιν 
ἀλήθεια). (29b6–c4)92 
 
 
The account of the paradigm, because it is stable and fixed, will be as irrefutable and 
invincible as any account may be. But the account of what has only been crafted in its 
likeness—the sensible cosmos—will itself only be likely. This leads Timaeus to make a 
related point about value: 
 
Whenever the craftsman looks at what is eternal (੒ δημιουργઁς πρઁς τઁ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χον 
βλέπων ἀεί) and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and power 
(τοιούτ૳ τιν੿ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τ੽ν ੁδέαν κα੿ δύναμιν α੝το૨ ἀπεργάζηται), 
then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that 
has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack 
 
then perishing out of it. It is apprehended by opinion, which involves sense perception (δόξૉ μετ’ αੁσθήσεως 
περιληπτόν).” 
92 το૨ μ੻ν ο੣ν μονίμου κα੿ βεβαίου κα੿ μετ੹ νο૨ καταφανο૨ς μονίμους κα੿ ἀμεταπτώτους, καθ’ ੖σον οੈόν 
τε κα੿ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εੇναι κα੿ ἀνικήτοις, τούτου δε૙ μηδ੻ν ਥλλείπειν, τοઃς δ੻ το૨ πρઁς μ੻ν 
ਥκε૙νο ἀπεικασθέντος, ੕ντος δ੻ εੁκόνος εੁκότας ἀν੹ λόγον τε ਥκείνων ੕ντας· ੖τιπερ πρઁς γένεσιν ο੝σία, 
το૨το πρઁς πίστιν ἀλήθεια. 
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beauty. […] Now surely it is clear to all that it was the eternal model that he looked at, for, 
of all the things that have come to be, our cosmos is the most beautiful, and of causes the 
craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, 
modeled after that which is changeless and is apprehended by reason and thought (τઁ λόγ૳ 
κα੿ φρονήσει περιληπτόν). (28a6–29b1)93 
 
 
Before turning our attention to the various facets of the divine craftsman’s work, however, 
it will be useful to examine Plato’s general account of craftsmanship.94 
 
1.2 Craftsmanship 
 
Craftsmanship for Plato is generally distinguished from other modes of production, 
such as mechanical causation or biological procreation, in that the craftsman works 
intelligently, arranging material according to an order or paradigm that is grasped in 
thought. So, for example, in the Republic, Socrates depicts the philosopher as a “craftsman 
(δημιουργός)” who looks to the “divine paradigm (τ૶ θεί૳ παραδείγματι)” (500d6–e3) in 
creating the ideal state. The philosopher is said to “look (ἀποβλέποιεν) often in each 
direction, toward the forms of justice, beauty, moderation and the like on the one hand, and 
towards those they are producing in (ਥμποιο૙εν) human beings on the other” (501b1–4).95 
More mundanely, the craftsman of a simple table or bed is said by Socrates to make 
each “by looking (βλέπων) to the form (ੁδέαν) of each” (596b6).96 In a word, craftsmanship 
 
93 ੖του μ੻ν ο੣ν ਗν ੒ δημιουργઁς πρઁς τઁ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτ૳ τιν੿ προσχρώμενος 
παραδείγματι, τ੽ν ੁδέαν κα੿ δύναμιν α੝το૨ ἀπεργάζηται, καλઁν ਥξ ἀνάγκης ο੢τως ἀποτελε૙σθαι π઼ν· ο੤ δ’ 
ਗν εੁς γεγονός, γεννητ૶ παραδείγματι προσχρώμενος, ο੝ καλόν. […] παντ੿ δ੽ σαφ੻ς ੖τι πρઁς τઁ ἀίδιον· ੒ 
μ੻ν γ੹ρ κάλλιστος τ૵ν γεγονότων, ੒ δ’ ਙριστος τ૵ν αੁτίων. ο੢τω δ੽ γεγενημένος πρઁς τઁ λόγ૳ κα੿ φρονήσει 
περιληπτઁν κα੿ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χον δεδημιούργηται 
94 Although the Timaeus is the only dialogue in which Plato offers anything like a detailed account of the 
production of the cosmos, it is certainly not the only dialogue in which a divine and craftsman-like 
intelligence appears. Cf. Republic 507c7–8, 530a3; Sophist, 265b4–6, 265c1–5, 265e2; Phaedo 97c1–2 
95 These passages describing philosophers as craftsmen looking to a divine paradigm occur shortly after 
Socrates’ graphic account of their souls ‘coupling with’ and being ‘nourished by’ real being (490a8–b7). In 
his characterization of philosophers as craftsmen, Plato has Socrates take great pains to indicate that their 
souls are in communion (੒μιλ઀α) with the intelligible paradigm to which they are looking. 
96 Cf. Republic 389a6 
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is simply a matter of looking to an intelligible paradigm and subsequently ordering the 
production so that the product becomes an image or likeness of it. To say, then, that the 
sensible cosmos is a work of divine craftsmanship is to say that it expresses, or is an image 
of, the intelligible paradigm to which the divine craftsman looks—just as a work of human 
craftmanship expresses, or is an image of, the intelligible paradigm to which the human 
craftsman looks. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what we find in the Timaeus: 
 
This, then, is how it [the cosmos] has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that 
which is changeless and is apprehended by reason and thought (τઁ λόγ૳ κα੿ φρονήσει 
περιληπτόν). These things being the case, again, there is every necessity that this cosmos 
is an image of something (π઼σα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τઁν κόσμον εੁκόνα τινઁς εੇναι). (29a6–b2)97 
 
What is unique about the account found in the Timaeus, however, is that—whereas other 
dialogues typically treat sensible particulars as images of particular forms—the entirety of 
the sensible cosmos, taken all together as a whole, is presented as an image of intelligible 
reality taken all together as a whole. Thus, to say that the sensible cosmos reflects the 
totality of intelligible reality—the totality of forms—is to say that the sensible cosmos is 
simply an image or likeness of that totality.98 As we will see in the next section, the totality 
of intelligible reality to which the divine craftsman is said to look is also explicitly 
described as what ‘νο૨ς’ contemplates (39e7–9).99 
 
 
 
 
 
97 ο੢τω δ੽ γεγενημένος πρઁς τઁ λόγ૳ κα੿ φρονήσει περιληπτઁν κα੿ κατ੹ τα੝τ੹ ਩χον δεδημιούργηται· τούτων 
δ੻ ਫ਼παρχόντων α੣ π઼σα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τઁν κόσμον εੁκόνα τινઁς εੇναι. 
98 In the Republic, the condition of the soul wherein intelligible reality is grasped in such a way as to make 
use of nothing visible, “but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms and ending in forms 
(ἀλλ’ ε੅δεσιν α੝το૙ς δι’ α੝τ૵ν εੁς α੝τά, κα੿ τελευτઽ εੁς ε੅δη)” (511b9) is the paradigm of knowledge. 
99 Cf. Gerson (2017) p. 9: “intellect, being cognitively identical with all the forms, is the paradigm of all 
intelligibility […] That intellect thinks these forms means that it is cognitively identical with them.” 
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§2 NOUS AS INTELLECT 
 
What exactly is νο૨ς? Timaeus characterizes it in a number of ways. He first refers 
to it as the “living thing” in which all other living things partake (30c3–6). He later tells us 
that the cosmos was crafted by it (47e4) and that it produces by looking to “that which is 
changeless and is apprehended by reason and wisdom (τઁ λόγ૳ κα੿ φρονήσει περιληπτόν)” 
(29a6–b1). Indeed, the very paradigm to which this craftsman looks is itself described as 
an eternal living thing (37c6–d1).100 Timaeus also tells us that the divine craftsman “wanted 
all things to come to be as like itself (παραπλήσια ਦαυτ૶) as possible” (29e3). Taken all 
together, these passages strongly suggest that the forms, the divine craftsman and the 
intelligible living thing are simply three different ways of characterizing ‘νο૨ς.’101 We will 
return this point more fully below—but first, a word on translation. 
The term ‘νο૨ς’ is sometimes translated as ‘mind,’ but the most common translation 
seems to be ‘reason.’ Not primarily ‘reason’ in the sense of a cause (αੁτία), or in the sense 
of an argument or account (λόγος), but rather in the sense of knowledge (ਥπιστήμη). Some 
philologists have tried to determine exactly what sort of knowledge Plato has in mind by 
comparing the noun ‘νο૨ς’ with its cognate verb ‘νοε૙ν.’102 This verb is not primarily used 
to indicate the act of reasoning from premises to conclusion, or the act of discursive thought 
 
100 ੲς δ੻ κινηθ੻ν α੝τઁ κα੿ ζ૵ν ਥνόησεν τ૵ν ἀιδίων θε૵ν γεγονઁς ਙγαλμα ੒ γεννήσας πατήρ, ਱γάσθη τε κα੿ 
ε੝φρανθε੿ς ਩τι δ੽ μ઼λλον ੖μοιον πρઁς τઁ παράδειγμα ਥπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. καθάπερ ο੣ν α੝τઁ τυγχάνει 
ζ૶ον ἀίδιον ੕ν 
101 Cf. Philebus 28c6–e6, 30d1–e1; Many recent commentators do not wish to identify the demiurge with the 
paradigm to which it looks—preferring instead to identify it with the world-soul. Cornford (1935) and 
Cherniss (1965) are representative of this sort of interpretation. See Menn (1995) p. 7 for an excellent 
discussion of their respective interpretive approaches. Such interpretations are problematic, however, since, 
as Menn forcefully puts it: “nothing authorizes us to override Plato’s contrast between the world-soul, ‘which 
has become the best of the generated things,’ and the god who has made it such, ‘the best of the intelligible 
and eternally existing things’ (Timaeus 37a1–2).” See also Perl (1998) and Gerson (2006) for sustained and 
convincing defenses of the traditional view. 
102 See especially Kurt von Fritz (1994) as well as Claus (1983) 
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more generally, which is better captured by such terms as ‘διάνοια’ or ‘λογισμός.’103 
Rather, it usually indicates a more synoptic, intellectual grasp. It is a term that is often 
reserved in both Plato and Aristotle for describing a direct and immediate intellectual 
apprehension.104 
One of Plato’s most frequent and basic expressions that involves this term is ‘νο૨ν 
਩χειν’ (to have or possess νο૨ς). From this we get ‘νο૨ν κτ઼σθαι’ (to acquire or to come-
to-possess νο૨ς). In the perfect tense this is rendered ‘νο૨ν κεκτોσθαι,’ which is more-or-
less equivalent to ‘νο૨ν ਩χειν.’105 While these expressions can have the colloquial sense of 
being reasonable, they tend to indicate—in the works of Plato, at any rate—the possession 
of reason, intellect, or knowledge. Plato arguably takes up this conception of νο૨ς in the 
Timaeus when he contrasts it with true belief, claiming that everyone “shares (μεταχε૙ν) in 
the former, but in νο૨ς the gods share, and human beings just a little” (51e5–6).106 Finally, 
it is worth noting that Plato uses the word ‘νο૨ς’ some 350–400 times (depending on how 
many texts are authentic), but never once uses it in the plural.107 
Taking all of this into account, I suggest that ‘νο૨ς’ is best translated as intellect, 
since this term can variously indicate not only the faculty of reason (the possession of 
which renders human beings capable of rational thought), but also a divine intelligence, 
 
103 Cf. Republic 509d1–511e3 
104 Cf. Menn (1995) p. 14 and Emilsson (2011) p. 146 
105 See Menn (1995) p. 15 for an even richer analysis. 
106 As this example shows, it is possible to substitute ‘νο૨ν ਩χειν’ for ‘νο૨ μετέχειν’ (to participate or share 
in νο૨ς). Menn (1995) p. 15 also points to Heraclitus’ claim that “learning many things does not teach ‘νο૨ν 
਩χειν’” (frag. 41). He takes Heraclitus’ point to be that learned people might nevertheless “fail to grasp the 
unitary logos behind the phenomena, the perception of which constitutes wisdom.” Cf. Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1177b26–30 
107 I am indebted to Menn (1995) for this observation. 
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with which νο૨ς seems to be primarily identified. Yet in order to more fully flesh this out, 
it will be necessary to draw on one further passage, found in the Sophist. 
 
2.1 The Motion of Intellect 
 
That the Timaeus bears some relation to the Sophist is borne out by its reference to 
the sensible cosmos as the product of a “demiurgic god (θεο૨ δημιουργο૨ντος)” (265c5) 
who produces “according to reason and divine knowledge (μετ੹ λόγου τε κα੿ ਥπιστήμης 
Θείας)” (265e2). As we’ve already seen, knowledge is the infallible cognitive power which 
grasps or apprehends the forms. Yet Plato’s ‘forms’ are such a popular philosophic trope 
that it will here be necessary to first address and subsequently clear up a possible 
misrepresentation of them—a possible misrepresentation that even Plato himself seemed 
to have been sensitive to. 
The forms are often characterized (if not caricatured) as inert, lifeless objects that 
remain eternally fixed in some intelligible realm. In the Sophist, however, Plato has a 
visitor from Elea problematize this sort of characterization. This visitor is made to respond 
to certain ‘friends of the forms’ (τοઃς τ૵ν εੁδ૵ν φίλους) who want to insist that ‘real being’ 
(τ੽ν ੕ντως ο੝σίαν) is entirely fixed and immovable (248a4, 248a11). These friends claim 
that “by the body through sensation we have dealings with becoming, but we deal with real 
being by our souls and through reasoning,” and that “being always stays the same and in 
the same state, but becoming is different at different times” (248a10–13).108 These passages 
make perfectly clear the way in which such people are ‘friends’ of the forms—broadly 
sympathetic to Platonic ontology. 
 
108 Note that, much as in the Phaedo, the contrast here is between body and soul—not between soul parts. 
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Yet there is a problem if the supposed ‘changelessness’ and fixity of intelligible 
reality means, as it does for these friends, that it neither does (δρ઼ν, 248c5; ποιε૙ν, 248c8) 
nor undergoes (π੺σχειν, 248c8) anything at all. For if knowing and being known are things 
done and undergone (248d4–e4), these would thereby be excluded from intelligible reality. 
Such a position, the visitor thinks, would be entirely untenable: 
 
Shall we easily be persuaded that, truly, motion and life and soul and wisdom (κίνησιν κα੿ 
ζω੽ν κα੿ ψυχ੽ν κα੿ φρόνησιν) are not present in that which completely is (τ૶ παντελ૵ς 
੕ντι), that it neither lives nor thinks (μηδ੻ ζોν α੝τઁ μηδ੻ φρονε૙ν), but, solemn and holy, 
without intellect (νο૨ν ο੝κ ਩χον), it is standing unchanged (ἀκίνητον)? (248e6–249a2)109 
 
This, it is concluded, would be a “terrible (δεινόν) thing to say” (249a3). To avoid such a 
result, motion and life and soul and wisdom must somehow be attributed to the forms.110 
Given that knowledge is of forms, it follows that the forms are ‘being known.’ 
When human beings know the forms, they are the ones doing the ‘knowing.’ But here in 
the Sophist, the forms themselves are also said to be ‘knowing.’ That is, they are described 
as both the subject and the object of knowledge. Intelligible reality considered as the object 
of knowledge is usually referred to as ‘form.’ But what this passage from the Sophist 
strongly suggests is that intelligible reality considered as the subject of knowledge is 
‘intellect’ (νο૨ς). Intelligible reality is thus described both as the (knowing) subject and as 
the (known) object.111 As the subject of knowledge—as intellect—intelligible reality is 
described as possessing a kind of motion and life.112 
 
109 ੪ς ἀληθ૵ς κίνησιν κα੿ ζω੽ν κα੿ ψυχ੽ν κα੿ φρόνησιν ਷ ૧઺δίως πεισθησόμεθα τ૶ παντελ૵ς ੕ντι μ੽ 
παρε૙ναι, μηδ੻ ζોν α੝τઁ μηδ੻ φρονε૙ν, ἀλλ੹ σεμνઁν κα੿ ਚγιον, νο૨ν ο੝κ ਩χον, ἀκίνητον ਦστઁς εੇναι; 
110 Cf. Laws 897d2–898b3 for a geometric analogy with the motion of intellect. Intellect’s motion is like a 
circle because it self-contained (i.e. what it knows is not extrinsic to itself; its knowledge is self-reflexive). 
111 See Perl (1998, 2014) for excellent treatments and defenses of this interpretation. 
112 Plato’s term for the activity of thinking is ‘intellect’s motion’ (κίνησις νο૨). Aristotle introduced the 
technical term ਥνέργεια (activity) and distinguished it from κίνησις (motion). For Aristotle, the latter implies 
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Note that the attribution of motion, life, soul, and wisdom to the forms in the Sophist 
accords extremely well—not only with the account of the paradigm of the cosmos as the 
“intelligible living thing” (39e1) in the Timaeus, but also with Plato’s many descriptions 
throughout the Phaedo (68a6, 81c5, 83e3), Republic (490a8–b6, 585b9–586b4), Timaeus 
(52a1) and Sophist (248d4–e4) of knowledge as the ‘συνουσία’ of knower and known. The 
intelligible living thing is simply the act of thinking the forms with which it is identified.113 
In other words, it is intellect (νο૨ς).114 In the next section, we will turn to a more thorough 
examination of the way in which life and soul are said to be present in intellect. 
 
§3 THE SOUL 
 
Perhaps the closest we approach to a definition of ‘soul’ anywhere in Plato’s corpus 
is at the end of the Phaedo, where Socrates tells us that the soul is such that “whenever it 
comes to be (ਥγγένηται) in a body,” that is what causes the body “to be alive (ζ૵ν ਩σται)” 
(105c9–10).115 Only a few lines later, we are told that “whatever the soul occupies, it 
always brings life to it (ψυχ੽ ਙρα ੖τι ਗν α੝τ੽ κατάσχૉ, ἀε੿ ਸ਼κει ਥπ’ ਥκε૙νο φέρουσα ζωήν)” 
(105d2).116 This is corroborated in the Republic, where the soul is likewise described as 
 
a degree of potency inherent in change whereas the former does not. Aristotle describes the thinking of the 
Prime Mover as ਥνέργεια νο૨ and identifies its activity with the best life (Cf. Metaphysics 1072b31–1073a2). 
113 Compare Kahn (1985) 327n24: “Reflexion must be reflexion on something which is not itself reflexion 
[…] Hence nous is determined or defined by the essences which are its objects […] The counter-objection, 
that the divine mind would be less perfect if it knew anything other than itself, is spurious, just because in 
actual nRƝViV the knowing subject is identical with its object. Drastically put, the Prime Mover [or, as we 
might say here: the ‘intelligible living thing’] is simply the formal-noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious 
of itself.” Although Kahn is here discussing Aristotle, this works equally well as an exegesis of Plato’s νο૨ς. 
114 As Gerson (2017) p. 298 puts it, since the sort of motion attributed to the forms “is just the activity of 
intellect, form and intellect are inseparable. Cf. Timaeus, 41c–d, 61c7, 65a5, 69c8–d1, 72d4, 89d–90d; See 
also Republic, 611b9–612a6 
115 Except, perhaps, if one includes the (likely spurious) Definitions, where ‘soul’ is defined as ‘that which 
moves itself (τઁ αਫ਼τઁ κινο૨ν)’ and ‘the principle of motion in living creatures’ (αੁτία κινήσεως ζωτικોς 
ζ૴ων)’ (411c7). 
116 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 415b8: “The soul is the cause and principle (αੁτία κα੿ ἀρχή) of the living body.” 
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“the very thing by which we live” (445a5).117 In the Phaedo, the “soul does not admit 
death” (105e4) and so is essentially alive.118 Or, as Socrates himself puts it, the soul is 
“immortal (ἀθάνατος)” (106b1). These claims, taken together with the arguments for the 
immortality of the soul in which they are embedded, suggest that for the soul to die is not 
a practical but a logical or a metaphysical impossibility.119 It is arguably in this sense that 
Socrates understands the soul to be “indestructible (ἀνώλεθρος)” (106b2).120 
Socrates also claims that our souls “existed apart from the body before they took 
on human form, and they had wisdom (φρόνησιν)” (76c10–11). But Socrates goes even 
further—yoking together the necessary existence of the reality constituted by forms with 
the necessity of the immortality of the soul (76d5).121 Just as the forms exist eternally, we 
are told, so too do our souls, which possess them. Given that this intelligible reality is “ours 
(ਲμετέραν)” (76e1), “there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls 
to exist before we came to be” (76e4).122 Indeed, as it will turn out, even “when death 
comes to humans, the mortal part of them dies, it seems, but the immortal part goes away 
safe and indestructible” (106e3). The ‘being’ or real reality possessed by our souls reveals 
 
117 Cf. Republic 353d3: “Is there some function of a soul that you couldn’t perform with anything else, for 
example, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to which 
you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar function? No, none of them. What of living? 
Isn’t that a function of a soul? It certainly is.” 
118 Cf. Sedley (2009) p. 147; He seems to accept that the definition of soul is simply ‘life,’ or perhaps, ‘that 
in virtue of which something is alive.’ He suggests as much in the following remark, p. 150: “were it to pass 
out of existence, it would thereby become that contradiction in terms, a dead soul. For a soul to die is as 
impossible as for a trio to come to be an even trio, or for snow to become hot snow.” 
119 See Sedley (2009) p. 152 
120 See Sedley (2009) pp. 146–52 for a very useful discussion of the immortality arguments. 
121 Cf. Phaedo 92d7–e2: “our soul was said to exist also before it came into the body, just as the reality does 
that is of the kind that we qualify by the words ‘what it is,’ and I convinced myself that I was quite correct to 
accept it.” 
122 κα੿ ੅ση ἀνάγκη τα૨τά τε εੇναι κα੿ τ੹ς ਲμετέρας ψυχ੹ς πρ੿ν κα੿ ਲμ઼ς γεγονέναι 
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the sort of immortality it must possess: not merely everlastingness—a (temporal) 
sempiternality—but, like the forms themselves, a full-fledged (atemporal) eternality.123 
Turning now to the Timaeus, we are told that intellect is the very paradigm of life.124 
It is, as Timaeus says, “the perfect and intelligible living thing (ઝ τ૶ τελέ૳ κα੿ νοητ૶ 
ζ૴૳)” (39e1), which is responsible for endowing the cosmos itself and all that it contains 
with soul and life: 
 
Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible 
no unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess 
intelligence as a whole (το૨ νο૨ν ਩χοντος ੖λον), and he further concluded that it is 
impossible for anything to come to possess intelligence apart from soul (νο૨ν δ’ α੣ χωρ੿ς 
ψυχોς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τ૳). Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, 
and soul in body (νο૨ν μ੻ν ਥν ψυχૌ, ψυχ੽ν δ’ ਥν σώματι) and so constructed the cosmos. 
He wanted to produce a work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would 
allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence 
brought the cosmos into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence 
(ο੢τως ο੣ν δ੽ κατ੹ λόγον τઁν εੁκότα δε૙ λέγειν τόνδε τઁν κόσμον ζ૶ον ਩μψυχον ਩ννουν 
τε τૌ ἀληθεί઺ δι੹ τ੽ν το૨ θεο૨ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν). (30b2–c2)125 
 
Recall that Socrates had claimed in the Phaedo that the soul is what causes the body “to be 
alive (ζ૵ν ਩σται)” (105c9).126 Here, one might say, is that very same claim writ-large: the 
body of the sensible cosmos is endowed with soul and life. Given that Timaeus insists that 
anything “which comes to be must have a body and be both visible and tangible” (31b6) it 
 
123 See Wilberding (2016) for an excellent discussion of this distinction. Cf. Timaeus 41b4 
124 Cf. Timaeus 37d1 
125 λογισάμενος ο੣ν η੢ρισκεν ਥκ τ૵ν κατ੹ φύσιν ੒ρατ૵ν ο੝δ੻ν ἀνόητον το૨ νο૨ν ਩χοντος ੖λον ੖λου κάλλιον 
਩σεσθαί ποτε ਩ργον, νο૨ν δ’ α੣ χωρ੿ς ψυχોς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τ૳. δι੹ δ੽ τઁν λογισμઁν τόνδε νο૨ν 
μ੻ν ਥν ψυχૌ, ψυχ੽ν δ’ ਥν σώματι συνιστ੹ς τઁ π઼ν συνετεκταίνετο, ੖πως ੖τι κάλλιστον ε੅η κατ੹ φύσιν 
ਙριστόν τε ਩ργον ἀπειργασμένος. ο੢τως ο੣ν δ੽ κατ੹ λόγον τઁν εੁκότα δε૙ λέγειν τόνδε τઁν κόσμον ζ૶ον 
਩μψυχον ਩ννουν τε τૌ ἀληθεί઺ δι੹ τ੽ν το૨ θεο૨ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. 
126 This passage has been used by some commentators (e.g. Cornford and Cherniss) to argue that since νο૨ς 
cannot exist apart from soul, then it must be identified with the world-soul. But this interpretation cannot be 
sustained, since the demiurge is explicitly said to form not just the body, but the soul of the cosmos. I take 
Menn (1995) to give the decisive blow when he cites 37a1–2, where Timaeus contrasts the world-soul as the 
best of the ‘generated things’ and the demiurge who is the best of the ‘intelligible and eternal things.’ 
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follows that the sensible cosmos, which has come to be as a living thing, is ensouled.127 Its 
soul is what scholars commonly refer to as the world-soul. 
Now, although the world-soul is embodied, the divine craftsman gave it “priority 
and seniority” in order that it might “be the body’s master and to rule over it as its subject” 
(34c5).128 Just insofar as the world-soul animates the entire sensible cosmos, it most closely 
resembles the perfect, intelligible paradigm of life, which is intellect (30d3, 39e1): “the 
[world] soul came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by the most 
excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal (τ૵ν νοητ૵ν ἀεί τε ੕ντων)” (36e6).129 As we 
will shortly come to see, the divine part of the human soul turns out to be, much like the 
world-soul, an embodied manifestation of this immortal intellect.130 
 
3.1 The Human Soul 
 
Following his description of the generation of the world-soul, Timaeus proceeds to 
offer an elaborate treatment of the generation of the human soul. The divine craftsman, we 
are told, subcontracts the job of our creation out to various “auxiliary causes” (αੁτίαις 
 
127 Or, alternatively, the world-soul is embodied. As we discover, the “body of the cosmos” (31b9) is 
constructed out of the four elements (32b5). The “eternal god” (34b2) then endows it with soul (34b4). 
128 Cf. Phaedo 80a1–6: “When the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to 
be ruled (δουλεύειν κα੿ ਙρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master (ਙρχειν κα੿ δεσπόζειν). Then again, 
which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine 
is to rule and to lead (ਙρχειν τε κα੿ ਲγεμονεύειν), whereas that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject 
(ਙρχεσθαί τε κα੿ δουλεύειν)?” 
129 Now if, as many scholars have supposed, the Timaeus is Plato’s attempt to make good on Anaxagoras’ 
claim that νο૨ς is the cause of all things, then one should also note that Anaxagoras himself seems to identify 
νο૨ς with soul. Pace Menn (1995) p. 18, who claims that “it is enough to see that Plato is not identifying soul 
and nous, and that he says different things about them.” I agree with Gerson (2017) p. 6: “It seems reasonable 
that […] the intelligible reality of […] Soul just is […] the Living Animal.” This is corroborated by Aristotle, 
De Anima 404a25–b6; Democritus also identifies soul with νο૨ς. 
130 Gerson (2006) p. 298 correctly claims that is unnecessary to “suppose that the soul that is introduced into 
the really real is other than the immortal part of the soul, that is, the soul that does not need to be embodied.” 
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ਫ਼πηρετούσαις, 68e5) which are also described as the craftsman’s divine progeny. The 
divine craftsman instructs these auxiliary causes as follows: 
 
O gods, works whose maker and father I am (ੰν ਥγઅ δημιουργઁς πατήρ τε ਩ργων) […] you 
must turn yourselves to the task of fashioning these living things […] And to the extent 
that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares the name immortal, something 
described as divine and ruling within those of them who always consent to follow after 
justice and after you (κα੿ καθ’ ੖σον μ੻ν α੝τ૵ν ἀθανάτοις ੒μώνυμον εੇναι προσήκει, θε૙ον 
λεγόμενον ਲγεμονο૨ν τε ਥν α੝το૙ς τ૵ν ἀε੿ δίκૉ κα੿ ਫ਼μ૙ν ਥθελόντων ਪπεσθαι), I shall begin 
by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of the task is yours. Weave what 
is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. (41a7–d3)131 
 
 
Note that we receive our immortality directly from the divine craftsman, while the rest is 
left to the auxiliary causes. Since we are fashioned both from what is immortal and what is 
mortal, it turns out that we possess a double-nature. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that 
of our two natures, “the superior (κρε૙ττον) kind should be such as would from then on be 
called ‘man’ (ἀνήρ).”132 So it is our immortal, rather than our mortal nature which is most 
properly called human. 
As surprising as such a claim might at first appear, it is not without precedent. 
Socrates had referred to the rational part of the soul in the Republic as the “human being 
 
131 “Θεο੿ θε૵ν, ੰν ਥγઅ δημιουργઁς πατήρ τε ਩ργων […] τρέπεσθε κατ੹ φύσιν ਫ਼με૙ς ਥπ੿ τ੽ν τ૵ν ζ૴ων 
δημιουργίαν […] κα੿ καθ’ ੖σον μ੻ν α੝τ૵ν ἀθανάτοις ੒μώνυμον εੇναι προσήκει, θε૙ον λεγόμενον ਲγεμονο૨ν 
τε ਥν α੝το૙ς τ૵ν ἀε੿ δίκૉ κα੿ ਫ਼μ૙ν ਥθελόντων ਪπεσθαι, σπείρας κα੿ ਫ਼παρξάμενος ਥγઅ παραδώσω· τઁ δ੻ λοιπઁν 
ਫ਼με૙ς, ἀθανάτ૳ θνητઁν προςυφαίνοντες 
132 Timaeus 42a2; Johansen (2008) pp. 109–10, also notes the similarity between the text here and the Glaucus 
passage from the Republic, though his stress is on a reading that doesn’t view the accretions as ‘monstrous.’ 
I am inclined to agree with him, though my stress is on the rational soul, which is said to be our ‘original 
nature.’ (Cf. Republic 611d2; Timaeus 90d5 and 42d2). Compare also with Aristotle, who reaches the same 
conclusion in the Nicomachean Ethics: granted that “intellect is divine (θε૙ον ੒ νο૨ς)” (1177b30), we still 
must not concern ourselves with merely mortal, human concerns, “but must, so far as we can, make ourselves 
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us (ἀλλ’ ਥφ’ ੖σον ਥνδέχεται 
ἀθανατίζειν κα੿ πάντα ποιε૙ν πρઁς τઁ ζોν κατ੹ τઁ κράτιστον τ૵ν ਥν αਫ਼τ૶)” (1177b33–34). In fact, this would 
seem “to be each person himself (δόξειε δ’ ਗν κα੿ εੇναι ਪκαστος το૨το), since it is the authoritative and better 
part (ε੅περ τઁ κύριον κα੿ ਙμεινον) of us.” (1178a2). So “the life according to intellect [is best and pleasantest] 
for man, since intellect more than anything else is man (κα੿ τ૶ ἀνθρώπ૳ δ੽ ੒ κατ੹ τઁν νο૨ν βίος, ε੅περ 
το૨το μάλιστα ਙνθρωπος)” (1178a8). 
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within the human being” (589a8). Expanding on his metaphor of human beings as creatures 
comprised of a savage beast (appetites), a lion (spirit) and a human (reason), Socrates 
secures agreement that the beautiful (καλόν) is anything that “subordinates the beastlike 
parts of our nature to the human—or better, perhaps, to the divine” (589d1). Given our 
twofold nature—irrational and rational, mortal and immortal—Plato seems to consistently 
maintain that our ‘superior’ and ‘human’ nature is the rational and immortal one. 
Following an exposition of how our souls came to be implanted in bodies, Timaeus 
outlines the way in which the embodied soul displays its various capacities. Our very first 
(innate) capacity is for sense perception (42a6). This is followed by the acquisition of 
simple and complex desires and emotions (42a7–b2). Last in this temporal sequence is the 
acquisition of reason, whose job it is to come to rule the entire person.  
The ascension of reason to power is cast as nothing less than the defining activity 
of our lives: “if they [humans] could master (κρατήσοιεν) these emotions, their lives would 
be just, whereas if they were mastered (κρατηθέντες) by them, they would be unjust” 
(42b2). Indeed, Timaeus goes on to tell us that those who live a just life under the rule of 
reason will, upon death, return to a disembodied state and, in this state, “live a life of 
happiness” (42b6). It is worth pointing out that, just as we saw in the previous chapter, self-
mastery is again cast in terms of a struggle between bodily appetites and reason: 
 
And he would have no rest from these toilsome transformations until he had dragged that 
massive accretion (προσφύντα) of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with the revolution 
of the same and uniform within him and so mastered (κρατήσας) that turbulent, irrational 
mass by means of reason. This would return him to his original and best condition (λόγ૳ 
κρατήσας εੁς τઁ τોς πρώτης κα੿ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εੇδος ਪξεως). (42c4–d2)133 
 
 
133 ἀλλάττων τε ο੝ πρότερον πόνων λήξοι, πρ੿ν τૌ τα੝το૨ κα੿ ੒μοίου περιόδ૳ τૌ ਥν αਫ਼τ૶ συνεπισπώμενος 
τઁν πολઃν ੕χλον κα੿ ੢στερον προσφύντα ਥκ πυρઁς κα੿ ੢δατος κα੿ ἀέρος κα੿ γોς, θορυβώδη κα੿ ਙλογον ੕ντα, 
λόγ૳ κρατήσας εੁς τઁ τોς πρώτης κα੿ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εੇδος ਪξεως. 
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This passage, down to its very wording, recalls the Glaucus passage from the Republic. 
The original nature of the sea-god Glaucus was hard to discern because of the various 
accretions that attached themselves (προσπεφυκέναι) to him while he was submerged under 
the sea, and which made him “look more like a wild animal than his natural self” (611d5). 
In the present context, it turns out that only by subduing a mass of irrational, bodily 
accretions can human beings hope to be restored to their original and best condition.134 
Later in the dialogue, Timaeus returns to a discussion of the soul’s embodiment, 
but he is now concerned to distinguish the immortal soul from the mortal: 
 
[H]aving taken the immortal principle of the soul (παραλαβόντες ἀρχ੽ν ψυχોς ἀθάνατον), 
they proceeded next to encase it (περιετόρνευσαν) within a round mortal body [the head], 
and to give it the entire body as its chariot (੕χημά).135 And within the body they built 
another kind of soul as well, the mortal (τઁ θνητόν), which contains within it those dreadful 
but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that 
make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish 
counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage, and expectation easily led 
astray. These they fused with unreasoning (ἀλόγ૳) sense perception and all-venturing lust, 
and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul. In the face of these 
disturbances they scrupled to stain the divine soul only to the extent that this was absolutely 
 
134 Cf. Symposium 192e9, where humans are also enjoined to return to their ‘original nature’ (ἀρχαία φύσις) 
135 Cf. Phaedrus 246b1–247c2, where the same image of a ‘chariot’ (ੑχήματα) is deployed. There, the chariot 
is comprised of two horses—one representing the spirited part of the soul, and the other representing the 
appetitive part of the soul. The ‘charioteer’ (ਲνίοχος) represents the rational part of the soul. See also 41e1, 
where the demiurge “mounted each soul in a chariot (੕χημα)” and showed it the nature of the cosmos. It 
would be rather surprising if Plato’s choice of language were anything less than a direct and deliberate 
reference to Phaedrus 247c6–e5: “What is in this place is without color and without shape and without 
solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intellect (μόν૳ 
θεατ੽ ν૶), the soul’s steersman (κυβερνήτૉ). Now a god’s mind is nourished by intelligence and pure 
knowledge (ο੣ν θεο૨ διάνοια ν૶ τε κα੿ ਥπιστήμૉ ἀκηράτ૳ τρεφομένη), as is the mind of any soul that is 
concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and 
watching what is true, feeding on all this and feeling wonderful, until the circular motion brings it around (ਲ 
περιφορ੹ εੁς τα੝τઁν περιενέγκૉ) to where it started. On the way around it has a view of justice itself by itself; 
it has a view of moderartion (σωφροσύνην); it has a view of knowledge—not the knowledge that is close to 
change, that becomes different as it knows the different things which we consider real down here. No, it is 
the knowledge of what really is what it is (ἀλλ੹ τ੽ν ਥν τ૶ ੖ ਥστιν ੓ν ੕ντως ਥπιστήμην ο੣σαν). And when 
the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes 
home. On its arrival, the charioteer (ਲνίοχος) stables the horses by the manger, throws in ambrosia, and gives 
them nectar to drink besides.” 
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necessary, and so they provided a home for the mortal soul in another place in the body. 
(69c6–e2, my emphases)136 
 
 
The mortal soul is constructed by the auxiliary causes, and all of the usual passions and 
affections are attributed to it. The immortal soul, though it is affected by its embodiment, 
is supposed to remain as pure and ‘unstained’ as possible—just as it was in the Phaedo 
(79d1–5). We will focus on the way in which the immortal embodied soul returns to its 
purest state below. 
First, however, it is worth briefly examining what Timaeus goes on to say about the 
body’s relation to the soul. Timaeus immediately goes on to explain how both the body 
and the soul were expertly and providentially arranged so that “the best part among them 
all can rule” (70b9). For example, our intestines are elongated and coiled because this 
prevents food from passing through the body too quickly. If we required constant 
nourishment, this would render us altogether “incapable of philosophy” and “incapable of 
heeding the most divine part within us” (73a7). The body is thus organized in such a way 
as to allow the soul to maintain its (hierarchical) structure, with reason firmly in command. 
Timaeus thus presents human beings as a kind of psychosomatic whole, naturally 
structured in such a way as to allow us to most effectively pursue a good embodied life 
under the rule of reason.137 
 
136 παραλαβόντες ἀρχ੽ν ψυχોς ἀθάνατον, τઁ μετ੹ το૨το θνητઁν σ૵μα α੝τૌ περιετόρνευσαν ੕χημά τε π઼ν 
τઁ σ૵μα ਩δοσαν ਙλλο τε εੇδος ਥν α੝τ૶ ψυχોς προσ૳κοδόμουν τઁ θνητόν, δειν੹ κα੿ ἀναγκα૙α ਥν ਦαυτ૶ 
παθήματα ਩χον, πρ૵τον μ੻ν ਲδονήν, μέγιστον κακο૨ δέλεαρ, ਩πειτα λύπας, ἀγαθ૵ν φυγάς, ਩τι δ’ α੣ θάρρος 
κα੿ φόβον, ਙφρονε συμβούλω, θυμઁν δ੻ δυσπαραμύθητον, ਥλπίδα δ’ ε੝παράγωγον· αੁσθήσει δ੻ ἀλόγ૳ κα੿ 
ਥπιχειρητૌ παντઁς ਩ρωτι συγκερασάμενοι τα૨τα, ἀναγκαίως τઁ θνητઁν γένος συνέθεσαν. κα੿ δι੹ τα૨τα δ੽ 
σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τઁ θε૙ον, ੖τι μ੽ π઼σα ਷ν ἀνάγκη, χωρ੿ς ਥκείνου κατοικίζουσιν εੁς ਙλλην το૨ σώματος 
ο੅κησιν τઁ θνητόν 
137 As such, we are encouraged to maintain good proportion between soul and body, since the lack of such 
proportion is the main cause of disease—both psychic and physical (87e1). Timaeus here pivots away from 
a discussion of three types of soul, or three soul-parts, and instead begins to contrast the rational soul with 
the irrational body, much as we saw in the Phaedo: “given that human beings have two sets of natural 
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 Yet embodiment also carries with it inherent risks. In expounding the sorts of 
diseases to which the soul is subject during its embodiment, Timaeus tells us that the 
gravest of all involves succumbing to excessive pleasures and pains. In moments of 
extreme ecstasy or blinding pain, people become “raving mad” and are in “that moment 
least capable of rational thought” (86c2). These pleasures and pains come “through the 
body” but they nevertheless make the “soul diseased and witless” (86d1). When the 
pleasures and pains of the body render someone witless, people unfortunately don’t 
consider them sick, but rather willfully evil. In fact, as Timaeus points out, “just about 
every type of succumbing to pleasure is talked about as something reproachable, as though 
the evils are willfully done” (86d6). Yet this, he says, is the furthest thing from the truth. 
When it comes to those who succumb to pleasure: 
 
[I]t is not right to reproach people, for no one is bad willingly (ο੝κ ੑρθ૵ς ੑνειδίζεται· 
κακઁς μ੻ν γ੹ρ ਦκઅν ο੝δείς). The bad become bad as a result of one or another corrupt 
conditions of their body and an uneducated upbringing (ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν). (86e1–3)138 
 
 
Now, anyone who has read the Protagoras should recognize that this is simply a 
restatement of the Socratic claim that no one does wrong willingly.139 Yet here it is: 
affirmed in a dialogue universally acknowledged to be later than the Republic and placed 
in the mouth, not of Socrates, but of Timaeus.140 What is especially striking (aside from 
the fact that it is embedded within an extended discussion of pleasures and pains, just as it 
 
desires—desires of the body for food and desires of the most divine part of us for wisdom—the motions of 
the stronger part will predominate, and amplify their own interests.” (88b1; Cf. Republic 431a3, 589a1). But 
even when the soul and body are naturally well proportioned, Timaeus tells us in a passage that recalls the 
Republic (411e3), that such ailments are prevented by exercising both body and soul proportionately (88b5). 
138 ο੝κ ੑρθ૵ς ੑνειδίζεται· κακઁς μ੻ν γ੹ρ ਦκઅν ο੝δείς, δι੹ δ੻ πονηρ੹ν ਪξιν τιν੹ το૨ σώματος κα੿ ἀπαίδευτον 
τροφ੽ν ੒ κακઁς γίγνεται κακός 
139 Cf. Protagoras 358d1 and Republic 589c4 
140 Cf. Meyer (2014) pp. 55–69 and Kamtekar (2018) pp. 155–157 
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had been in the Protagoras) is that both the preceding and ensuing discussions furnish us 
with an account that renders such a statement not at all paradoxical in the context of this 
work: for it has been established that the cosmos and all within it—including human 
beings—are naturally and necessarily oriented toward the good. Not only human beings, 
but the cosmos itself, has been providentially constructed in such a way that a supremely 
good intellect may come to rule “one and all” (71a2). 
 
§4 BECOMING LIKE GOD 
 
 David Sedley has noted that although ‘becoming like god’ (੒μο઀ωσις θε૶) was 
universally acknowledged in antiquity to be the Platonic goal in life—in “modern studies 
of Plato, ੒μο઀ωσις θε૶ is rarely even to be found in the index.”141 Yet given its normative 
force, it can hardly fail to be a pivotal feature of Plato’s ethics, or indeed of his thought 
more generally. It is perhaps best understood in connection with Timaeus’ remark that the 
divine craftsman “wanted all things to come to be, as much as possible, like itself” (29e3). 
This final section of the chapter will focus on the way in which human beings, in particular, 
are called to assimilate themselves to this divine intellect. 
The Timaeus retains a version of the tripartite psychology familiar from the 
Republic, although now the appetitive and spirited parts (or ‘types’) of soul are explicitly 
said to be mortal (69c6–7). The spatial distribution of the mortal soul within the body gains 
some salience toward the end of the dialogue, when the discussion turns to the possibility 
of moral progress. Moral defects and their remedies are first given a purely physiological 
 
141 Sedley (1997) p. 327. If Sedley is too polite to take aim at any particular author, Gerson (2017) p. 13n65 
is not: “See Irwin (1977, 1995) for nearly 800 pages of analysis of Plato’s ethics which nowhere discusses 
the meaning and significance of ‘assimilation to the divine.’” 
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explanation (86b1–89d2): imbalances between soul and body are to be remedied by the 
appropriate sorts of physical and cultural training that are familiar from the Republic. As 
for the various kinds of soul-imbalances, these must be remedied by ensuring that each 
type of soul retains its own proper motions (89e4). These proper motions are retained by 
means of the sort of educational program also familiar from the Republic. But while the 
discussion of education in the Republic had culminated in an analysis of the moral virtues, 
what Timaeus goes on to offer (90a3–d8) is an account of purely intellectual virtue, which 
places the so-called moral virtues on the back burner.142  
 Timaeus explains that the rational soul has been implanted in the head. Since it is 
divine, and only temporarily housed within the body, he thinks it is no exaggeration to call 
it our resident divinity (δαίμονα): 
 
Now we ought to think of the most sovereign (κυριωτάτου) part of our soul as god’s gift 
to us, given to be our guiding spirit (δαίμονα). This, of course, is the type of soul that, as 
we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies (οੁκε૙ν μ੻ν ਲμ૵ν ਥπ’ ਙκρ૳ τ૶ σώματι). 
It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we 
are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak absolutely 
correctly. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that 
the divine part suspends our head—our root—and so keeps our whole body upright 
(ਥκε૙θεν γάρ, ੖θεν ਲ πρώτη τોς ψυχોς γένεσις ਩φυ, τઁ θε૙ον τ੽ν κεφαλ੽ν κα੿ ૧ίζαν ਲμ૵ν 
ἀνακρεμαννઃν ੑρθο૙ π઼ν τઁ σ૵μα.). (90a3–b1)143 
 
 
Timaeus immediately goes on to contrast the sort of people who devote their lives to the 
cultivation of this immortal and sovereign part of themselves with those who instead 
nurture the various mortal aspects of themselves: 
 
142 In antiquity, this was perhaps the single most celebrated passage on the subject of ‘੒μο઀ωσις θε૶’ in all 
of Plato—along with Theaetetus 176b ff. and Symposium 207d ff. 
143 τઁ δ੻ δ੽ περ੿ το૨ κυριωτάτου παρ’ ਲμ૙ν ψυχોς ε੅δους διανοε૙σθαι δε૙ τૌδε, ੪ς ਙρα α੝τઁ δαίμονα θεઁς 
ਦκάστ૳ δέδωκεν, το૨το ੔ δή φαμεν οੁκε૙ν μ੻ν ਲμ૵ν ਥπ’ ਙκρ૳ τ૶ σώματι, πρઁς δ੻ τ੽ν ਥν ο੝ραν૶ συγγένειαν 
ἀπઁ γોς ਲμ઼ς α੅ρειν ੪ς ੕ντας φυτઁν ο੝κ ਩γγειον ἀλλ੹ ο੝ράνιον, ੑρθότατα λέγοντες· ਥκε૙θεν γάρ, ੖θεν ਲ 
πρώτη τોς ψυχોς γένεσις ਩φυ, τઁ θε૙ον τ੽ν κεφαλ੽ν κα੿ ૧ίζαν ਲμ૵ν ἀνακρεμαννઃν ੑρθο૙ π઼ν τઁ σ૵μα. 
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So if someone has become absorbed in their appetites (ਥπιθυμίας) or their love of victory 
(φιλονικίας) and takes great pains to further them, all their thoughts are bound to become 
mortal. And so far as it is at all possible for someone to become thoroughly mortal, they 
cannot help but fully succeed in this, seeing that they have cultivated mortality all along. 
On the other hand, if they have seriously devoted themselves to the love of learning and to 
true wisdom (τ૶ δ੻ περ੿ φιλομαθίαν κα੿ περ੿ τ੹ς ἀληθε૙ς φρονήσεις ਥσπουδακότι), if they 
have exercised these aspects of themselves above all, then there is absolutely no way that 
their thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine (ἀθάνατα κα੿ θε૙α), should truth come 
within their grasp. And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality 
(μετασχε૙ν ἀνθρωπίνૉ φύσει ἀθανασίας ਥνδέχεται), they can in no way fail to achieve this: 
constantly caring for their divine part, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives 
within them, they must indeed be supremely happy (ਚτε δ੻ ἀε੿ θεραπεύοντα τઁ θε૙ον 
਩χοντά τε α੝τઁν ε੣ κεκοσμημένον τઁν δαίμονα σύνοικον ਦαυτ૶, διαφερόντως ε੝δαίμονα 
εੇναι). (90b1–c6)144 
 
 
Supreme happiness lies in the well-being of that ‘divinity’ in us which is just the immortal 
and rational part of the soul.145 
Should someone wholly devote themselves to the love of learning and to true 
wisdom, they would then be nurturing the immortal (and divine) part of themselves, and 
thus come to share in a divine life. In that sense, one who pursues (and perhaps even attains) 
true wisdom is achieving immortality to the extent that this is possible for embodied human 
beings.146 One should of course be able to detect more than mere echoes here of discussions 
 
144 τ૶ μ੻ν ο੣ν περ੿ τ੹ς ਥπιθυμίας ਲ਼ περ੿ φιλονικίας τετευτακότι κα੿ τα૨τα διαπονο૨ντι σφόδρα πάντα τ੹ 
δόγματα ἀνάγκη θνητ੹ ਥγγεγονέναι, κα੿ παντάπασιν καθ’ ੖σον μάλιστα δυνατઁν θνητ૶ γίγνεσθαι, τούτου 
μηδ੻ σμικρઁν ਥλλείπειν, ਚτε τઁ τοιο૨τον η੝ξηκότι· τ૶ δ੻ περ੿ φιλομαθίαν κα੿ περ੿ τ੹ς ἀληθε૙ς φρονήσεις 
ਥσπουδακότι κα੿ τα૨τα μάλιστα τ૵ν αਫ਼το૨ γεγυμνασμέν૳ φρονε૙ν μ੻ν ἀθάνατα κα੿ θε૙α, ਙνπερ ἀληθείας 
ਥφάπτηται, π઼σα ἀνάγκη που, καθ’ ੖σον δ’ α੣ μετασχε૙ν ἀνθρωπίνૉ φύσει ἀθανασίας ਥνδέχεται, τούτου 
μηδ੻ν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, ਚτε δ੻ ἀε੿ θεραπεύοντα τઁ θε૙ον ਩χοντά τε α੝τઁν ε੣ κεκοσμημένον τઁν δαίμονα 
σύνοικον ਦαυτ૶, διαφερόντως ε੝δαίμονα εੇναι. 
145 Cf. Republic 589a1 
146 Sedley (1998) p. 332: “If you concentrate your concerns on one or the other mortal part of the soul, by 
devoting your life either to acquisitive or to competitive pursuits, you will be making your mortal soul your 
true self.” 
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familiar from both the Phaedo (106e3, 107d7)147 and the Republic (500c2).148 But the 
Timaeus goes further, telling us how we are to assimilate ourselves to the divine: 
 
Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the nourishment 
and the motions that are proper to it. And the motions that have an affinity to the divine 
part within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the cosmos (τ૶ δ’ ਥν ਲμ૙ν θεί૳ συγγενε૙ς 
εੁσιν κινήσεις αੂ το૨ παντઁς διανοήσεις κα੿ περιφοραί). These, surely, are the ones which 
each of us should follow. We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown 
off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the cosmos, 
and so bring into conformity with its objects our faculty of intellect, as it was in its original 
nature (τ૶ κατανοουμέν૳ τઁ κατανοο૨ν ਥξομοι૵σαι κατ੹ τ੽ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν). And when 
this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life 
offered to humankind by the gods (੒μοιώσαντα δ੻ τέλος ਩χειν το૨ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις 
ਫ਼πઁ θε૵ν ἀρίστου βίου), both now and forevermore. (90c6–d7)149  
 
 
Becoming like god is said to be the return of the divine part of the soul to its original nature. 
This is achieved by assimilating one’s thoughts to the thoughts and motions of the cosmos. 
For the rational soul, we are told, is constructed from the very same ingredients as the 
world-soul. Indeed, the revolutions of the world-soul are said to be made visible as stellar 
and planetary motions in order that human beings might come to learn mathematics (39b3). 
Human beings, in turn, are endowed with sight primarily in order to study the heavenly 
revolutions (47a2). So not only our physiology, but the very structure of the cosmos itself, 
 
147 Phaedo 106e3–107d7: “Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his 
deathless part goes away safe and indestructible […] But now that the soul appears to be immortal, there is 
no escape from evil or salvation for it except by becoming as good and wise as possible (βελτίστην τε κα੿ 
φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι).” 
148 Republic 500c2–d1: “Or do you suppose there is any way in which someone can consort (੒μιλε૙) with 
what he admires without becoming like it? […] Then the philosopher, consorting with what is divine and 
orderly, becomes as orderly and divine as is possible for a man (Θεί૳ δ੽ κα੿ κοσμί૳ ੖ γε φιλόσοφος ੒μιλ૵ν 
κόσμιός τε κα੿ θε૙ος εੁς τઁ δυνατઁν ἀνθρώπ૳ γίγνεται).” 
149 θεραπεία δ੻ δ੽ παντ੿ παντઁς μία, τ੹ς οੁκείας ਦκάστ૳ τροφ੹ς κα੿ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τ૶ δ’ ਥν ਲμ૙ν θεί૳ 
συγγενε૙ς εੁσιν κινήσεις αੂ το૨ παντઁς διανοήσεις κα੿ περιφοραί· ταύταις δ੽ συνεπόμενον ਪκαστον δε૙, τ੹ς 
περ੿ τ੽ν γένεσιν ਥν τૌ κεφαλૌ διεφθαρμένας ਲμ૵ν περιόδους ਥξορθο૨ντα δι੹ τઁ καταμανθάνειν τ੹ς το૨ 
παντઁς ਖρμονίας τε κα੿ περιφοράς, τ૶ κατανοουμέν૳ τઁ κατανοο૨ν ਥξομοι૵σαι κατ੹ τ੽ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, 
੒μοιώσαντα δ੻ τέλος ਩χειν το૨ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ਫ਼πઁ θε૵ν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τઁν παρόντα κα੿ τઁν 
਩πειτα χρόνον. 
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has been providentially arranged so as to allow human beings to assimilate themselves to 
the divine as far as possible.150 
Yet there is a potentially devastating problem lurking for the sort of reading that I 
am advancing—for the text seems to suggest that we follow the thoughts and motions of 
the world-soul, and not of intellect (νο૨ς). This could be problematic because the soul of 
the sensible cosmos is explicitly said to think, not only about being, but also about 
becoming (37a4–c5). So it would seem that human beings, even in their rational or 
intellectual assimilation to the divine, cannot altogether transcend the sensible world of 
change or becoming. 
Yet the solution to this problem is rather simple: for the text strongly suggests that 
the whole purpose of assimilating our thoughts to the revolutions of the world-soul is 
precisely to get us away from thoughts about the sensible world. As Timaeus puts the point: 
“we should correct the corrupted revolutions in our head concerned with becoming” 
(90d1). The text seems suggest that by focusing our thoughts on becoming rather than 
being, we have distorted our intellect’s naturally circular motions. Indeed, it is specifically 
the mathematical principles of the cyclical celestial motions that Timaeus advises us to 
internalize. The study of astronomy in the Timaeus, just as in the Republic (530a3), is 
valued solely for its ability to turn our thoughts away from becoming and toward being.151 
There is thus good textual warrant for reading the ideal of ੒μο઀ωσις θε૶ as being focused 
strictly on our intellectual assimilation to the thoughts and motions of intellect. 
 
150 Sedley (1998) pp. 328–9; Cf. Burnyeat (2008) 
151 It is notable, too, that, according to Socrates in the Republic, when ‘real’ astronomers observe the motions 
of the stars, they will “believe that the craftsman of the heavens (τ૶ το૨ ο੝ρανο૨ δημιουργ૶) arranged them 
and all that is in them in the finest way possible for such things” (530a3). 
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 On this sort of reading, the moral virtues of justice, moderation and courage—as 
well as the kind of self-mastery required to possess them—turn out to be merely secondary 
considerations in the Timaeus (44a5–c4).152 Although moral virtue is recommended and 
briefly treated in passing, the emphasis is on that supreme happiness which is identified 
with the god-like state of the rational soul released from bodily concerns in its ascent to 
intelligible reality.153 An embodied life, during which reason rules, ultimately allows for a 
disembodied life that, as Socrates had suggested at the end of the Republic, is the ultimate 
ideal of happiness.154 For if we truly realized what the soul “grasps and longs to have 
intercourse with, because it is akin to the divine and immortal and what always is,” then 
we would also “realize what it would become if it followed this longing with its whole 
being” (611e1–4). If Socrates was somewhat vague and speculative at the end of the 
Republic, the account offered in the Timaeus is far less so: the soul would become intellect. 
In the next chapter, we will turn to a discussion of self-mastery in Plato’s last work, 
the Laws. Much as we have already seen, self-mastery is again glossed as the rule of reason 
or knowledge, and it is again said to issue in virtue. But the ensuing discussion of self-
mastery reveals that it actually comes in two varieties, which broadly tracks the difference 
between the kind of self-mastery exhibited by those who are in the process of acquiring the 
moral virtues, and the kind of self-mastery exhibited by the those who have acquired 
wisdom and so have become like god. I then examine an additional set of arguments that 
 
152 Cf. Phaedo 82b1; Republic 500d8, 518d9–e2 
153 As Gerson (2006) p. 14 writes: “The ‘popular and political virtue’ of Phaedo is not vice. But it is not 
philosophical virtue either. It is […] the social virtue of a human being. We are not, however, primarily 
human beings. We are intellects. The valorization of human virtue without the recognition of this truth is not 
the solution to any important philosophical problem; it is the problem itself.” Cf. Vasiliou (2014) 
154 Cf. Kahn (1985) pp. 327n24: “The more completely a human being engages in noetic contemplation, the 
more fully he grasps the formal structure of the cosmos. If the divine represents the goal to which human 
thought at its best aspires, surely the divine must grasp the whole of this structure rather than none of it!” 
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seek to establish the superiority of soul to body—as natural ruler to natural subject. These 
arguments further bolster the suggestion I have made here that knowledge, intellect, and 
soul are simply three different ways of characterizing intelligible reality. Finally, I return 
to an account of the human soul, where we find the clearest statement of all that the 
immortal soul is who we really are. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SELF-MASTERY & MODERATION IN THE LAWS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We began with an interpretive problem centering on Socrates’ seemingly 
incompatible positions regarding the possibility of psychic conflict. I claimed that this 
apparent inconsistency could be resolved through a better understanding of Plato’s view of 
the soul. My strategy has been to examine self-mastery, a concept central to virtually all 
discussions putatively concerned with psychic conflict. Chapter one examined the 
Protagoras, the Phaedo, and the Republic, and demonstrated that self-mastery was 
consistently glossed as the rule of reason or knowledge. Although the account of self-
mastery in the Republic led more-or-less directly to the argument for soul-partitioning, 
something which had not been explicitly countenanced in either the Protagoras or the 
Phaedo, I went on to show that Plato had Socrates correct, in the final book of the Republic, 
what might have been an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite 
structure. The account of various ‘parts’ was only perspicuous when the soul was analyzed 
in its embodied state (612a6). What Socrates strongly suggested was that the human soul 
in its pure, disembodied state was both immortal and rational (611e1–3). 
In the second chapter, I focused on the Timaeus, where the tantalizing suggestion 
from the final book of the Republic—namely, that the disembodied immortal soul is simply 
the rational part of the embodied soul—is taken up and further developed. The two lower 
parts of the embodied soul are now explicitly said to be mortal, while the rational part alone 
is said to be both divine and immortal (69c6–70b9). I proceeded to unpack the way in 
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which Plato went on to identify the immortal rational soul with a divine intellect (νο૨ς). 
This intellect was not only said to rule the entire cosmos, but also turned out to be our own 
‘superior’ nature (42a2): the divine and immortal thing that should rule in each of us. I 
subsequently outlined the way in which human beings are called to assimilate themselves 
to this divine intellect and so become self-mastered. 
In the present chapter, I aim to bring the analysis of the previous two chapters to 
bear on Plato’s final work, the Laws. I argue that the account of self-mastery and the 
account of the soul that Plato develops in this final work are consistent with his earlier 
treatments. The plan for the first part of the chapter is as follows. After examining the 
passages where self-mastery is foregrounded in the first book of the Laws (§1), I discuss a 
particularly challenging stretch of text known as the ‘puppets passage’ (644d7–645b1), 
which promises to illuminate the concept of self-mastery (§2). Much as elsewhere, self-
mastery is glossed as the rule of reason, and it is said to issue in virtue. After discussing a 
related dilemma about virtue that has exercised recent commentators, I provide a novel 
resolution to it (§3). I argue that Plato is operating with two distinct conceptions of self-
mastery in view, which in turn reveals that Plato is operating with two distinct conceptions 
of virtue (§4). 
In the second part of the chapter, I examine the arguments that seek to establish that 
knowledge, intellect and soul are natural rulers (§5). When these arguments are coupled 
with an extended argument for the superiority of soul to body—as natural ruler to natural 
subject (896c2)—it becomes clear that knowledge, intellect, and soul are simply three ways 
of characterizing intelligible reality.155 Finally, I turn to an analysis of the human soul (§6), 
 
155 While the Phaedo and Timaeus emphasize that “it is intellect (νο૨ς) that orders and is the cause of 
 72 
  
where we discover in no uncertain terms that the immortal soul is who we really are 
(959a4). Armed with this account, we will be furnished with a unified interpretation of the 
soul that will allow us, in the next and final chapter, to return to some of the interpretive 
problems with which we began (§7). 
 
§1 SELF-MASTERY & CONFLICT 
 
A striking feature of the Laws is that it begins with a sustained and careful treatment 
of self-mastery, which structures much of the ensuing discussion (627a3). No sooner have 
an unnamed Athenian and his two interlocutors, Clinias and Megillus, agreed to examine 
“constitutions and laws” (625a6) than they seek to identify the primary aim of a legislator. 
Clinias proposes that the primary aim of a legislator is to ensure victory in war (626a4). 
This initial proposal is then subjected to sustained examination. When Clinias is asked to 
specify the scope of the war he has mind, he is first led by the Athenian to acknowledge—
and then to enthusiastically maintain—that wars exist not just between states, but also 
between villages within states, households within villages, and individuals within 
households (626c3).  
The most pervasive sort of conflict, however, is discovered to be the one waged 
within each of us. Each person, we learn, “is pitted against themselves” (626d8). The 
victory one achieves in such cases is agreed to be the “first and best (πρώτη τε κα੿ ἀρίστη)” 
of all victories (626e2). This is the sort of struggle that will later be taken up in the puppets 
passage.156 Initially, however, no consideration is given to the parties involved in what I 
 
everything” (97c1–2, 47e4), the Laws emphasizes instead that it is “the best soul (ἀρίστην ψυχήν) that cares 
for the entire cosmos and leads it along the best path” (897c3). 
156 Clinias initially speaks of achieving “victory over oneself” (τઁ νικ઼ν α੝τઁν ਦαυτόν). However, the 
Athenian immediately interprets him as meaning that “each of us, a single individual, is either master of or 
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will henceforth call intrapersonal cases of conflict. Instead, the Athenian and his 
interlocutors focus on some interpersonal cases—those of familial and political conflict. 
A crucial feature of such conflicts, the interlocutors agree, is that they are waged 
between a better and a worse party.157 Self-mastery is thus initially glossed as the victory 
of the better party over the worse, while self-defeat is glossed as the victory of the worse 
party over the better (627b2).158 Although it may initially seem strange to use the locutions 
‘self-mastery’ and ‘self-defeat’ to describe cases of interpersonal conflict, the Athenian 
makes it clear that he is unconcerned with common linguistic usage (627d3–5). It is the 
underlying phenomenon that he is most interested in, and his strategy seems to be to extend 
the notion of self-mastery beyond its clearest application to individuals (626e–628e). The 
Athenian deploys an example in order to help illustrate its expanded meaning: in a family 
comprising several brothers—the majority of whom we are to suppose are unjust—the 
family as whole would rightly be called ‘self-defeated’ if the unjust brothers prevail in 
conflict, and ‘self-mastered’ if instead the just minority prevail. So too for the state: 
“whenever the better people are victorious over the inferior masses, the state would 
correctly be called self-mastered” (627a7).159 
In all such cases of conflict, the Athenian maintains that it would be far better to 
reconcile the conflicting parties than to forcibly subordinate the inferior party to the 
superior one: 
 
The best is neither war nor faction (one should pray to be spared the necessity of either) 
but rather peace and friendship. Victory of a city over itself, it would seem, is not best, but 
 
defeated by himself (੒ μ੻ν κρείττων αਫ਼το૨, ੒ δ੻ ਸ਼ττων)” (626e8). Clinias is made to both repeat and explicitly 
accept the Athenian’s reformulation (627a3). 
157 Note that this excludes the possibility of conflict between equal parties. 
158 Cf. Republic 430e7 
159 ੑρθ૵ς ਗν α੢τη κρείττων τε ਦαυτોς λέγοιθ’ ਲ πόλις. 
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a necessity (ο੝κ ਷ν τ૵ν ἀρίστων ἀλλ੹ τ૵ν ἀναγκαίων). To think otherwise is like 
supposing that a disease-ridden body is performing at its best after being flushed out by a 
purgative—with no thought to the case of a body that needs no such treatment. For the 
same reason, no proper statesman will assess the happiness of either a city or an individual 
(ਲ਼ κα੿ ੁδιώτου) solely and primarily with a view to war against external enemies, and no 
lawgiver is any good unless they regulate military matters for the sake of peace, rather than 
regulating peacetime for the sake of war. (628c9–e1)160 
 
Far better than a recovering body is one that was never sick, and far better than a state 
recovering from civil war is one in which the citizens have all along enjoyed peace and 
friendship.161 Indeed, peace and friendship seem to be preferred to faction—not only in the 
state, but also in the individual.162 This, as we will see in the next section, seems to stand 
in stark contrast to what we find in the puppets passage. 
 
§2 THE PUPPETS PASSAGE 
 
The Athenian first undertakes an analysis of the parties involved in cases of 
intrapersonal conflict toward the end of the first book of the Laws. Reminding his 
interlocutors of their earlier discussion, the Athenian now wishes to clarify his thoughts on 
self-mastery in the intrapersonal case by means of an illustration (644c3). We are each a 
single individual, he says, but we have within us various forces that pull in opposing 
directions, like so many ‘strings’ or ‘cords’ (644c5). We are in this respect like puppets: 
 
160 Τό γε μ੽ν ਙριστον ο੡τε ੒ πόλεμος ο੡τε ਲ στάσις, ἀπευκτઁν δ੻ τઁ δεηθોναι τούτων, εੁρήνη δ੻ πρઁς 
ἀλλήλους ਚμα κα੿ φιλοφροσύνη, κα੿ δ੽ κα੿ τઁ νικ઼ν, ੪ς ਩οικεν, α੝τ੽ν αਫ਼τ੽ν πόλιν ο੝κ ਷ν τ૵ν ἀρίστων 
ἀλλ੹ τ૵ν ἀναγκαίων· ੖μοιον ੪ς εੁ κάμνον σ૵μα ੁ ατρικોς καθάρσεως τυχઁν ਲγο૙τό τις ਙριστα πράττειν τότε, 
τ૶ δ੻ μηδ੻ τઁ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδ੻ προσέχοι τઁν νο૨ν, ੪σαύτως δ੻ κα੿ πρઁς πόλεως ε੝δαιμονίαν 
ਲ਼ κα੿ ੁδιώτου διανοούμενος ο੢τω τις ο੡τ’ ਙν ποτε πολιτικઁς γένοιτο ੑρθ૵ς, πρઁς τ੹ ਩ξωθεν πολεμικ੹ 
ἀποβλέπων μόνον κα੿ πρ૵τον, ο੡τ’ ਗν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εੁ μ੽ χάριν εੁρήνης τ੹ πολέμου νομοθετο૙ μ઼λλον 
ਲ਼ τ૵ν πολεμικ૵ν ਪνεκα τ੹ τોς εੁρήνης. 
161 The Athenian’s endorsement of friendship over faction coheres well with the account from the Republic. 
There, psychic harmony is likened both to a city that is free of conflict (441e9–442d3), and to a body that is 
free of disease (444c3–445b4). These, of course, are the very same analogies that the Athenian deploys here. 
162 While the Athenian indicates that his conclusion applies to both an individual and a city (628d4), many 
commentators are quick to point out that he fails to state explicitly that this means the individual must have 
internally harmonious relations. 
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Consider each of us, living beings that we are, to be a puppet of the gods—whether 
constituted as the gods’ plaything, or for some serious purpose, we have no idea. What we 
do know is that these passions in us (τ੹ πάθη ਥν ਲμ૙ν) are like cords or strings that tug at 
us and oppose each other. They pull against each other (ἀνθέλκουσιν) towards opposing 
actions (ਥναντίας πράξεις) across the field where virtue is marked off from vice. Our 
account singles out one of these pulls (ਪλξεων) and says that each of us must follow it and 
pull against (ἀνθέλκειν) the other cords, never loosening our grip on it. This is the sacred 
and golden guidance (ἀγωγήν) of reasoning (λογισμο૨), also called the city’s common law 
[...] One must always pitch in (συλλαμβάνειν) with the noblest guidance, that of law, since 
reasoning—although it is noble—is gentle rather than violent, so its guidance requires 
helpers if our golden element is to be victorious (νικઽ) over the other cords. (644d7–
645b1)163 
 
 
We are pulled toward vice by ‘iron’ cords associated with feelings (πάθη) of pleasure and 
pain, and we are pulled toward virtue by a ‘golden’ cord associated with reasoning 
(λογισμός) and law (644c7).164 If the golden cord is to emerge victorious in this tug-of-war 
battle across the field where virtue is marked off from vice, then it is necessary for us to 
‘pitch in’ with it. The Athenian now concludes: 
 
Here is how we may vindicate this tale of virtue (μ૨θος ἀρετોς) that likens us to puppets. 
It makes clearer, in a way (τρόπον τινά), what is meant by ‘self-mastery’ and ‘self-defeat’ 
(τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨ κα੿ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι), as well as the manner in which a city and an individual 
ought to live. (645b1–4)165 
 
 
Given that the point of this illustration is to help clarify the meaning of ‘self-mastery,’ and 
that the Athenian has now identified the salient parties in cases of intrapersonal conflict, 
 
163 Περ੿ δ੽ τούτων διανοηθ૵μεν οਫ਼τωσί. θα૨μα μ੻ν ਪκαστον ਲμ૵ν ਲγησώμεθα τ૵ν ζ૴ων θε૙ον, ε੅τε ੪ς 
παίγνιον ਥκείνων ε੅τε ੪ς σπουδૌ τινι συνεστηκός· ο੝ γ੹ρ δ੽ το૨τό γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δ੻ ੅σμεν, ੖τι τα૨τα 
τ੹ πάθη ਥν ਲμ૙ν οੈον νε૨ρα ਲ਼ σμήρινθοί τινες ਥνο૨σαι σπ૵σίν τε ਲμ઼ς κα੿ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ਥναντίαι 
ο੣σαι ਥπ’ ਥναντίας πράξεις, ο੤ δ੽ διωρισμένη ἀρετ੽ κα੿ κακία κε૙ται. μιઽ γάρ φησιν ੒ λόγος δε૙ν τ૵ν ਪλξεων 
συνεπόμενον ἀε੿ κα੿ μηδαμૌ ἀπολειπόμενον ਥκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν το૙ς ਙλλοις νεύροις ਪκαστον, ταύτην δ’ εੇναι 
τ੽ν το૨ λογισμο૨ ἀγωγ੽ν χρυσોν κα੿ ੂεράν, τોς πόλεως κοινઁν νόμον ਥπικαλουμένην [...] δε૙ν δ੽ τૌ 
καλλίστૉ ἀγωγૌ τૌ το૨ νόμου ἀε੿ συλλαμβάνειν· ਚτε γ੹ρ το૨ λογισμο૨ καλο૨ μ੻ν ੕ντος, πρ઻ου δ੻ κα੿ ο੝ 
βιαίου, δε૙σθαι ਫ਼πηρετ૵ν α੝το૨ τ੽ν ἀγωγήν, ੖πως ਗν ਥν ਲμ૙ν τઁ χρυσο૨ν γένος νικઽ τ੹ ਙλλα γένη. 
164 Cf. Republic 611c3 
165 κα੿ ο੢τω δ੽ περ੿ θαυμάτων ੪ς ੕ντων ਲμ૵ν ੒ μ૨θος ἀρετોς σεσωμένος ਗν ε੅η, κα੿ τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨ κα੿ 
ਸ਼ττω εੇναι τρόπον τιν੹ φανερઁν ਗν γίγνοιτο μ઼λλον ੔ νοε૙, κα੿ ੖τι πόλιν κα੿ ੁδιώτην, τઁν μ੻ν λόγον ἀληθો 
λαβόντα ਥν ਦαυτ૶ περ੿ τ૵ν ਪλξεων τούτων, τούτ૳ ਦπόμενον δε૙ ζોν 
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he would finally seem to be in a position to assert—just as he had when discussing the 
interpersonal cases—that a condition of harmony or friendship is to be greatly preferred to 
the mere victory of the golden cord in its struggle against the iron cords. But surprisingly, 
the Athenian makes no such claim.166 
Has he simply forgotten his earlier assertion that victory over obstinate resistance 
is to be strongly dis-preferred to reconciliation and harmony (628d1)? Or is the Athenian 
now highlighting an important dis-analogy between interpersonal relations on the one hand 
(where harmony is the goal) and intrapersonal relations on the other hand (where victory 
is the goal)? The most straightforward reading of the puppets passage seems to suggest that 
the Athenian construes virtue in the intrapersonal case (for he calls this a tale of virtue) as 
the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords. That there is absolutely no mention here 
of a better condition involving harmony or friendship thus seems strange—and cries out 
for explanation.167 
 
2.1 Conflict & Harmony: Interpretive Horns 
 
Many commentators have tried to make sense of the rather conspicuous absence of 
any mention of harmony or friendship in the puppets passage. I here canvas the two most 
prominent interpretive strategies. The first (and perhaps most straightforward) way to 
explain this absence is to simply take the passage at its word: virtue in the intrapersonal 
case does not preclude conflict.168 On this straightforward reading, virtue as described in 
 
166 Cf. Laws 803c5 and 804b3, where talk of ‘puppets’ is resumed. 
167 It is not just strange given what is said in the Laws, but also given the more familiar account that is found 
in the Republic (442c9). 
168 Both Belfiore (1986) pp. 428–433, 429 and Bobonich (2002) pp. 289, 350, 546n122 have advanced such 
interpretations. 
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the puppets passage consists in the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords, just as 
the Athenian seems to assert. I will label this the CONFLICT model of virtue, as virtue is to 
be understood as the victory of a better party over a worse in cases of conflict.169 
One problem for those who read the puppets passage as endorsing the CONFLICT 
model of virtue, however, is that it is hard to square with the earlier account of virtue 
endorsed by the Athenian, where harmony had been greatly preferred to victory. It is also 
hard to square with the account of virtue that the Athenian soon recommends. In the very 
opening lines of the second book of the Laws, he endorses an account of intrapersonal 
virtue that explicitly takes harmony as the goal: 
 
If pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in our souls when we are not 
yet able to grasp the account (τઁν λόγον), and when we do grasp the account they 
harmonize (συμφωνήσωσι) with it because they have been correctly trained by the 
appropriate habits, this harmony is virtue in its entirety (ਲ συμφωνία σύμπασα μ੻ν ἀρετή). 
(653b2–6)170 
 
The Athenian maintains this account of intrapersonal virtue for the duration of the Laws. 
So those who read the puppets passage as straightforwardly endorsing an account of virtue 
according to which a better party subordinates an inferior one have some explaining to do. 
First, why would the Athenian endorse this sort of account in the puppets passage when he 
had already endorsed harmony over victory, even before the puppets passage (628c9–e1)? 
Second, why would the Athenian endorse this sort of account in the puppets passage only 
to cast it aside in the opening lines of the very next book? 
 
169 In labeling this the CONFLICT model, I am following Meyer (2018). 
170 ਲδον੽ δ੽ κα੿ φιλία κα੿ λύπη κα੿ μ૙σος ਗν ੑ ρθ૵ς ਥν ψυχα૙ς ਥγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγ૳ λαμβάνειν, 
λαβόντων δ੻ τઁν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τ૶ λόγ૳ ੑρθ૵ς εੁθίσθαι ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν προσηκόντων ਥθ૵ν, α੢τη ‘σθ’ ਲ 
συμφωνία σύμπασα μ੻ν ἀρετή 
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Another common interpretive strategy is to deny that the victory of the golden cord 
over the iron cords is really an instance of conflict at all. Commentators who advance this 
sort of reading offer interpretations according to which the puppets passage is not actually 
describing a case of conflict amongst the cords, but rather a case of harmony.171 I will label 
this competing account the HARMONY model of virtue, as virtue is to be understood as the 
harmonious relations between better and worse parties.172 On this sort of interpretation, the 
Athenian and his interlocutors have already agreed, by the time we reach the puppets 
passage, that the HARMONY model of virtue is, in all cases, superior to the CONFLICT model 
of virtue.173 The appeal of this sort of interpretation is that it faces none of the difficulties 
presented by the more straightforward reading of the puppets passage described above, 
since it maintains that the Athenian consistently endorses the HARMONY model of virtue 
throughout the Laws. 
The problem for this interpretative strategy, however, is that it must somehow 
explain away the many explicit references to conflict in the puppets passage—where 
pleasure, pain and reasoning are all described as distinct ‘pulls’ (ਪλξεων) that “draw against 
each other (ἀνθέλκουσιν) towards opposing actions (ਥναντίας πράξεις)” (644e3).174 The 
golden cord emerges victorious (νικઽ), it would seem, not by harmonizing or reconciling 
with the other cords, but by overpowering them. Indeed, the passage explicitly “singles out 
one of these pulls (ਪλξεων)” as the golden cord and says that each of us must help it “pull 
 
171 Annas (1999) pp. 142–44, Frede (2010) pp. 217–20, Schofield (2016) pp. 146–48 and Wilburn (2012) pp. 
29–35 have all advanced such interpretations. 
172 In labeling this the HARMONY model, I am again following Meyer (2018). 
173 We may suppose that this earlier endorsement is what the Athenian is referring to when he asks his 
interlocutors to recall their previous agreement that those who rule themselves are good at 644b6. 
174 Cf. Meyer (2018). The verb ἀνθέλκειν is repeated at 644e6. The pull of reason is also referred to as 
‘guidance’ (ἀγωγήν) at 645a1 and 645a7, which suggests that it is a sort of ‘pull.’ Plato often uses this word 
when describing the non-rational pull of appetites and emotions; Cf. Republic 604b1 and Phaedrus 238c3 
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against (ἀνθέλκειν) the other cords.” Now, if such textual hurdles are not simply 
insurmountable, they at least stretch the plausibility of this sort of interpretative strategy. 
 
2.2 Conflict & Harmony: Splitting the Horns 
 
So there remain serious difficulties for those who opt for either interpretive horn. 
But there is a third interpretive strategy that seeks to split them. According to this third 
interpretative strategy, when the Athenian takes up and develops Clinias’ initial suggestion 
that victory in war is the primary aim of a legislator (626a4), he is developing an account 
of virtue (one modeled on conflict) that he does not himself endorse, but which he knows 
he can use as a stepping-stone to arrive at his own more fully developed account of virtue 
(one modeled on harmony).175 Such an interpretation not only has the benefit of being able 
to read the puppets passage as straightforwardly endorsing the CONFLICT model of virtue, 
but it can do so without thereby committing the Athenian to it. It is thus able to avoid the 
difficulties faced by the previous two interpretive strategies, while preserving what is most 
plausible in each. 
Unfortunately, this interpretative strategy is not without its own set of difficulties. 
According to the view it advances, on the most natural reading of the stretch of text we are 
concerned with, the Athenian and his two interlocutors jointly accept the following three 
claims: 
 
(a) Virtue is to be understood as self-rule (ਙρχειν αਫ਼τ૵ν)176 
(b) Self-rule is to be understood as self-mastery (τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨) 
(c) Self-mastery is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords 
 
 
175 Meyer (2018) p. 108 
176 Cf. Laws 645b2; Meyer (2018) p. 98 
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The problem for this interpretation is that (a)–(c) collectively commit the Athenian to the 
CONFLICT model of virtue.177 In order to better appreciate why this is a problem, consider 
the sort of argument that this interpretive strategy relies on in order to motivate the now-
familiar dilemma about virtue: 
 
(1) If virtue is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords in the 
puppets passage, then virtue entails conflict 
(2) If virtue entails conflict, then the puppets passage supports the CONFLICT model of 
virtue 
(3) Virtue is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords in the 
puppets passage (by a–c) 
(4) Therefore, virtue entails conflict (by 1 and 3) 
(5) Therefore, the puppets passage supports the CONFLICT model of virtue (by 2 and 4) 
(6) CONFLICT is inconsistent with HARMONY as an account or model of virtue (implicit) 
(7) If the Athenian endorses HARMONY, then he cannot consistently endorse CONFLICT 
(8) The Athenian endorses HARMONY 
(9) Therefore, the Athenian cannot consistently endorse CONFLICT (by 6, 7 and 8) 
 
 
This argument formalizes the dilemma: since the CONFLICT and HARMONY models of virtue 
are inconsistent with one another, the Athenian can only endorse one of them. This 
interpretation maintains that the Athenian endorses the HARMONY model of virtue. But it 
also recognizes that the Athenian endorses (a)–(c), which collectively commit him to the 
CONFLICT model of virtue. Since the Athenian appears to endorse both models of virtue, 
this interpretation is forced to conclude that there is simply “no satisfactory resolution” to 
the dilemma.178 The best it can do is psychologize: even granted that the Athenian explicitly 
 
177 Meyer (2018) pp. 99, 107–8 
178 Meyer (2018) p. 108 
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endorses claims that commit him to both models of virtue, he does not actually endorse the 
claims that commit him to the CONFLICT model of virtue. He only endorses those claims in 
order to prepare his interlocutors to eventually accept the HARMONY model of virtue.179 
 
2.3 Toward a Satisfactory Resolution 
 
At this juncture, it is worth reemphasizing that the stated aim of the puppets passage 
is to help clarify the notion of self-mastery (644c1, 645b2)—not virtue.180 The near-
exclusive focus on virtue by commentators is therefore somewhat distracting. Such a focus 
has meant, more often than not, that self-mastery is either downplayed or altogether 
sidelined in their accounts.  
This, I will now argue, is a mistake. By focusing on self-mastery rather than virtue, 
I uncover an overlooked distinction between two kinds of self-mastery: one that is 
compatible with the CONFLICT model of virtue, and one that is compatible with the 
HARMONY model of virtue. This distinction allows for a more straightforward reading of 
the text in that it permits the Athenian to consistently (and genuinely) endorse both models 
of virtue. By focusing on self-mastery rather than virtue, my interpretation is able to 
eventually dissolve the dilemma. It thus avoids all of the problems faced by the three 
interpretive strategies canvased above. It also brings to light latent philosophical resources 
that have not been previously noted or appreciated. In order to advance my interpretation, 
it will be necessary to return to the text of the Laws. 
 
179 This is Meyer’s parting suggestion (2018) p. 109. But it could also be that the Athenian (or Plato, however 
unlikely) is simply unaware that (a)–(c) collectively entail the CONFLICT model of virtue (if they do 
collectively entail it). 
180 The Athenian also claims that “the tale gives us a more lucid articulation of virtue and vice” (645c1). But 
the payoff of this “greater clarity” is that it will help to shed light on education and other practices like 
drinking parties. 
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§3 SELF-MASTERY & MODERATION 
 
In the third book of the Laws, the Athenian details the history of three Greek states: 
Argos, Messene and Sparta. The upshot in doing so is that it will allow the Athenian to 
examine some actual legislation without needing to engage “in idle speculation, but 
investigating what has actually and truly happened” (684a1). As it turns out, these three 
states were ruled by kings that just so happened to be brothers (685d4). These brothers 
initially exchanged oaths in accordance with mutually binding laws so that their kingdoms 
were ultimately “brought under the control of a single family” (686a4). Unfortunately, their 
alliance quickly evaporated: two of the three kingdoms overstepped the established laws 
(691a4).181 Only the Spartan kingdom continued to honor the common oath which had 
originally bound and united all three of them. 
Now, if it were not already clear that this is meant to recall the familial case of 
conflict from the first book of the Laws, the Athenian loses any pretense to subtlety when 
he again reminds his interlocutors—not even twelve lines later—that these kings are 
brothers (686a4). Consistent with his earlier assessment, the Athenian now claims that it 
would have been best if these brothers had remained in harmony with one another (693a7). 
Unfortunately, their “lack of harmony” (691a7) resulted in conflict, which eventually led 
to the dissolution of their empire. 
The point in recounting these events, the Athenian now informs his interlocutors, 
is that if they can determine the cause of this unfortunate dissolution, then they will be in 
a much better position to avoid similar pitfalls when enacting their own legislation. He here 
reminds them that their legislation should be constructed with a view to virtue (693b2). But 
 
181 Plato tends to reserve τઁ πλεονεκτε૙ν for those ruled by their appetitive desires. 
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he now adds that legislation constructed with a view to “moderation […] wisdom or 
friendship (τઁ σωφρονε૙ν […] φρόνησιν ਲ਼ φιλίαν) (693c3) are all equally acceptable ways 
of stating this same aim or goal. Indeed, he is careful to note that “all these aims are the 
same, not different” (693c3). If we think they are different, he tells us, then we must also 
take pains to figure out in what respect they are the same (693c3). In the next two sub-
sections, I explore the respects in which the legislative aim of moderation is both different 
from and the same as the legislative aim of virtue. My reason for doing so is simple: 
moderation turns out to be a kind of self-mastery. 
 
3.1 Moderation: Necessary or Sufficient for Virtue? 
 
In the ensuing discussion, the Athenian applauds Sparta for refusing to confer civic 
distinction or office on the basis of such superficialities as wealth, good looks, or even the 
possession some particular virtue (like courage) if that virtue is not also accompanied by 
moderation (σωφροσύνη) (696b5).182 He explains that even though courage is “one part of 
virtue” (696b7) no one would want to have someone who is courageous but immoderate 
(ἀκόλαστον) living in their home or in their community.183 Without moderation, it seems, 
no other virtue is much to speak of: 
 
But surely, in the absence of moderation, justice will never spring up [...] Nor will the wise 
person we just now mentioned, whose pleasures and pains are in harmony with right reason 
and follow it (συμφώνους το૙ς ੑρθο૙ς λόγοις κα੿ ਦπομένας). (696c5–10)184 
 
182 Cf. Laws 630b1; Sparta was the only kingdom which honored its agreement with Argos and Messene. 
183 Moderation is one of Plato’s four canonical virtues—along with wisdom, justice, and courage. These are 
what the Athenian also refers to as ‘divine goods’ (631b7). Unlike the other three virtues however, there is 
still no standardly accepted translation of the virtue I am calling ‘moderation.’ This virtue is just as often 
rendered ‘temperance,’ ‘prudence,’ or ‘soundness of mind.’ It is even sometimes rendered ‘self-control,’ or 
‘self-mastery.’ This is especially true in the Saunders and Schofield translations of the Laws. Cf. Meyer’s 
review of Schofield (2018) 
184 ਝλλ੹ μ੽ν τό γε δίκαιον ο੝ φύεται χωρ੿ς το૨ σωφρονε૙ν [...] Ο੝δ੻ μ੽ν ੖ν γε σοφઁν ਲμε૙ς νυνδ੽ 
προυθέμεθα, τઁν τ੹ς ਲδον੹ς κα੿ λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους το૙ς ੑρθο૙ς λόγοις κα੿ ਦπομένας. 
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So moderation is at least necessary for virtue.185 But is it sufficient for virtue? Or, as the 
Athenian himself puts it: 
 
If we found moderation (σωφροσύνη) existing in the soul without the rest of virtue (ਙνευ 
πάσης τોς ਙλλης ἀρετોς), should we be justified in admiring it, or not? (696d4–5)186 
 
 
Megillus demurs—he doesn’t know whether they would be justified in admiring it. But the 
Athenian approves of this non-answer: “a very proper reply, for if you had opted for either 
alternative (੒ποτερονο૨ν) it would have struck an odd note, I think” (696d7). The reason 
it would have struck an odd note is because moderation on its own is not entirely unworthy 
of admiration, but neither is it all that valuable when separated from the preeminent virtue 
of wisdom. Without wisdom, moderation turns out to be a mere “adjunct that isn’t worth 
saying much about” (696d11). 
 
3.2 Two Kinds of Moderation 
 
While moderation without wisdom isn’t worth saying much about, it is still 
apparently worth saying a little about, which is what the Athenian goes on to do in the 
fourth book of the Laws. When describing the conditions under which a legislator could 
most effectively enact laws, the Athenian maintains that it would be in a state ruled by a 
tyrant (709e7). This tyrant would ideally be young, have a good memory, a quick wit, and 
a character of natural elevation.187 Yet if these qualities are to be at all useful to the 
 
185 Justice will never spring up without moderation because justice is the conjunction of wisdom, moderation 
and courage (631c5): “wisdom itself is the leading ‘divine’ good; second comes the habitual moderation of 
a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get justice; courage lies in fourth place.” 
186 Σωφροσύνη ਙνευ πάσης τોς ਙλλης ἀρετોς ਥν ψυχૌ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον ਲ਼ ਙτιμον γίγνοιτ’ ਗν κατ੹ 
δίκην; 
187 Cf. Republic 474b2, where these are the qualities that pick out a philosophic nature. 
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legislator, the soul of this young tyrant should also possess “that quality which in our earlier 
discussion we said must accompany all the parts of virtue” (710a2). This quality, of course, 
was moderation. Now, however, the Athenian distinguishes between two different kinds of 
moderation: 
 
I mean the popular kind (τ੽ν δημώδη), Clinias, not the exalted kind (σεμνύνων) one might 
invoke when insisting that moderation is also wisdom (φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εੇναι τઁ 
σωφρονε૙ν). I have in mind the quality that naturally develops in children and animals—
some of whom are akratically disposed with respect to pleasures (το૙ς μ੻ν ἀκρατ૵ς ਩χειν 
πρઁς τ੹ς ਲδονάς), others enkratically (το૙ς δ੻ ਥγκρατ૵ς). We said that if this quality existed 
in isolation from the many other so-called goods we are discussing, it was not worthy of 
mention. (710a5–b2)188 
 
It is clear that the popular kind of moderation is the quality that the Athenian had earlier 
referred to as a mere ‘adjunct.’ This kind of moderation naturally develops in children and 
animals. It is described as a kind of self-control or restraint with respect to pleasure. Some 
children and some animals are naturally more enkratic—naturally better able to control or 
restrain the pull of pleasure—than others.189 One could think here of children faced with 
the prospect of unlimited candy, or puppies faced with the prospect of unlimited kibble: 
some children and some puppies will eat themselves sick, while others will not.190 
 
188 κα੿ ο੝χ ਸ਼ν τις σεμνύνων ਗν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εੇναι τઁ σωφρονε૙ν, ἀλλ’ ੖περ ε੝θઃς παισ੿ν 
κα੿ θηρίοις, το૙ς μ੻ν ἀκρατ૵ς ਩χειν πρઁς τ੹ς ਲδονάς, σύμφυτον ਥπανθε૙, το૙ς δ੻ ਥγκρατ૵ς· ੔ κα੿ μονούμενον 
਩φαμεν τ૵ν πολλ૵ν ἀγαθ૵ν λεγομένων ο੝κ ਙξιον εੇναι λόγου. 
189 When discussing what it means to be ‘self-defeated’ in the first book of the Laws, Clinias claims that “we 
are all much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasure than by pains” (633e4). This suggests that 
the popular meaning of self-mastery will likely be more concerned with pleasure than pain, which is exactly 
what we find. (Cf. Republic 389d7, 430e6) 
190 One might here object that children (and a fortiori, animals) do not possess reason—at least not in any 
robust sense. It would thus be strange to describe the sort of moderation they possess as reason ‘controlling’ 
or ‘mastering’ appetitive desires. It is worth noting, however, that the Athenian is prepared to call animals 
and children naturally enkratic (710a5). Moreover, it is clear that the Athenian thinks that this natural sort of 
control or restraint, at least in the case of children, eventually can (and should) be informed by reason. (Cf. 
Laws 963e3 for a parallel discussion about courage.) So perhaps it is better to think of the sort of control over 
pleasure that some children and animals exhibit as a kind of proto-control or proto-victory over pleasure. 
This kind of natural control is the sort of thing capable of being directed by reason in humans. Actualizing 
this capacity is arguably the role of education and habituation. Cf. Laws 645e ff. for a discussion of drinking, 
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 Indeed, the Athenian seemed to allow for this popular kind of moderation as far 
back as the first book of the Laws. Even before the puppets passage, he had invoked the 
“moderate disposition of soul” (631c7) that must be combined with wisdom in order to be 
counted among the ‘divine’ goods, or virtues.191 When discussing this moderate disposition 
of soul in separation from wisdom, the Athenian consistently described it as a natural 
tendency to restraint in the face of pleasure (634a–b, 635e–636e, 636c7). Not only this, but 
the Athenian had also suggested that moderation is perfected only after repeatedly 
practicing such restraint: 
 
So will anyone become perfect (τελέως) in moderation if they haven’t done battle against 
the many pleasures and desires that urge them to commit shameless and unjust actions—if 
they haven’t defeated (νενικηκώς) them by means of reason (μετ੹ λόγου), effort, and skill, 
in play and in earnest? (647d5–7)192 
 
The language here is that of battle, and victory in this battle is construed as effectively 
resisting the pull of pleasure. This is exactly how self-mastery was described in the puppets 
passage. 
Now, recall that the puppets passage was a tale of virtue, which promised to help 
make the meaning of self-mastery clearer (645b2). The kind of self-mastery it seemed to 
model was the sort according to which reason emerges victorious over the opposing pulls 
of pleasure and pain. Here, a popular kind of moderation turns out to model this same sort 
of self-mastery: the kind that is exhibited by those who are naturally disposed to achieve a 
 
which is said to return us to the state of young children. When drunk, our cognitive abilities are said to 
‘entirely’ abandon us and we are then said to be ‘least in control’ of ourselves. (See also Statesman 307e ff.) 
Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1151a15–19, where Aristotle draws a distinction between natural and habituated 
character virtue. (See also Historia Animalium 588b ff.) 
191 See Meyer (2019) for an excellent discussion of how these divine goods combine with one another. 
192 Σώφρων δ੻ ਙρα τελέως ਩σται μ੽ πολλα૙ς ਲδονα૙ς κα੿ ਥπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντε૙ν κα੿ ἀδικε૙ν 
διαμεμαχημένος κα੿ νενικηκઅς μετ੹ λόγου κα੿ ਩ργου κα੿ τέχνης ਩ν τε παιδια૙ς κα੿ ਥν σπουδα૙ς 
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kind of victory over pleasure. For this reason, the popular kind of moderation seems to 
conform nicely to the CONFLICT model of virtue. 
What about the exalted kind of moderation: the kind that is “also wisdom” 
(710a6)?193 Does it, too, model a sort of self-mastery? My suggestion is that the exalted 
kind of moderation models the perfected kind of self-mastery exhibited by those rare, wise 
individuals who attain harmony between reason and feelings of pleasure and pain. Such 
harmony, recall, is the defining mark of the wise person (653b2, 696c5).194 If this 
suggestion is correct, then it would also explain why the Athenian had paired moderation 
with wisdom or friendship and claimed that they all equally well captured the same 
legislative aim as virtue (693c3). The exalted kind of moderation or self-mastery thus 
seems to conform nicely to the HARMONY model of virtue. 
 
§4 TWO KINDS OF VIRTUE 
 
So we are now armed with an account of two kinds of moderation or self-mastery: 
a popular kind that seems to conform to the CONFLICT model of virtue, and an exalted kind 
that seems to conform to the HARMONY model of virtue. Indeed, it is this distinction 
between two kinds of moderation that explains why ‘opting for either alternative’ would 
have struck an odd note when deciding whether or not moderation was sufficient for virtue. 
In order to bolster this account, I now want to return to the first book of the Laws, where 
moderation was originally introduced. Moderation places second, after wisdom, among the 
 
193 It is clear that the Athenian is appealing to the connection between σωφρονε૙ν and φρόνησις. This 
connection is evident both in their common etymology, and in their ordinary usage, where σωφρονε૙ν (the 
verb cognate with σωφροσύνη) regularly means “to be wise.” Hence “know thyself” is a dictum of 
σωφροσύνη. The account of moderation as a divine good at Laws 631c7 also fits this picture. I am indebted 
to Meyer (2015) for this point. 
194 Cf. Laws 689d4: “Without harmony (ਙνευ συμφωνίας), how could there be wisdom (φρονήσεως) of even 
the smallest degree (τઁ σμικρότατον εੇδος)? There is no way (ο੝κ ਩στιν).” 
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four divine goods or virtues (631c6).195 Once the survey of these virtues is complete, the 
Athenian informs his interlocutors that—after enacting laws that seek to promote them—
the legislator will appoint guardians charged with their protection. It turns out that these 
guardians come in two varieties: 
 
Some of whom possess wisdom (τοઃς μ੻ν δι੹ φρονήσεως), others of whom possess true 
opinion (τοઃς δ੻ δι’ ἀληθο૨ς δόξης ੁόντας), so that intellect (੒ νο૨ς) will bind everything 
together to follow moderation and justice (σωφροσύνૉ κα੿ δικαιοσύνૉ) rather than wealth 
and ambition. (632c5–d1)196 
 
Two sorts of guardians will be appointed: some will possess wisdom, and some will not.197 
Now, we saw in the previous section that the kind of moderation that is separated from 
wisdom is barely worth mentioning—let alone praising (696d11, 710a5). So at this 
juncture, it is worth asking the following question: what sort of moderation will be 
possessed by those guardians who are said to lack wisdom? 
Before answering this question, it is worth briefly pointing out some other dialogues 
where the virtue of moderation is discussed in separation from wisdom. In the Phaedo, for 
instance, the sort of moderation exhibited by those without wisdom is referred to as mere 
“popular and political virtue (τ੽ν δημοτικ੽ν κα੿ πολιτικ੽ν ἀρετήν)” (82b1)—the sort of 
virtue “instilled by habituation and practice without philosophy and without intellect (ਥξ 
਩θους τε κα੿ μελέτης γεγονυ૙αν ਙνευ φιλοσοφίας τε κα੿ νο૨)” (82b2). In the Republic, too, 
the sort of moderation possessed by non-philosophers is counted among the “popular 
 
195 Cf. Laws 696e3, 727b2–728d5 
196 τοઃς μ੻ν δι੹ φρονήσεως, τοઃς δ੻ δι’ ἀληθο૨ς δόξης ੁόντας, ੖πως πάντα τα૨τα συνδήσας ੒ νο૨ς ਦπόμενα 
σωφροσύνૉ κα੿ δικαιοσύνૉ ἀποφήνૉ, ἀλλ੹ μ੽ πλούτ૳ μηδ੻ φιλοτιμί઺. 
197 Cf. Republic 506c6–9: “Haven’t you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly 
things? The best of them are blind—or do you think that those who express a true opinion without 
understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?” 
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virtues” (τોς δημοτικોς ἀρετોς)” (500d8).198 A bit later on, Socrates claims that the person 
who forcibly holds their appetites in check:  
 
Would not be entirely free from internal civil war […] though generally their better desires 
are in control (κρατούσας) of their worse desires […] For this reason, they would be more 
respectable than many, but the true virtue (ἀληθ੽ς ἀρετή) of a single-minded and 
harmonious (੒μονοητικોς δ੻ κα੿ ਲρμοσμένης) soul far escapes them. (554d8–e4)199 
 
 
I point out these passages because I now want to suggest that the two accounts of 
moderation (popular and exalted) not only track a distinction between two types of self-
mastery—but also track a distinction between two types of virtue. If we apply this 
distinction to the two sorts of guardians above, it quickly becomes clear that those who 
possess wisdom will possess exalted virtue, while those guardians who only possess true 
opinion will possess popular virtue.200 But note that all of the guardians will possess some 
kind of ‘virtue’ on my account.201 This, I take it, is a welcome result. For surely those 
tasked with protecting the laws enacted by the legislator—laws that are ultimately 
constructed with a view to virtue (693b2)—should themselves be virtuous. 
On the interpretation I am advancing, then, the puppets passage remains a ‘tale of 
virtue.’ It illuminates the popular kind of virtue, which issues from the popular kind of 
moderation or self-mastery.202 This would explain why the Athenian explicitly qualifies 
what he takes the puppets passage to reveal about self-mastery: it only makes the meaning 
 
198 Cf. Statesman 309c6 ff. 
199 Ο੝κ ਙρ’ ਗν ε੅η ἀστασίαστος ੒ τοιο૨τος ਥν ਦαυτ૶ […] ਥπιθυμίας δ੻ ਥπιθυμι૵ν ੪ς τઁ πολઃ κρατούσας ਗν 
਩χοι βελτίους χειρόνων […] Δι੹ τα૨τα δ੽ οੇμαι ε੝σχημονέστερος ਗν πολλ૵ν ੒ τοιο૨τος ε੅η· ੒μονοητικોς 
δ੻ κα੿ ਲρμοσμένης τોς ψυχોς ἀληθ੽ς ἀρετ੽ πόρρω ποι ਥκφεύγοι ਗν α੝τόν. Cf. Republic 430e9 
200 Cf. Vasiliou (2014) p. 21. Guardians who lack wisdom will be akin to Vasiliou’s Phd-philosophers. 
201 Contra Meyer (2018), who argues that only one model can ultimately be the correct account of virtue. 
202 Cf. Meno 98b1–c1 and Republic 506c6–9, where knowledge and true opinion have the same practical 
effects on behavior. 
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clear ‘in a way’ (τρόπον τινά).203 My reading also explains why the Athenian encourages 
his interlocutors to think of virtue as self-mastery: because (in a way) he thinks it is. 
So while I accept the rather elegant suggestion of the third interpretive strategy that 
the CONFLICT model of virtue represents a developmental stage on the way to the HARMONY 
model of virtue, I reject the assumption—common to all three interpretive strategies—that 
these two models of virtue are incompatible with one another, so that we must ultimately 
choose between them.204 On my account, the CONFLICT model captures the popular kind of 
virtue and the HARMONY model captures the exalted kind of virtue. Indeed, this should not 
be surprising given that the puppets passage takes its inspiration from Clinias’ initial thesis 
that self-mastery is a kind of victory (626e2). This is the popular self-mastery ultimately 
captured by the CONFLICT model of virtue, which, at best, renders someone enkratically 
disposed toward pleasure. It is not until much later that we receive an account of exalted 
virtue—and the exalted kind of moderation or self-mastery exhibited by those who possess 
it. The Athenian was thus not wrong when he suggested that an upshot of his ‘tale of virtue’ 
was that it would eventuate in a clearer understanding of virtue and vice (645c1). He was 
also not wrong to suggest that the meaning of ‘self-mastery’ would eventually become 
clearer. Exalted moderation is perfected self-mastery. 
 
4.1 A Tantalizing Suggestion 
 
When the Athenian and his two interlocutors finally begin to enact legislation for 
 
203 Indeed, the treatment of self-mastery in the puppets passage coheres well with the way that self-mastery 
it is treated in other dialogues, most notably the Republic, where both moderation and self-mastery are 
initially glossed as a sort of control over pleasure (430e6). When analyzed more deeply, however, their 
meanings are refined—just as in the Laws (633e3). See also Gorgias (491d11–e1), where Socrates defines 
moderation as the state in which a person “rules the pleasures and appetites within himself.” 
204 Meyer (2018) p. 108: “repeated success at resisting the pull of opposing desires and fears will ultimately 
result in retraining those desires and fears so that they agree with rather than oppose the golden cord.” 
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their own state, the first order of business is to determine what sort of political system 
should be imposed (712b9). Clinias and Megillus seek clarification: does the Athenian have 
something like democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy in mind (712c2)? The Athenian 
answers their question with one of his own: which of these political systems is operative in 
their home states of Sparta and Crete? Megillus finds it impossible to give a straight answer, 
since Sparta seems to have some democratic institutions, while other institutions are more 
aristocratic or even despotic in nature. Clinias thinks much the same about Crete (712e6). 
The Athenian proceeds to diagnose their puzzlement as follows: 
 
My excellent friends, that is because you belong to genuine constitutions, while those we 
just now enumerated are not constitutions (ο੝κ εੁσ੿ν πολιτε૙αι), but forms of government 
in which one part of a city is ruling and another part is enslaved (δεσποζομένων τε κα੿ 
δουλευουσ૵ν), with each labelled according to the strength of the part that is in charge. If 
one has to give a name to this sort of thing in a city, one should cite the name of the god 
that truly rules those who possess intellect (τઁ το૨ ἀληθ૵ς τ૵ν τઁν νο૨ν ਥχόντων 
δεσπόζοντος θεο૨ ੕νομα λέγεσθαι). (712e9–713a4)205 
 
 
When asked to name this god, the Athenian demurs and turns to a story that promises to 
make his meaning clearer. Yet it is not the story with which I am now concerned, but with 
the moral he draws from it: 
 
Even today it is said with some truth that a city ruled not by a god but by a mortal (੖σων 
ਗν πόλεων μ੽ θεઁς ἀλλά τις ਙρχૉ θνητός) has no escape from evils and toils. [...] To the 
extent that we have anything of immortality inside ourselves (੖σον ਥν ਲμ૙ν ἀθανασίας 
਩νεστι), we must heed it in our public and private life, as we administer our households and 
our cities, giving the title ‘law’ to the governance by intellect (τ੽ν το૨ νο૨ διανομ੽ν 
ਥπονομάζοντας νόμον). (713e4–714a2)206 
 
 
205 πολιτει૵ν μετέχετε· ਘς δ੻ ੩νομάκαμεν ν૨ν, ο੝κ εੁσ੿ν πολιτε૙αι, πόλεων δ੻ οੁκήσεις δεσποζομένων τε κα੿ 
δουλευουσ૵ν μέρεσιν ਦαυτ૵ν τισι, τઁ το૨ δεσπότου δ੻ ਦκάστη προσαγορεύεται κράτος. χρોν δ’ ε੅περ του 
τοιούτου τ੽ν πόλιν ਩δει ਥπονομάζεσθαι, τઁ το૨ ἀληθ૵ς τ૵ν τઁν νο૨ν ਥχόντων δεσπόζοντος θεο૨ ੕νομα 
λέγεσθαι. 
206 Λέγει δ੽ κα੿ ν૨ν ο੤τος ੒ λόγος, ἀληθεί઺ χρώμενος, ੪ς ੖σων ਗν πόλεων μ੽ θεઁς ἀλλά τις ਙρχૉ θνητός, 
ο੝κ ਩στιν κακ૵ν α੝το૙ς ο੝δ੻ πόνων ἀνάφυξις […] κα੿ ੖σον ਥν ਲμ૙ν ἀθανασίας ਩νεστι, τούτ૳ πειθομένους 
δημοσί઺ κα੿ ੁδί઺ τάς τ’ οੁκήσεις κα੿ τ੹ς πόλεις διοικε૙ν, τ੽ν το૨ νο૨ διανομ੽ν ਥπονομάζοντας νόμον. 
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The alliterative play on the words ‘intellect’ (νο૨ς) and ‘law’ (νόμος) in the lines above are 
lost in translation—but the Athenian has played on them constantly.207 The divine ‘ruler’ 
(ਙρχૉ) of states, houses, and even individuals is intellect (νο૨ς), and the deliverances of 
this immortal god are most properly called law (νόμος). Indeed, those who follow the 
deliverances of intellect are themselves said to possess it (τ૵ν τઁν νο૨ν ਥχόντων). They are 
thus obedient to whatever there is of immortality in them. So, just as we saw in the Timeaus, 
that god who should come to rule in us—and indeed over everything—is intellect (νο૨ς). 
 
§5 NATURAL RULERS: KNOWLEDGE, INTELLECT & SOUL 
 
 In the course of his extended discussion of rule, the Athenian claims that the soul 
is preeminently valuable (726a1) and contrasts two elements within it:  
 
There are two elements that make up the whole. One is stronger and superior, and acts as 
master (κρείττω κα੿ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα); the other, which is weaker and inferior, is a slave 
(τ੹ δ੻ ਸ਼ττω κα੿ χείρω δο૨λα); and so a person must always honor the master in them in 
preference to the slave (δεσπόζοντα ἀε੿ προτιμητέον τ૵ν δουλευόντων). (726a4–10)208 
 
 
While everyone should honor the master in them (and most people think that they do), 
almost no one actually does. Rather, they honor the weaker and inferior element in 
themselves by pursuing pleasure.209 The Athenian then makes a (by now familiar) point: 
 
Most of us agree that some people are master of pleasure and feelings of anger, while others 
 
207 See England (1921) for further discussion of this point. Cf. Laws 957c3, where this connection is made 
explicit: “It can’t be an accident that the name of this god-given and wonderful institution, law (νόμος), is so 
suggestive of intellect (νο૨ς).” 
208 τ੹ δ’ αਫ਼το૨ διττ੹ πάντ’ ਥστ੿ π઼σιν. τ੹ μ੻ν ο੣ν κρείττω κα੿ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τ੹ δ੻ ਸ਼ττω κα੿ χείρω 
δο૨λα· τ૵ν ο੣ν αਫ਼το૨ τ੹ δεσπόζοντα ἀε੿ προτιμητέον τ૵ν δουλευόντων. 
209 The proper order in which honor is to be conferred, the Athenian tells his interlocutors is: first, the gods 
(727b4); second, the soul (728d2); and third, the body (728d5). Cf. Laws 631c6, where this threefold division 
broadly tracks the divine and human goods. 
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are defeated by them (੒ μ੻ν κρείττων ਲμ૵ν, ੒ δ੻ ਸ਼ττων ਥστίν). (863d7–8)210 
 
 
He notes that pleasure, pain and anger are all sources of wrong-doing whenever one is 
defeated by them, and that they “often prompt every person to take the opposite course to 
the one which attracts them and which they really wish to take” (863e2).211 Laws should 
therefore be crafted with a view to helping people resist this kind of wrong-doing and so 
become self-mastered. 
Yet even for the person who reliably honors the master in them in preference to the 
slave, the Athenian doubts that such a person could remain self-mastered should they ever 
attain absolute power in a state (875b3). The weakness of the mortal human condition 
would eventually corrupt them; this is in part what makes legislation so important. 
However, the Athenian is prepared to grant that if some perfectly virtuous and 
knowledgeable person had the opportunity to assume absolute power in a state, that person 
alone would have no need of the laws to master them (875c4). This is because: 
 
Knowledge (ਥπιστήμης) is stronger (κρείττων) than any law or regulation; it is not right 
that intellect (νο૨ν) should be under the control (ਫ਼πήκοον) of anything else, as though it 
were some sort of slave (δο૨λον), but should rule all things (πάντων ਙρχοντα), if it is 
genuine (ἀληθινός) and really enjoys its natural freedom. (875d1–3)212 
 
 
Recall that the Athenian had earlier claimed that intellect was stronger than any law or 
legislation (713e4). Now he makes the same claim about knowledge, and even seems to 
equate the two: both knowledge and intellect turn out to be the natural rulers of everything. 
 
210 ਺δονોς μ੻ν τοίνυν κα੿ θυμο૨ λέγομεν σχεδઁν ਚπαντες ੪ς ੒ μ੻ν κρείττων ਲμ૵ν, ੒ δ੻ ਸ਼ττων ਥστίν· κα੿ 
਩χει ταύτૉ. 
211 By pleasure, by anger, and by ignorance (863b6). These track the three parts of the soul from the Republic. 
212 ਥπιστήμης γ੹ρ ο੡τε νόμος ο੡τε τάξις ο੝δεμία κρείττων, ο੝δ੻ θέμις ਥστ੿ν νο૨ν ο੝δενઁς ਫ਼πήκοον ο੝δ੻ 
δο૨λον ἀλλ੹ πάντων ਙρχοντα εੇναι, ਥάνπερ ἀληθινઁς ਥλεύθερός τε ੕ντως ઝ κατ੹ φύσιν. 
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Given that ‘intellect’ and ‘knowledge’ are the natural rulers of both states and individuals 
(713e4, 875d1) and that ‘soul’ is also said to be a natural ruler (726a1), we might now 
reasonably ask: what is the relationship, if any, between soul, knowledge, and intellect? 
 
5.1 Soul as Ruler 
 
 An answer to this question suggest itself in the tenth book of the Laws, where the 
Athenian seeks to address a “form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble, but which 
passes for the height of wisdom” (886b7). Namely, the belief in a thoroughgoing naturalism 
(888e4). Those who falsely believe that a purely naturalistic account can be offered to 
explain everything think that the gods, who are typically invoked as causes or explanations, 
are simply fictions—conventions meant to enshrine certain moral and legal rules that are 
themselves purely conventional (889e6). Armed with such a naturalistic account of both 
morality and law, these people think themselves above such seemingly arbitrary rules and 
standards (890a3). 
This “vicious doctrine” (890b1) must therefore be countered by the legislator—not 
only because it is a positive hindrance to proper legislation and a source of injustice in the 
state, but also because it is simply false. Rather than immediately threatening punishment 
for those who endorse such a vicious doctrine, however, the Athenian thinks it would be 
better to persuade them that the gods do in fact exist and that laws and legislation are not 
solely a matter of convention. In particular, the legislator “should defend the law itself and 
craft as either part of nature or existing by reason of something no less powerful, being 
creations of intellect (ε੅περ νο૨ γέ ਥστιν γεννήματα) in accordance with right reason (κατ੹ 
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λόγον ੑρθόν)” (890d5).213 The Athenian proceeds to more carefully outline and examine 
the sort of beliefs held by those who endorse this vicious doctrine: 
 
I assume the upholder of this doctrine thinks of fire and water, earth and air as being first 
of all substances, and this is precisely what they mean by ‘nature’ (τ੽ν φύσιν). Soul, they 
think, was derived from them at a later stage. No, I do more than assume; I’d say they argue 
the point explicitly (ἀλλ੹ ੕ντως σημαίνειν τα૨τα ਲμ૙ν τ૶ λόγ૳). (891c2–6)214 
 
 
This belief, says the Athenian, is the “fountainhead, so to speak, of the senseless beliefs of 
all those who have ever undertaken investigation into nature” (891c8). Such people possess 
an entirely inverted view of causal priority. In actual fact, soul is the cause of everything 
(892a2). The truth of this can be discovered by tracing efficient causes back to their 
ultimate source: 
 
But when something which has set itself moving effects an alteration in something, and 
that in turn effects something else, so that the motion is transmitted to thousands upon 
thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely 
spring from some initial principle (μ૵ν ἀρχή), which can hardly be anything except the 
change effected by self-generating motion (ਲ τોς α੝τોς αਫ਼τ੽ν κινησάσης μεταβολή). 
(894e8–895a3)215 
 
 
Whenever a causal chain is initiated by something that moves itself, we trace the entire 
causal chain back to that thing. Indeed, whenever things move themselves, we call those 
things “alive (ζોν)” (895c8). The Athenian now points out that “when we see that a thing 
has a soul, the situation is exactly the same […] we have to admit that it is alive” (895c7). 
 
213 κα੿ δ੽ κα੿ νόμ૳ α੝τ૶ βοηθોσαι κα੿ τέχνૉ, ੪ς ਥστઁν φύσει ਲ਼ φύσεως ο੝χ ਸττον, ε੅περ νο૨ γέ ਥστιν 
γεννήματα κατ੹ λόγον ੑρθόν 
214 κινδυνεύει γ੹ρ ੒ λέγων τα૨τα π૨ρ κα੿ ੢δωρ κα੿ γોν κα੿ ἀέρα πρ૵τα ਲγε૙σθαι τ૵ν πάντων εੇναι, κα੿ τ੽ν 
φύσιν ੑνομάζειν τα૨τα α੝τά, ψυχ੽ν δ੻ ਥκ τούτων ੢στερον. ਩οικεν δ੻ ο੝ κινδυνεύειν ἀλλ੹ ੕ντως σημαίνειν 
τα૨τα ਲμ૙ν τ૶ λόγ૳. 
215 ἀλλ’ ੖ταν ਙρα α੝τઁ αਫ਼τઁ κινોσαν ਪτερον ἀλλοιώσૉ, τઁ δ’ ਪτερον ਙλλο, κα੿ ο੢τω δ੽ χίλια ਥπ੿ μυρίοις 
γίγνηται τ੹ κινηθέντα, μ૵ν ἀρχή τις α੝τ૵ν ਩σται τોς κινήσεως ਖπάσης ਙλλη πλ੽ν ਲ τોς α੝τોς αਫ਼τ੽ν 
κινησάσης μεταβολή; 
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He then points out that whether something is referred to (1) by its name, (2) by its essential 
nature, or (3) by the definition of its essential nature, we are in all three cases referring to 
one and the same thing (895d6). So whether we refer to a particular soul, to soul in general, 
or to the definition of soul as “motion capable of moving itself” (896a1), we are in all three 
cases simply referring to the same thing (896a2). Since the motion capable of moving itself 
has been shown to be the ultimate source of all motion, the Athenian now concludes: 
 
Haven’t we been given a sufficient proof (ੂκαν૵ς δεδε૙χθαι) that soul is the same thing as 
the original coming to be (ψυχ੽ν τα੝τઁν ੓ν κα੿ τ੽ν πρώτην γένεσιν) and motion of all past, 
present, and future things, and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause 
of all change and motion in everything. (896a6–b1)216 
 
 
With this, the naturalists have been refuted. As it turns out: “soul, being the source of 
motion, is the most ancient thing there is” (896b3).217 
That soul is the source of motion should sound familiar. Recall the attribution of 
motion, life and intellect to the forms in the Sophist in the previous chapter. We saw that 
this attribution accorded extremely well with the account of the paradigm of the cosmos as 
an “intelligible living thing” (39e1) in the Timaeus, which also turned out to be the motion 
of intellect. This, too, had been described as motion moving itself. But we now also have 
the claim, familiar from both the Phaedo (80a1) and the Laws (726a1), that soul is the 
natural ruler and master of the body. Not just particular bodies, but body in general—which 
includes the entire sensible cosmos: 
 
So it was an equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth, when we said that 
soul is prior to body (ψυχ੽ν μ੻ν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ਲμ૙ν), and that body came 
 
216 ਛρα ਩τι ποθο૨μεν μ੽ ੂκαν૵ς δεδε૙χθαι ψυχ੽ν τα੝τઁν ੓ν κα੿ τ੽ν πρώτην γένεσιν κα੿ κίνησιν τ૵ν τε ੕ντων 
κα੿ γεγονότων κα੿ ਥσομένων κα੿ πάντων α੣ τ૵ν ਥναντίων τούτοις, ਥπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολોς τε κα੿ 
κινήσεως ਖπάσης αੁτία ਚπασιν; 
217 Cf. Phaedrus 245c ff. 
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later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and body its natural subject (ψυχોς 
ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατ੹ φύσιν). (896b10–3)218 
 
 
We are back, then, to the priority of soul over body.219 That treatment, however, has now 
been significantly expanded. We now have a general definition of soul, which applies not 
only to humans, but to all living things, including the cosmos itself: “And surely it’s 
necessary to assert that soul resides and keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, 
it controls the heavens as well” (896e1).220 Not only this, but soul is said to be “wise and 
supremely virtuous (τઁ φρόνιμον κα੿ ἀρετોς πλોρες)” (897b6). 
Indeed, the “soul cleaves to intellect (ψυχ੽ χρωμένη νο૨ν)” and “always truly 
grasps the divine (προσλαβο૨σα ἀε੿ θεઁν ੑρθ૵ς θεο૙ς)” (897b1). Not only is the soul said 
to grasp the divine intellect, but the divine intellect is also said to grasp the soul. (898e1). 
So while the discussions in the Phaedo and the Timaeus had emphasized that “it is intellect 
(νο૨ς) that orders and is the cause of everything” (97c1–2, 47e4), the discussion here in 
the Laws emphasizes that it is “the best soul (ἀρίστην ψυχήν) that cares for the entire 
cosmos and leads it along the best path” (897c3). Intellect, knowledge, and soul thus seem 
to be three different ways to characterize one and the same thing. 
 
§6 WHO ARE WE? 
 
In the final book of the Laws, the Athenian concludes his expansive treatment of 
 
218 ੗ρθ૵ς ਙρα κα੿ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε κα੿ τελεώτατα εੁρηκότες ਗν εੇμεν ψυχ੽ν μ੻ν προτέραν γεγονέναι 
σώματος ਲμ૙ν, σ૵μα δ੻ δεύτερόν τε κα੿ ੢στερον, ψυχોς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατ੹ φύσιν. 
219 Cf. Phaedo 80a1: “When the soul and body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and ruled 
(δουλεύειν κα੿ ਙρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master (ਙρχειν κα੿ δεσπόζειν). Then again, which do 
you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule 
and to lead (ਙρχειν τε κα੿ ਲγεμονεύειν), whereas that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject?” 
220 Ψυχ੽ν δ੽ διοικο૨σαν κα੿ ਥνοικο૨σαν ਥν ਚπασιν το૙ς πάντૉ κινουμένοις μ૵ν ο੝ κα੿ τઁν ο੝ρανઁν ἀνάγκη 
διοικε૙ν φάναι; 
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legislation in exactly the way he said he would (632c2): with a discussion of funeral rites. 
Unsurprising for a context in which death is at the fore, the Athenian once again turns to a 
discussion of the soul and the body: 
 
We should pay particular attention to the legislator when they say that the soul is wholly 
superior to the body (ψυχ੽ν σώματος εੇναι τઁ π઼ν διαφέρουσαν), and that in life itself it is 
nothing but the soul that makes each of us what we are (ਥν α੝τ૶ τε τ૶ βί૳ τઁ παρεχόμενον 
ਲμ૵ν ਪκαστον το૨τ’ εੇναι μηδ੻ν ἀλλ’ ਲ਼ τ੽ν ψυχήν); the body is just is a lookalike which 
in each case keeps us company (τઁ δ੻ σ૵μα ੁνδαλλόμενον ਲμ૵ν ਦκάστοις ਪπεσθαι). This 
is why it is correct to say that corpses are images of the deceased. Who we really are, which 
goes by the name of our immortal soul (τઁν δ੻ ੕ντα ਲμ૵ν ਪκαστον ੕ντως, ἀθάνατον εੇναι 
ψυχ੽ν ਥπονομαζόμενον) departs, as the ancestral law declares, to the gods to give an 
account of itself. To the good this is a source of comfort, to the bad a source of fear. (959a4–
b5)221 
 
 
Here, then, in the final book of Plato’s final work, we have what is perhaps the most explicit 
statement of all concerning who we really are (τઁν ੕ντα ਲμ૵ν ਪκαστον ੕ντως).222 As had 
been suggested in the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Timaeus, what we really are is the 
immortal soul. 
 
§7 Looking Ahead: Unity of the Virtues 
 
At the conclusion of the Laws (963a), the Athenian Stranger recalls the original 
account of virtue that had been sketched in book one. He once again reminds his 
interlocutors that the primary aim of the legislator is virtue (963a3). Although there are 
 
221 πείθεσθαι δ’ ਥστ੿ τ૶ νομοθέτૉ χρεઅν τά τε ਙλλα κα੿ λέγοντι ψυχ੽ν σώματος εੇναι τઁ π઼ν διαφέρουσαν, 
ਥν α੝τ૶ τε τ૶ βί૳ τઁ παρεχόμενον ਲμ૵ν ਪκαστον το૨τ’ εੇναι μηδ੻ν ἀλλ’ ਲ਼ τ੽ν ψυχήν, τઁ δ੻ σ૵μα 
ੁνδαλλόμενον ਲμ૵ν ਦκάστοις ਪπεσθαι, κα੿ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλ૵ς ε੅δωλα εੇναι τ੹ τ૵ν νεκρ૵ν 
σώματα, τઁν δ੻ ੕ντα ਲμ૵ν ਪκαστον ੕ντως, ἀθάνατον εੇναι ψυχ੽ν ਥπονομαζόμενον, παρ੹ θεοઃς ਙλλους 
ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, καθάπερ ੒ νόμος ੒ πάτριος λέγει – τ૶ μ੻ν γ੹ρ ἀγαθ૶ θαρραλέον, τ૶ δ੻ κακ૶ μάλα 
φοβερόν. 
222 Schöpsdau (1994) p. 574 points to the first Alcibiades 130c1–3, Phaedo 115c–d, and Republic 469d as 
parallel passages. He also notes that this seems to be an inversion of the Homeric analogy of the soul as a 
shadowy image of the body in Hades (Odyssey 11.476, 10.495): “Fur Platon ist gerade umgekehrt der Körper 
nur äußere Erscheinung des Lebenden und Abbild des Verstorbenen, dessen wahres Selbt die Seele ist...” 
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four virtues, he now reminds them that the leading one to which “everything else should 
be oriented, is intellect” (963a8). In recounting this claim, the Athenian points out a 
problem familiar from the Protagoras. Namely, a problem about the unity of the virtues: 
 
When we said there were four kinds of virtue, we must have been saying that each of them 
was one, making four in all. Yet we call them all by a single name. We say courage is 
virtue, wisdom is virtue, and the other two similarly (ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετ੽ν εੇναι, κα੿ 
τ੽ν φρόνησιν ἀρετήν, κα੿ τ੹ δύο τਛλλα), as if in reality there were not several things but 
just one: virtue (੪ς ੕ντως ੕ντα ο੝ πολλ੹ ἀλλ’ ਨν το૨το μόνον, ἀρετήν). It is not hard to 
explain how these two virtues and the rest differ from each other and how each has acquired 
a different name. The real problem is this: why, precisely, have we described both of them, 
as well as the others, by a single name. (963c8–d6)223 
 
 
He illustrates the way in which the virtues of courage and wisdom differ from each other. 
It is notable, of course, that these were the two virtues that had proven especially 
troublesome in the Protagoras. Yet perhaps surprisingly, they pose no great difficulty here. 
In fact, we learn that the way in which courage differs from wisdom is precisely the way 
in which moderation differs from wisdom.224 In language directly recalling his discussion 
of popular moderation (710a5), we now learn that there is also a popular kind of courage: 
 
Why is it that after calling both by a single term, virtue (ἀρετήν), in the next breath we 
speak of two virtues: courage and wisdom (τઁ μ੻ν ἀνδρείαν, τઁ δ੻ φρόνησιν)? I’ll tell you 
why. One of them, courage (τોς ἀνδρείας), concerns fear, and is found in wild animals (τ੹ 
θηρία) as well as in the characters of very young children (τ૵ν παίδων ਵθη τ૵ν πάνυ νέων). 
The soul can become naturally courageous, without the aid of reason (ਙνευ γ੹ρ λόγου κα੿ 
φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή). By contrast, without reason a wise and intelligent soul (ਙνευ 
δ੻ α੣ λόγου ψυχ੽ φρόνιμός τε κα੿ νο૨ν) is out of the question. That is true now, has always 
been, and always will be; the two processes are fundamentally different. (963e1–9)225 
 
223 Οੈον ੖τε τέτταρα ਥφήσαμεν ἀρετોς ε੅δη γεγονέναι, δોλον ੪ς ਨν ਪκαστον ἀνάγκη φάναι, τεττάρων γε 
੕ντων. Κα੿ μ੽ν ਪν γε ਚπαντα τα૨τα προσαγορεύομεν. ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετ੽ν εੇναι, κα੿ τ੽ν φρόνησιν 
ἀρετήν, κα੿ τ੹ δύο τਛλλα, ੪ς ੕ντως ੕ντα ο੝ πολλ੹ ἀλλ’ ਨν το૨το μόνον, ἀρετήν. ੀι μ੻ν τοίνυν διαφέρετον 
α੝το૙ν τούτω τઅ δύο κα੿ δύ’ ੑνόματα ਥλαβέτην κα੿ τਛλλα, ο੝δ੻ν χαλεπઁν εੁπε૙ν· ઞ δ੻ ਨν ἀμφο૙ν 
ਥπωνομάσαμεν, ἀρετήν, κα੿ το૙ς ਙλλοις, ο੝κ ε੝πετ੻ς ਩τι. 
224 Cf. Laws 791b–c; Cf. Statesman 306a–309e, where Plato also discusses popular courage and moderation. 
225 ποτε ਨν προσαγορεύοντες ἀρετ੽ν ἀμφότερα, δύο πάλιν α੝τ੹ προσείπομεν, τઁ μ੻ν ἀνδρείαν, τઁ δ੻ 
φρόνησιν.τઁ μέν ਥστιν περ੿ φόβον, ο੤ κα੿ τ੹ θηρία μετέχει, τોς ἀνδρείας, κα੿ τά γε τ૵ν παίδων ਵθη τ૵ν 
πάνυ νέων· ਙνευ γ੹ρ λόγου κα੿ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή, ਙνευ δ੻ α੣ λόγου ψυχ੽ φρόνιμός τε κα੿ νο૨ν 
਩χουσα ο੡τ’ ਥγένετο πώποτε ο੡τ’ ਩στιν ο੝δ’ α੣θίς ποτε γενήσεται, ੪ς ੕ντος ਦτέρου. 
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The Athenian immediately points out that the guardians (specifically, those guardians who 
are members of the ‘Nocturnal Council’)226 should be able to understand the way in which 
all of the virtues form a unity and the way in which each particular virtue differs from the 
others. For knowledge requires that one not only grasp the names of the virtues, but also 
their essential definitions, and the way in which those definitions relate to one another 
(964a7). The Athenian puts it thus: 
 
Didn’t we say that a really skilled craftsman or guardian (δημιουργόν τε κα੿ φύλακα) must 
be able not merely to grasp the many (μ੽ μόνον δε૙ν πρઁς τ੹ πολλ੹ βλέπειν δυνατઁν εੇναι), 
but also to win through to a knowledge of the one (πρઁς δ੻ τઁ ਨν ਥπείγεσθαι γν૵ναί τε), 
and when they have understood that, put the whole in order (κα੿ γνόντα πρઁς ਥκε૙νο 
συντάξασθαι πάντα συνορ૵ντα)? What better tool for a penetrating investigation of a 
concept than an ability to look beyond the many dissimilar instances to a single form (τઁ 
πρઁς μίαν ੁδέαν ਥκ τ૵ν πολλ૵ν κα੿ ἀνομοίων δυνατઁν εੇναι βλέπειν)? […] So it looks as 
if we have to compel the guardians of our divine foundation to get an exact idea of the 
common element in all the four virtues (ἀκριβ૵ς ੁδε૙ν πρ૵τον τί ποτε δι੹ πάντων τ૵ν 
τεττάρων τα੝τઁν τυγχάνει)—that factor which, though single, is to be found in courage, 
moderation, justice and wisdom (ἀνδρεί઺ κα੿ σωφροσύνૉ κα੿ δικαιοσύνૉ κα੿ ਥν 
φρονήσει), and thus in our view deserves the general title ‘virtue’ (ἀρετήν). (965b7–d4)227 
 
 
That single factor found in all of the virtues, the Athenian seems to suggest, is wisdom. He 
makes clear that, on all such serious questions, the doctrine is firm: “If our guardians are 
going to be genuine guardians of the law, they must have genuine knowledge of the reality 
 
226 These are the ten eldest guardians of the laws. For an excellent treatment of the Nocturnal Council—
including its members, functions, and activities—see Morrow (1960) pp. 500–18. 
227 Ο੝κο૨ν ਥλέγομεν τόν γε πρઁς ਪκαστα ਙκρον δημιουργόν τε κα੿ φύλακα μ੽ μόνον δε૙ν πρઁς τ੹ πολλ੹ 
βλέπειν δυνατઁν εੇναι, πρઁς δ੻ τઁ ਨν ਥπείγεσθαι γν૵ναί τε, κα੿ γνόντα πρઁς ਥκε૙νο συντάξασθαι πάντα 
συνορ૵ντα; ਣρ’ ο੣ν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τε ਗν περ੿ ੒τουο૨ν ੒τ૳ο૨ν γίγνοιτο ਲ਼ τઁ πρઁς μίαν ੁδέαν ਥκ 
τ૵ν πολλ૵ν κα੿ ἀνομοίων δυνατઁν εੇναι βλέπειν; […] ਝναγκαστέον ਙρ’, ੪ς ਩οικεν, κα੿ τοઃς τોς θείας 
πολιτείας ਲμ૙ν φύλακας ἀκριβ૵ς ੁ δε૙ν πρ૵τον τί ποτε δι੹ πάντων τ૵ν τεττάρων τα੝τઁν τυγχάνει, ੔ δή φαμεν 
਩ν τε ἀνδρεί઺ κα੿ σωφροσύνૉ κα੿ δικαιοσύνૉ κα੿ ਥν φρονήσει ਨν ੕ν, ἀρετ੽ν ਦν੿ δικαίως ਗν ੑνόματι 
προσαγορεύεσθαι. 
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of those things; they must be articulate enough to explain the real difference between good 
actions and bad, and capable of sticking to the distinction in practice” (966b5).228 
With all of this in place, we can now return to some of the interpretive problems 
with which we began. Specifically, we will return to the Protagoras in order to more fully 
examine the following claims: that knowledge rules, that virtue is knowledge, and that self-
mastery is nothing other than wisdom. We will then be in a position to answer the 
interpretive question with which we began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras 
concerned to reinterpret putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 The Athenian is careful to single out theology as one of the finest fields of knowledge (966c1) and point 
out that anyone who has failed to study it cannot be a member of the Nocturnal Council. He also points out 
that no one can attain a truly religious outlook unless they grasp two doctrines: (1) That the soul is far older 
than any created thing and that it is immortal and controls all becoming (967d ff.), and (2) that reason or 
intellect is the supreme power (967d ff.). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SELF-MASTERY, SELF-KNOWLEDGE & VIRTUE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Armed with a developed account of the nature of the soul, made possible through 
an extended analysis of self-mastery, we now return to the Protagoras. The discussion of 
moderation and wisdom in the Laws, treated at some length in the previous chapter, helps 
to illuminate many of the issues related to the discussion of virtue in the Protagoras. In 
particular, it helps to shed light on why courage remains the primary stumbling block to 
the unity of the virtues, and why the difficulties Protagoras raises ultimately occasion an 
argument that knowledge is sufficient for virtue, as well as Socrates’ puzzling rejection of 
the possibility of psychic conflict. 
The plan for this chapter is as follows. After first outlining the disagreement 
between Socrates and Protagoras vis-à-vis the teachability of virtue (§1), I turn to Socrates’ 
initial attempt to demonstrate the unity of the virtues—focusing on moderation and wisdom 
(§2). I then explore the distinction that Socrates draws between the process of becoming 
virtuous and the state of being virtuous (§3). Given Socrates’ staunch insistence that only 
someone with knowledge can be virtuous, I explore what this knowledge must ultimately 
amount to (§4). Then, after briefly outlining and diagnosing Socrates’ failed attempt to 
convince Protagoras that courage, too, is wisdom (§5), I return to his defense of the claim 
that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (§6). The dialogue concludes with an explicit, 
unresolved dilemma about the teachability of virtue—but we now have the resources to 
meet it (§7). We will then be in a position to answer the interpretive question with which 
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we began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of 
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance? 
 
§1 VIRTUE IN THE PROTAGORAS 
 
Protagoras claims to teach civic virtue, or the “craft of citizenship” (319a5), but 
Socrates is skeptical that such a thing can be taught (319b3).229 He grants that if citizenship 
were a craft, then it would be teachable—but he points out that Athenians do not seem to 
regard it as such. As evidence of this, he points out that when it comes to civic matters 
involving some particular craft, Athenians only seem to entertain counsel from a small 
cadre of experts, and summarily reject the advice of anyone thought to lack the relevant 
expertise. Yet no citizen is barred from offering advice on general political matters, such 
as city management (319d1). This seems to suggest that city management is not thought of 
as a craft.230 Socrates also points out that even the very best citizens, those who possess the 
greatest reputation for virtue, are unable to reliably teach it to others.231 Indeed, such 
distinguished citizens seem to be utterly incapable of teaching virtue even to their own 
children, on whom no expense is spared. 
Protagoras attempts to address this set of concerns in a stretch of text known as the 
‘Great Speech’ (320c–328d). In this speech, Protagoras argues that citizenship is indeed a 
craft, and therefore something teachable. He begins on a conciliatory note; he grants that 
Socrates’ skepticism is not entirely unwarranted, as citizenship does differ from all other 
 
229 Protagoras claims to teach sound deliberation in public and private affairs and how to be successful in 
political debate and action (318e6), which Socrates quickly re-characterizes as the craft of citizenship. 
Protagoras explicitly accepts this re-characterization: “This is exactly what I claim, Socrates” (319a7). 
230 Cf. Gorgias 455b1–c2 
231 Pericles and Themistocles are the usual examples. Cf. Alcibiades 118d ff.; Gorgias 455e2, 503c1, 515d1–
516d7, 519a6; Menexenus 235e6; Meno 93d2–94e2, 99b4; Phaedrus 269e1; Protagoras 320a1, 329a2; 
Republic 329e6 
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crafts in just the respect that Socrates had identified. Namely, in that it is practiced by 
everyone (323c4). The reason for this, Protagoras claims, is that human beings would be 
unable to form communities if citizenship were, like other crafts, practiced only by a small 
group of experts (323a3).232 Protagoras even goes so far as to claim that one cannot be 
entirely devoid of the craft of citizenship—entirely devoid of civic virtue—and still be 
considered human (323c2).233 
Since every human being must possesses some share of civic virtue, one might 
reasonably believe that it is a natural endowment, in which case there would still be no 
need to teach it. Protagoras is careful to head off this worry. He maintains that people “do 
not regard this virtue as natural or self-generated, but as something taught and carefully 
developed in those in whom it is developed” (323c7). As evidence of this, he points out 
that no one reproves people for natural deficiencies. For example, no one is reproved for 
lacking beauty (323d5). But people are reproved when it comes to deficiencies involving 
“things that accrue to them through practice and training and teaching” (323d8). The fact 
that Athenians punish people for injustice or impiety is good evidence that they believe 
“virtue is learned” (324c2). For as Protagoras is careful to note: “reasonable punishment is 
not vengeance for a past wrong,” but rather serves as a deterrent to future wrong (324b5).234 
Punishment is thus a form of teaching. Protagoras takes this to be strong evidence that 
virtue is generally regarded as teachable; otherwise, punishing someone for lacking virtue 
would be as absurd as punishing someone for lacking beauty. 
 
232 Humans are given a share of virtue by divine dispensation (322a5). 
233 Cf. Protagoras 349a2, where Socrates calls him a teacher of virtue. This also resonates with Aristotle’s 
famous assertion that “man is by nature a political animal” (Politics 1253a1–18). 
234 This is also the view of punishment endorsed by the Athenian in the Laws (863d ff.). 
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In response to Socrates’ final worry—that those who have exhibited the greatest 
virtue in public and private life fail to reliably transmit it—Protagoras canvases the myriad 
ways that such people do, in fact, seek to instill virtue in their children (325c6–326c2).235 
This is yet another indication, he takes it, that virtue is generally regarded as teachable. If 
it were not so regarded, then it would not be the case that so many people expend significant 
effort and resources seeking to impart it.236 But Protagoras is also careful to point out that 
this does not imply that everyone is equally capable of learning, or acquiring virtue.  
Suppose that everyone were required to practice the craft of flute-playing. It would 
not be at all surprising, Protagoras insists, if some people turned out to be naturally better 
flutists than others (327c1). Indeed, it would be inordinately surprising if the children of 
excellent flute-players turned out on the whole to be anywhere near as gifted as their 
parents, or if children from wealthy families turned out on the whole to be any more gifted 
at flute-playing than children from poorer families (327c2). When it comes to making 
progress in any particular craft, natural endowment and disposition are far more important 
than wealth or pedigree (327b5–c4). 
Nevertheless, Protagoras notes that even the worst flutists in such a society would 
still be far more skilled at flute-playing than those who have had no exposure to this craft 
(327c5). Protagoras uses this point in order to draw a distinction between ignorance, 
competence, and expertise (327c4–e2). He thinks that Socrates has “affected delicate 
sensibilities” (327e2) in refusing to distinguish the layman from someone who possesses a 
low degree of competence on the one hand—and in refusing to identify the expert with 
 
235 The resemblance of the education outlined by Protagoras to the education that the guardians receive in the 
Republic is particularly striking. This resemblance is discussed more fully in the final section of this chapter. 
236 Witness Hippocrates at the beginning of the dialogue (310e1). 
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someone who possesses a high degree of competence on the other hand. Socrates would be 
more prepared to admit that virtue is teachable if he were to encounter wholly ignorant 
people—those who have not been “reared in human society under law” (327d1). If he were 
to encounter such people, Socrates would readily grant that the sort of basic competence in 
virtue exhibited by the average Athenian is a genuine accomplishment: one that would not 
be possible unless everyone were more-or-less competent to teach it.237 
Protagoras is also careful to add that it is no knock on a distinguished teacher if 
their students (or even their own children) fail to attain a comparable level of distinction. 
More often than not, students are simply less gifted than their teachers. Fortunately, 
Protagoras does not believe that one needs a distinguished teacher (or even a good one) in 
order to make progress. Sufficient progress can be made so long as one is taught by 
someone more advanced than oneself (328a1). According to Protagoras, “it is the same 
with virtue and everything else. If there is someone who is the least bit more advanced in 
virtue than ourselves, they are to be cherished” (328a8). Protagoras thus secures his place 
as a teacher of virtue, worth his exorbitant fee, simply by maintaining that he is more 
competent in virtue than most (328b1). He merely teaches virtue to those less advanced 
than himself. So much for Protagoras’ defense. In the next section, we will examine the 
way that Socrates challenges Protagoras to unpack his views about virtue. 
 
§2 MODERATION & WISDOM 
 
 Socrates expresses his admiration for both Protagoras and his speech, but claims 
that there is still “one little thing” that is bothering him (329b7). Protagoras has repeatedly 
 
237 Protagoras also draws a useful analogy with language here (328a1): if the contrast is simply between 
ignorance and expertise, then Socrates would have to grant that there are no teachers of Greek.  
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claimed “that justice and moderation and piety and all these things were somehow 
collectively one thing: virtue” (329c3). Socrates now wants to know why Protagoras thinks 
that all of these particular virtues can be collected under a single heading. Is it because he 
thinks that virtue is (1) a whole, “with justice and moderation and piety its parts” (329d1), 
or (2) a unit, with justice and moderation and piety serving as different “names for a single 
entity” (329d2)? 
Protagoras thinks that virtue is (1) a whole composed of parts, so Socrates now 
seeks additional clarification: does he think that the various parts of virtue are (1a) 
heterogenous, as parts of a face are to the face, or (1b) homogenous, as parts of gold are to 
gold? Protagoras maintains that they are (1a) heterogenous, at which point Socrates seeks 
still further clarification: how do these heterogenous parts of virtue relate to the whole of 
virtue? Are each of the parts (1a1) separable from the whole, so that it is possible to possess 
some part of virtue without necessarily possessing the whole of it, or are they (1a2) 
inseparable from the whole, so that it is impossible to possess any part of virtue without 
necessarily possessing the whole of it?238 
Protagoras opts for (1a1): he thinks that it is possible to possess one heterogenous 
part of virtue without necessarily possessing the whole of it. He supports this claim by 
pointing out that “many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but not wise” 
(329e6). Since Protagoras had not previously mentioned courage or wisdom, Socrates 
seeks and obtains explicit confirmation that these, too, are parts of virtue (330a1).239 But 
 
238 This last dilemma is seeking to clarify the dependence relation of the parts of virtue to the whole of virtue: 
do the parts depend on the whole or does the whole depend on the parts? Socrates mereological commitments 
in this dialogue are largely consistent with his mereological commitments in other dialogues. See Harte 
(2002) for an especially clear and illuminating treatment of parts and wholes in Plato. 
239 So, to “justice (δικαιοσύνη), moderation (σωφροσύνη) and piety (੒σιότης)” (329c7) are added “wisdom 
(σοφία) and courage (ἀνδρεία)” (330a1). He adds that “wisdom is the greatest part” of virtue (330a1). 
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the view that the various heterogenous parts of virtue can be possessed independently of 
the whole implies that each of them must somehow be distinct—both from the whole and 
from the other parts. So Socrates now wants to know in what respect each part of virtue is 
distinct. Does Protagoras think that, just as each of the parts of the face have a distinct 
power (δύναμις), so too each of the parts of virtue have a distinct power (330a4)? 
Protagoras confirms that this is his view, at which point Socrates makes explicit what this 
commits him to: 
 
Then, none of the other parts of virtue is like knowledge (ਥπιστήμη), or like justice 
(δικαιοσύνη), or like courage (ἀνδρεία), or like moderation (σωφροσύνη), or like piety 
(੒σιότης)? (330b4–5)240  
 
Protagoras is prepared to accept this entailment, but Socrates now works to undermine it. 
He first attempts to show that two parts of virtue, justice and piety, are either very similar 
(੒μοιότατον) or the same (τα੝τόν) as one another (331b4).241 But Protagoras resists in 
precisely the way one would expect of a consummate relativist: he points out that any two 
things can be shown to be very similar, or perhaps even the same, in some respect (331d1). 
Socrates therefore changes tack. He now attempts to argue that moderation and 
wisdom are not just very similar, or even the same in some respect, but identical.242 He 
does this by first securing Protagoras’ agreement that folly (ἀφροσύνην) is the opposite of 
 
240 Ο੝δ੻ν ਙρα ਥστ੿ν τ૵ν τોς ἀρετોς μορίων ਙλλο οੈον ਥπιστήμη, ο੝δ’ οੈον δικαιοσύνη, ο੝δ’ οੈον ἀνδρεία, 
ο੝δ’ οੈον σωφροσύνη, ο੝δ’ οੈον ੒σιότης. It is worth noting that the virtue of ‘wisdom’ (σοφία) is recast as 
the virtue of ‘knowledge’ (ਥπιστήμη). For the rest of the dialogue, these two terms are used interchangeably. 
241 The discussion of moderation and wisdom runs from 332a3–333b6. 
242 If each thing has only one opposite, then the implication is not merely that moderation and wisdom are 
very similar (੒μοιότατον). Neither is it merely that moderation and wisdom are the same (τα੝τόν) in some 
respect. The implication is that they are identical—numerically one (ਨν). Indeed, Socrates explicitly draws 
attention to this at 333b5. I take it that, for Plato, sameness requires a specifying predicate (i.e. a and b are 
the same F), whereas identity requires no such specifying predicate (i.e. a = b). 
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both moderation (σωφροσύνη) and wisdom (σοφία). He then secures agreement that each 
thing has only one opposite. The following three claims are thus explicitly endorsed by 
Protagoras: 
 
1) Folly is opposite of wisdom (332a6) 
2) Folly is the opposite of moderation (332b5) 
3) Each thing has only one opposite (332d1) 
 
 
These claims form an inconsistent triad, so Protagoras must abandon at least one of them. 
Socrates offers him a choice: he can either abandon (3), or collapse (1) into (2) by 
abandoning his commitment to the view that wisdom and moderation are each 
heterogenous parts of virtue that have distinct powers.243 
 Now, it is here worth recalling the discussion of wisdom and moderation from the 
Laws, which was treated at length in the previous chapter. There, the kind of moderation 
that was distinct from wisdom had been labeled popular, while the kind of moderation that 
was identified with wisdom had been labeled exalted. Recall, too, that popular moderation 
had been described as a quality that naturally develops in children and animals, but was 
not much to speak of when separated from wisdom. What should become clear in the 
present context is that Protagoras is defending something like the popular kind of 
moderation: the kind of moderation that is distinct from wisdom. What should also become 
clear is that Socrates is arguing for something like the exalted kind of moderation: the kind 
of moderation that is identified with wisdom. We will return to these points in greater detail 
below. 
 
 
243 Of course, Protagoras could also abandon (1) or (2). Tellingly, Socrates does not give him that option. 
 110 
  
§3 BEING & BECOMING VIRTUOUS 
 
After Protagoras reluctantly acknowledges that he must abandon his earlier 
commitment to the view that wisdom and moderation are each heterogenous parts of virtue, 
Socrates quickly points out what this entails: “wouldn’t that make wisdom and moderation 
one thing” (333b4)?244 Without waiting for an answer, Socrates quickly attempts to show 
that moderation is also identical to justice, but he meets with stiff resistance while 
attempting to flesh out his account of moderation (333e3).245 Protagoras filibusters, at 
which point Socrates is prepared to conclude the discussion (334a4–336b2). When 
Protagoras is finally compelled to resume, he changes tack (338e5). Rather than answering 
questions, he will now be asking them. His new “line of questioning will still concern the 
subject of the present discussion, namely virtue, but translated into the sphere of poetry” 
(339a5). He begins with certain lines of Simonides, and aims to show that the poet 
contradicts himself on the subject of virtue: 
 
First, he asserts himself that is hard for a man truly to become good, and then, a little further 
on in his poem he forgets and criticizes Pittacus for saying the same thing as he did, that it 
is hard for a man to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same thing he himself 
said. (339d2–6)246 
 
 
Socrates attempts to save Simonides from the charge of hypocrisy by drawing a distinction 
between being good and becoming good (340c5): he interprets Simonides as claiming, in 
 
244 Ο੝κο૨ν ਨν ਗν ε੅η ਲ σωφροσύνη κα੿ ਲ σοφία. 
245 Protagoras once again resists in the way one would expect of a consummate relativist: he points out that 
anything can be shown to be good for someone (or something) in some respect (334a4). 
246 ੖ς γε τઁ μ੻ν πρ૵τον α੝τઁς ਫ਼πέθετο χαλεπઁν εੇναι ਙνδρα ἀγαθઁν γενέσθαι ἀλαθεί઺, ੑλίγον δ੻ το૨ 
ποιήματος εੁς τઁ πρόσθεν προελθઅν ਥπελάθετο, κα੿ Πιττακઁν τઁν τα੝τ੹ λέγοντα ਦαυτ૶, ੖τι χαλεπઁν ਥσθλઁν 
਩μμεναι το૨τον μέμφεταί τε κα੿ ο੡ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι α੝το૨ τ੹ α੝τ੹ ਦαυτ૶ λέγοντος 
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contrast to Pittacus, that only becoming good is hard.247 Protagoras resists this 
interpretation, however, explaining that Simonides’ “ignorance would be monumental if 
he says the possession of virtue is so trivial when everyone agrees it is the hardest thing in 
the word” (340e2).248 
Now, it is worth noting how strange it is for Protagoras to be worried about making 
the possession of virtue trivial, given the position he had staked out in his ‘Great Speech.’249 
Recall that Protagoras had accused Socrates of “affecting delicate sensibilities” (327e2) in 
refusing to admit that there are any teachers of virtue. Protagoras, by contrast, had argued 
at length that “everyone is a teacher of virtue” (327e2) precisely because he maintained 
that every (civilized) person possesses a share of it and so displays some basic degree of 
competence. One would be hard-pressed to make the possession of virtue any more trivial 
than that. In his effort to resist Socrates, then, Protagoras seems to have significantly 
backpedaled: virtue is no longer the common possession of all human beings, but the 
hardest thing in the world to acquire. 
Socrates appears to notice this (likely unintended) reversal by Protagoras, and picks 
up on it in his own exegetical treatment of Simonides’ poem. He does so by reviving the 
distinction that Protagoras had introduced in his ‘Great Speech’ between ignorance, 
competence, and expertise (327c4–e2). This, recall, was the threefold distinction that had 
allowed Protagoras to maintain that everyone is a teacher of virtue: everyone reared within 
 
247 Cf. Protagoras 344a3; Socrates utilizes lines from Hesiod’s Works and Days (289, 291–92) in his 
interpretation of Simonides. The word translating ‘goodness’ in these lines of Hesiod is ‘virtue.’ 
248 Note that Prodicus is made to distinguish between two senses of ‘hard.’ However, this distinction does no 
work. (Prodicus chooses the wrong sense, anyway.) This can be seen as a jab at sophistry, but it can also be 
seen as highlighting a benefit of sophistic training for philosophers. Prodicus was Socrates’ teacher (341a4). 
249 Cf. Republic 539b1: “I don’t suppose that it has escaped your notice that... people misuse [arguments] by 
treating it as a kind of game of contradiction. They imitate those who’ve refuted them by refuting others 
themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments.” 
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human society is competent to teach virtue to anyone less advanced than themselves. He 
had also insisted that “no one can be a layman” (327a1), or wholly ignorant, when it comes 
to virtue. Not only this, but he had claimed that the sort of expertise in virtue that Socrates 
had envisioned was a pipedream (328a1). Forget ignorance and expertise: there are only 
varying degrees of competence. Socrates now challenges this view. He does so, in part, by 
systematically applying the distinction between being and becoming good to the craft of 
medicine. 
According to Socrates, a medical student is someone “learning how to cure the 
sick” (345a2). Although medical students have initiated the process of becoming doctors, 
they are not yet doctors: they are still laymen. Once these medical students complete their 
training, however, they are no longer becoming doctors. They now are doctors. But are we 
prepared to call these newly-minted graduates good doctors? Socrates gets at this question 
by asking a slightly different one: who could, properly speaking, become a bad doctor 
(345a3)? As it turns out, it is only someone who is “first, a doctor and, second, a good 
doctor” (345a4).250 But what, exactly, is the difference between what I will call a mere 
doctor and a good doctor? 
The answer will be forthcoming, I suggest, if we flesh out his example in a slightly 
more modern way. We can grant, with Socrates, that medical students are laymen: they are 
in the process of learning the medical knowledge that they do not yet possess. For this 
reason, they are not legally permitted to practice the craft of medicine. Medical interns, by 
contrast, display a basic degree of competence: they are newly-minted doctors and so are 
 
250 Indeed, this distinction also seems to be deployed in the Phaedrus (268b ff.), where Socrates points out 
that someone can know “the preliminaries of medicine, but not medicine itself” (269a3). Such a person  
(though they may know the preliminaries) is in not a competent practitioner, but remains ignorant of the craft. 
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legally permitted to practice the craft of medicine. However, they must be supervised. 
Medical residents display an even higher degree of competence than their first-year 
counterparts: they are more seasoned than the interns they supervise. But these residents 
are themselves supervised by attendings: veteran doctors who are only tapped for the most 
difficult diagnoses and challenging procedures. It is the attending doctor alone whom 
Socrates seems to be prepared to call both an ‘expert’ and ‘good.’251 
If this suggestion is correct, then Socrates is not only prepared to countenance 
Protagoras’ threefold distinction between ignorance, competence and expertise—but he 
appears to grant, with Protagoras, that competence comes in degrees.252 Where Socrates 
seems to fundamentally disagree with Protagoras, however, concerns the threshold at 
which ignorance can properly be said to give way to competence, and competence, in turn, 
to expertise. 
On the one hand, Protagoras had set the bar so low for ignorance that only those 
who are literally uncivilized (327d1) would qualify. On the other hand, Protagoras had set 
the bar so high for expertise that it is unclear if anyone would qualify (328a1). On his view, 
nearly everyone displays some degree of competence, such that anyone more advanced is 
capable of teaching anyone less advanced (328a8). For Protagoras, then, medical students 
would surely count as competent teachers of medicine; indeed, they exhibit a much higher 
degree of competence than the average person. For Socrates, however, medical students 
are no teachers of medicine: they are ignorant. While they have certainly initiated the 
 
251 The Athenian makes much the same point in the Laws at 719a1, where he quotes the very same lines of 
Hesiod that are cited here in the Protagoras at 340d5. In fact, the Athenian there draws a distinction between 
doctors and doctors’ assistants. The doctors are said to have systematic knowledge, while the doctors’ 
assistants pick up the skill empirically and so lack any sort of systematic knowledge (720b2). 
252 This is likely tracking the cognitive distinction between ignorance, belief and knowledge. 
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process of becoming doctors, they are not yet doctors and so not competent to practice 
medicine.253 It is the mere doctor (the intern or resident) who displays some degree of 
competence, while it is the good doctor alone who qualifies as the expert.254 It appears that 
Simonides was right—becoming good is hard! 
In putting a fine point on all of this, Socrates adds a final, intriguing suggestion 
about the way in which the good doctor might become bad: 
 
[B]ut we who are medical laymen could never by faring ill become doctors or carpenters 
or any kind of craftsman. And if one cannot become a doctor by faring ill, clearly one 
cannot become a bad one either. In the same way a good man (ἀγαθઁς ἀνήρ) may eventually 
become bad with the passage of time, or through hardship, disease, or some other 
circumstance that involves the only real kind of faring ill, which is the loss of knowledge 
(ਥπιστήμης στερηθોναι). But the bad man can never become bad, for he is so all the time. 
If he is to become bad, he must first become good (εੁ μέλλει κακઁς γενέσθαι, δε૙ α੝τઁν 
πρότερον ἀγαθઁν γενέσθαι). (345a6–c1, my emphasis)255 
 
Only those who are already good are capable of becoming bad. Since most people never 
reach the state of being good, they cannot strictly speaking become bad. As Socrates is 
made to put the point: you simply “can’t knock down someone already supine; you can 
only knock down someone standing up and render them supine” (344d1).The way in which 
good and upright people become bad, however, is through the loss of knowledge.256 But 
 
253 Cf. Statesman 299b ff. where the same analogies are deployed. 
254 Socrates summarizes his position as follows: it is knowledge that renders craftsmen capable of practicing 
their crafts. Laymen, by contrast, lack the requisite knowledge, and their ignorance renders them incapable. 
Since only craftsmen possesses knowledge, they alone can be dispossessed of it. Properly speaking, laymen 
cannot be dispossessed of knowledge that they never possessed in the first place. That is: they cannot be 
incapacitated because their chronic ignorance has rendered them “chronically incapable” (344d4). 
255 ਲμε૙ς δ੻ οੂ ੁ ατρικોς ੁδι૵ται ο੝κ ਙν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακ૵ς πράξαντες ο੡τε ੁ ατρο੿ ο੡τε τέκτονες ο੡τε ਙλλο 
ο੝δ੻ν τ૵ν τοιούτων· ੖στις δ੻ μ੽ ੁατρઁς ਗν γένοιτο κακ૵ς πράξας, δોλον ੖τι ο੝δ੻ κακઁς ੁατρός. ο੢τω κα੿ ੒ 
μ੻ν ἀγαθઁς ἀν੽ρ γένοιτ’ ਙν ποτε κα੿ κακઁς ਲ਼ ਫ਼πઁ χρόνου ਲ਼ ਫ਼πઁ πόνου ਲ਼ ਫ਼πઁ νόσου ਲ਼ ਫ਼πઁ ਙλλου τινઁς 
περιπτώματος α੢τη γ੹ρ μόνη ਥστ੿ κακ੽ πρ઼ξις, ਥπιστήμης στερηθોναι ੒ δ੻ κακઁς ἀν੽ρ ο੝κ ਙν ποτε γένοιτο 
κακός ਩στιν γ੹ρ ἀεί. ἀλλ’ εੁ μέλλει κακઁς γενέσθαι, δε૙ α੝τઁν πρότερον ἀγαθઁν γενέσθαι. 
256 Humans will inevitably be “thrown down” (334c6), if for no other reason than that they will die. Those 
who persist in this state for the longest are “those whom the gods love” (345c5). 
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while it is easy to determine what would constitute ‘faring ill’ for the good doctor (i.e. the 
loss of medical knowledge), it is not at all easy to surmise what would constitute ‘faring 
ill’ for the good person. What sort of knowledge would they lose? 
 
§4 SELF-KNOWLEDGE & MODERATION 
 
The answer to this question suggests itself in a lengthy preamble that Socrates offers 
to his exegetical treatment of Simonides’ poem.257 In this preamble, Socrates attributes the 
political dominance of Crete and Sparta, not (as is popularly thought) to the superior 
courage displayed by their citizens, but rather to their wisdom and superior education in 
philosophy (342d5).258 The high caliber of their education, and a distinctive mark of their 
wisdom, is displayed in their ability to form pithy maxims (342e3, 343a6). Chief among 
these maxims, Socrates tells us, are the two inscribed at Delphi: 
 
(1) Know Thyself (343b3) 
(2) Nothing in Excess (343b4) 
 
 
Socrates quickly adds to these a third: “It is hard to be good” (343c1). This, of course, is 
the maxim attributed to Pittacus‚ and challenged by Simonides.259 As we saw in the 
previous section, Socrates tries to save Simonides from the charge of hypocrisy by 
distinguishing between being and becoming good. According to Socrates, Simonides only 
 
257 Why does Socrates: (1) Spend more than a full Stephanus page gushing about Spartan wisdom (342a6–
d4)? (2) Note their superior education in philosophy (342d4–343b1)? (3) Attribute to them (somewhat 
tenuously) the famous maxims inscribed at Delphi (343b1–4)? (4) Link those maxims to the disputed adage 
of Pittacus targeted by Simonides (343b5–c6)? I answer all of these questions in the main text below. 
258 It is notable that the Laws features a discussion with Clinias (from Crete) and Megillus (from Sparta). 
259 Socrates says that this line was “privately circulated with approval among the sages” (343c2). The seven 
sages—Pittacus was one of them—approved of this maxim because they all understood the spirit of it. 
Simonides is challenging the letter “in order to score a takedown” (343c3) and so win fame for himself. 
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believes that becoming good is hard; he is therefore criticizing Pittacus for falsely claiming 
that being good is hard. 
 What does Simonides say about being good? Well, he claims that even the rare 
person who wins through to this coveted state can only persist in it “for a short period of 
time” (344c1). Remaining in such a state is just not “humanly possible” (344c3). On 
Socrates’ reading: “God alone can have this privilege” (344c3). So how does this rare 
person who is good or virtuous (however briefly) eventually become bad? It is through the 
loss of knowledge. Now, we saw in the previous section that the good doctor becomes bad 
through the loss of medical knowledge. But it still remains to determine what sort of 
knowledge the good person loses. 
 It is telling, of course, that one of these Delphic maxims concerns a particular kind 
of knowledge. Namely, self-knowledge. References to this maxim abound in the Platonic 
corpus, but it is perhaps nowhere discussed more directly, or treated in greater detail, than 
in the Charmides.260 In the Charmides, this maxim is notably discussed in connection with 
the virtue of moderation (164c8–165b5). This is fortuitous, since it is also an examination 
of moderation that triggers the lengthy discussion of poetry in the Protagoras (333d4–
334a4). It is therefore worth examining the way that both moderation and the Delphic 
maxims are treated in the Charmides, as this will help to explain why they also show up 
together at precisely this juncture in the Protagoras. 
In the Charmides, one of Socrates’ interlocutors, Critias, suggests that both of the 
Delphic maxims are imperatival and essentially command the same thing: be moderate 
 
260 Cf. Alcibiades 124b1, 129a2, 130e6, 132c8, 133b6; Apology 21a4; Charmides 164d5, 165c8; Epinomis 
988a4, 988b6; Hipparchus 228e1; Phaedrus 150d, 230a; Philebus 48c11; Protagoras 343b3; Theaetetus 
150d7, 210b–c 
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(165a2).261 He thus proposes a definition of moderation in terms of the first of these 
maxims: “moderation is to know oneself” (165b5).262 Socrates wants to think through this 
definition more carefully. He supposes that “if knowing is what moderation is, then it 
clearly must be some kind of knowledge and must be of something” (165c5). Critias very 
quickly fills in the blank: moderation is knowledge of oneself (165c8). 
Socrates points out that the subject of any particular kind of knowledge (i.e. what 
that knowledge is of) always seems to be “distinct from the knowledge itself” (166a5). For 
example, calculation is the kind of knowledge that is of odd and even—it is not of 
calculation. But Critias maintains that moderation is unique in just this way: it is the only 
sort of knowledge that is ‘of’ itself—the only sort of knowledge that is self-reflexive 
(166c2). Socrates proceeds to raise a host of concerns about this—concerns which 
eventually prove too much for Critias and stall the discussion (166c7–169c4). In an attempt 
to restart the discussion, Socrates suggests that they simply proceed on the assumption that 
self-reflexive knowledge is, in fact, possible. Here is what is said to follow from that 
supposition: 
 
[I]f someone has knowledge which knows itself (τις ਩χει ਥπιστήμην ਴ α੝τ੽ αਫ਼τ੽ν 
γιγνώσκει), they would be identical with the knowledge they possess (τοιο૨τος ਗν α੝τઁς 
ε੅η οੈόνπερ ਥστ੿ν ੔ ਩χει). For example: when a person has speed they are swift, and when 
they have beauty they are beautiful, and when they have knowledge they are knowing. So 
when someone has knowledge which knows itself (੖ταν δ੻ δ੽ γν૵σιν α੝τ੽ν αਫ਼τોς τις ਩χૉ), 
then I imagine they will be someone who knows themselves (γιγνώσκων που α੝τઁς ਦαυτઁν 
τότε ਩σται.). (169e1–7)263 
 
 
261 Critias suggest that the second maxim is redundant; it was added later by those who misunderstood the 
true meaning of the first maxim. 
262 Note that ‘σωφρονε૙ν’ (the verb cognate with ‘σωφροσύνη’) regularly means “to be wise.” Hence “know 
thyself” is a dictum of σωφροσύνη. 
263 εੁ γάρ τις ਩χει ਥπιστήμην ਴ α੝τ੽ αਫ਼τ੽ν γιγνώσκει, τοιο૨τος ਗν α੝τઁς ε੅η οੈόνπερ ਥστ੿ν ੔ ਩χει· ੮σπερ ੖ταν 
τάχος τις ਩χૉ, ταχύς, κα੿ ੖ταν κάλλος, καλός, κα੿ ੖ταν γν૵σιν, γιγνώσκων, ੖ταν δ੻ δ੽ γν૵σιν α੝τ੽ν αਫ਼τોς 
τις ਩χૉ, γιγνώσκων που α੝τઁς ਦαυτઁν τότε ਩σται. 
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That both Critias and Socrates—assuming the truth of the antecedent—are prepared to 
accept the consequent is worth flagging (169e8). 
 It is worth flagging, in part, because this is not the only place that self-reflexive 
knowledge has put in an appearance. Recall that, in chapter two, intellect (νο૨ς) had been 
described as the activity of ‘knowing’ the forms, taken all together as a unified whole. 
While the forms had been described as the object of knowledge—as what was ‘being 
known’ by intellect—the forms were also described as the subject of knowledge, as what 
was doing the ‘knowing.’ Intellect and form were thus simply two sides of the same coin.264 
More technically, the terms ‘intellect’ and ‘form’ have the same reference, but different 
senses: ‘intellect’ most properly denotes the subject that is (actively) knowing, while ‘form’ 
most properly denotes the object that is (passively) being known.265 But the subject and 
object are one and the same. 
Self-reflexive knowledge thus turns out to be the knowledge of what is both 
impersonal and most truly real: it is the knowing of the forms by the forms, or the knowing 
of intellect by intellect.266 Anyone, then, who possesses intellect or knowledge of the forms 
would thereby “be identical with the knowledge they possess” (169e1).267 Self-knowledge 
 
264 Plato’s term for the activity of thinking is “intellect’s motion” (κίνησις νο૨). Aristotle introduced the 
technical term ਥνέργεια (activity) and distinguished it from κίνησις (motion). 
265 Gerson (2006) p. 298; Timaeus 41c–d, 61c7, 65a5, 69c8–d1, 72d4–e1, 89d–90d; Republic 611b9–612a6 
266 Cf. Kahn (1985) p. 327n24: “Reflexion must be reflexion on something which is not itself reflexion […] 
Hence nous is determined or defined by the essences which are its objects […] The counter-objection, that 
the divine mind would be less perfect if it knew anything other than itself, is spurious, just because in actual 
noēsis the knowing subject is identical with its object. Drastically put, the Prime Mover is simply the formal-
noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious of itself.” Kahn’s explanation seems to work equally well as an 
exegesis of Plato’s νο૨ς. 
267 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 430a3: “For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what 
is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are identical.” 
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would thus consist in the knowledge that the self is the knowing intellect (νο૨ς). The self 
would then be, quite literally, knowledge or wisdom.268 
The suggestion that moderation is self-knowledge in the Charmides nicely 
dovetails with the argument from the Protagoras that moderation and wisdom are “one 
thing.” That this argument shows up just prior to the poetic interlude in the Protagoras, 
which is itself occasioned by a failed attempt to flesh out an account of moderation, helps 
to explain why Socrates would invoke the Delphic maxims in his preamble.269 Namely, 
because these maxims centrally involve both moderation and the relevant kind of 
knowledge: a self-reflexive knowledge that also turns out to be identified, conveniently, 
with the knowledge that god is most properly said to possess (344c3).270 Finally, it provides 
the key to answering the question posed at the end of the previous section: what sort of 
knowledge, when lost, constitutes the only real kind of faring ill for the good human being? 
The answer is self-knowledge.271 The knowledge that the self is intellect, and so identical 
with the knowledge or wisdom that is being known. 
We can now begin to see why it is so important for Socrates to identify virtue with 
wisdom or knowledge in the Protagoras: one cannot possess virtue if one does not possess 
knowledge.272 The sort of knowledge one must possess is self-knowledge. But if self-
 
268 Cf. Sophist 253b ff. and Republic 438c4, 511b3 
269 As North (1966) argues, at least up to the time of Plato, moderation (σωφροσύνη) was thought of as a 
single quality covering an area which we would divide roughly between two concepts: self-knowledge, and 
self-mastery. In ordinary speech ‘moderation’ was used to indicate what might be thought of as a kind of 
‘self-knowledge’ (i.e. knowing your place) and of what might be thought of as a kind of ‘self-mastery’ (i.e. 
the ability to restrain immediate impulses in the service of one’s reasoned plans). 
270 Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1177b27–1178a8, and Metaphysics 1072b25–1073a3 
271 Cf. Annas (1985) p. 118: “self-knowledge is not an intuitively clear notion, and it may be helpful to come 
at it first through the claim, twice made in the dialogue, that self-knowledge is the virtue of sophrosune.” 
272 Cf. Republic 443d ff.; intellect or knowledge is capable of existing in separation from the body, but when 
embodied it so transforms and unifies all of the other virtues that they become entirely indistinguishable. 
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knowledge is just the self-reflexive knowing of the forms by the forms, then one cannot 
possess virtue or knowledge without grasping the forms—without being a philosopher.273 
 
§5 COURAGE & WISDOM 
 
When the discussion of poetry finally draws to a close, Socrates reminds Protagoras 
of the results of their initial exchange (349b2). He summarizes their findings and then asks 
Protagoras if he still holds that wisdom, moderation, courage, justice and piety are each 
distinct, heterogenous parts of virtue. While Protagoras is now prepared to concede that 
most are “reasonably close to each other” (349d5), courage remains a stumbling block. 
Protagoras continues to maintain that someone can be ignorant (i.e. lack wisdom or 
knowledge) and yet still be courageous (349d7). Socrates attempts once more to 
demonstrate that courage is wisdom. He does so by first securing Protagoras’ assent to all 
of the following claims: 
 
a) Courageous people are confident (349e2) 
b) Knowledgeable people are confident (350a3) 
c) Knowledgeable people are always more confident than unknowledgeable people (350a11) 
d) Unknowledgeable people are confident (350b1)  
e) Unknowledgeable people are not courageous (350b5) 
 
 
These claims collectively entail that only those people whose confidence is accompanied 
by knowledge will be courageous.274 Socrates then utilizes these claims in order to produce 
the following argument: 
 
 
 
 
273 Cf. Phaedo 65c ff., 79d ff., 82c ff.; Republic 477a2, 479e–480a; Parmenides 134a3: “then knowledge 
itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?” 
274 Socrates in fact reaches the converse of this conclusion: those people whose confidence is not 
accompanied by knowledge will not be courageous (350c2).  
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1) The wisest are the most confident (350c3, inference from c) 
2) The most confident are the most courageous (350c4, a–e) 
3) Therefore, wisdom is courage (350c5)275 
 
 
Protagoras rejects this argument.276 He points out that while he had accepted that (a) 
courageous people are confident, he had not accepted the inverse claim that (a*) confident 
people are courageous. In context, it is clear that Protagoras takes himself to be challenging 
the second premise of the argument.277 
Protagoras insists that had Socrates tried to secure his assent to (a*) he would have 
qualified his answer: only some confident people are courageous.278 Protagoras uses an 
analogy to help explain why he would have qualified his answer: the confident are to the 
courageous, he says, as the powerful are to the strong. And while power comes from 
knowledge and passionate emotion (351a2), strength comes from nature and proper nurture 
of the body (351a3). The upshot of this analogy is that it promises to shed some light on 
why Protagoras seems to think that wisdom is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
possession of courage: if courage is indeed like strength, then it comes from nature and 
from the proper nurture of the body.279 And someone can certainly be strong without being 
wise.280 Unfortunately, however, Protagoras fumbles the analogy. When he spells it out 
 
275 What actually follows is that the wisest are the most courageous, not that wisdom is courage. But it also 
follows that wisdom is at least necessary for courage, since those who lack wisdom will not be courageous. 
276 Cf. Taylor (1976) pp. 150–60 
277 Protagoras has not only misconstrued the second premise, but fails to properly identify the salient claim(s) 
on which it rests. However, this misconstrual is certainly understandable: “The most confident are the most 
courageous” sounds awfully close to the inverse of “the courageous are confident.” For someone who is 
supposed to be keeping track of this (verbal) argument in real-time, such a slip-up would be understandable. 
278 Recourse to counterfactuals is not necessary: the answer is implicit in his assent to (b), (d) and (e). 
279 Put another way, while nature and proper nurture of the body are necessary for courage, knowledge and 
passionate emotion are neither necessary nor sufficient for courage. Cf. Protagoras 326c1 
280 Cf. Protagoras 326b5–c2, where Protagoras attributes cowardice to physical deficiencies. 
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explicitly, he claims that courage—unlike strength—comes from nature and from the 
proper nurture of the soul (351a8). 
At this juncture, it is worth recalling the discussion of courage from the Laws. Just 
as moderation had come in two varieties—popular and exalted—so too had courage come 
in two varieties.281 Much like popular moderation, popular courage had been described as 
a quality that naturally develops in children and animals “without the aid of reason” 
(963e3).282 In this respect, popular courage is indeed similar to strength. Exalted courage, 
on the other hand, was identified with wisdom.283 What should become clear is that 
Protagoras continues to defend something like popular courage: the kind of courage that 
develops naturally and can be possessed without wisdom. What should also become clear 
is that Socrates continues to argue for something like exalted courage: the kind of courage 
that he identifies with wisdom.284 We will again return to these points in greater detail 
below. 
 
§6 VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE 
 
So which is it? Does courage come from nature and proper nurture of the body, or 
does it come from nature and proper nurture of the soul? Protagoras seems patently 
 
281 Popular courage and moderation are invoked at Euthydemus 281c ff., Meno 88a ff., Republic 430b ff., and 
Statesman 306a ff. They are arguably also invoked at Laws 681b ff. and 710c ff., and at Republic 374e ff. 
282 Cf. Republic 430b5, where popular courage is invoked—the kind found “in animals and slaves, which is 
not the result of education.” This is said to be civic courage. 
283 Laws 963e3: “Why is it that after calling both by a single term ‘virtue’ (ἀρετήν), in the next breath we 
speak of two virtues: courage and wisdom? I’ll tell you why. One of them, courage, concerns fear, and is 
found in wild animals (τ੹ θηρία) as well as in the characters of very young children (τ૵ν παίδων ਵθη τ૵ν 
πάνυ νέων). The soul becomes courageous naturally, without the aid of reason (ਙνευ γ੹ρ λόγου κα੿ φύσει 
γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή). By contrast, without reason a wise and intelligent soul (ਙνευ δ੻ α੣ λόγου ψυχ੽ 
φρόνιμός τε κα੿ νο૨ν) is out of the question. That is true now, has always been, and always will be; the two 
processes are fundamentally different.” 
284 Plato seems to be harking back to the Protagoras (329d2) when discussing the unity of the virtues in the 
Laws: “whether it is a single entity, a composite whole, or both or whatever (ε੅τε ੪ς ਨν ε੅τε ੪ς ੖λον ε੅τε 
ἀμφότερα ε੅τε ੖πως ποτ੻ πέφυκεν)” (965d6). 
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confused.285 Rather than point out this confusion, however, Socrates changes tack.286 In an 
abrupt shift, he now seeks to defend the striking claim that knowledge is sufficient for 
virtue (352c1–7). We have already gone some way toward explaining why Socrates would 
do this. Protagoras has insisted that wisdom or knowledge is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for courage. If knowledge turns out to be sufficient for virtue, however, then it 
will not only be sufficient for courage, but for courageous action as well, since courageous 
action is a species of virtuous action. 
Socrates now proposes that if someone possesses knowledge, they will unfailingly 
act on it. But he doesn’t think that the majority of people will go in for such a view. Here 
we return to Socrates’ famous description of what most people think about knowledge, 
which had been discussed at length in chapter one: 
 
Most people think this way about it, that it is not powerful (ο੝κ ੁσχυρઁν), neither a leader 
nor a ruler (ο੝δ’ ਲγεμονικઁν ο੝δ’ ἀρχικઁν εੇναι). They do not think of it in that way at all, 
but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a person, what rules (ਙρχειν) 
them is not knowledge but rather anything else, sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, 
sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of it as being utterly dragged 
around by these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to 
you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing, capable of ruling a person, and 
that if someone were to know what is good and bad, then they would not be forced by 
anything to act (πράττειν) otherwise than knowledge dictates (ਥπιστήμη κελεύૉ), and 
wisdom (φρόνησιν) would be sufficient to save them? (352b3–c7)287 
 
 
285 Indeed, insensitivity to this distinction between body and soul—specifically with respect to nurture—also 
proves to be an important trip-up in the Statesman (275d9). That Plato seems to be harking back to the 
Protagoras in the Statesman is evidenced by the fact that this point is immediately preceded by a myth which 
concludes with the story of Prometheus (274c5)—the very story that initiates the extended discussion of 
virtue in the Protagoras. Not only this, but a discussion of courage and moderation—both the popular and 
exalted kinds—bring the Statesman to close (306b–311c). 
286 Protagoras misinterpreted both the spirit and the letter of Socrates’ argument that wisdom is courage. 
287 δοκε૙ δ੻ το૙ς πολλο૙ς περ੿ ਥπιστήμης τοιο૨τόν τι, ο੝κ ੁσχυρઁν ο੝δ’ ਲγεμονικઁν ο੝δ’ ἀρχικઁν εੇναι· ο੝δ੻ 
੪ς περ੿ τοιούτου α੝το૨ ੕ντος διανοο૨νται, ἀλλ’ ਥνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπ૳ ਥπιστήμης ο੝ τ੽ν ਥπιστήμην 
α੝το૨ ਙρχειν ἀλλ’ ਙλλο τι, τοτ੻ μ੻ν θυμόν, τοτ੻ δ੻ ਲδονήν, τοτ੻ δ੻ λύπην, ਥνίοτε δ੻ ਩ρωτα, πολλάκις δ੻ 
φόβον, ἀτεχν૵ς διανοούμενοι περ੿ τોς ਥπιστήμης ੮σπερ περ੿ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν ਙλλων 
ਖπάντων. ਛρ’ ο੣ν κα੿ σο੿ τοιο૨τόν τι περ੿ α੝τોς δοκε૙, ਲ਼ καλόν τε εੇναι ਲ ਥπιστήμη κα੿ οੈον ਙρχειν το૨ 
ἀνθρώπου, κα੿ ਥάνπερ γιγνώσκૉ τις τἀγαθ੹ κα੿ τ੹ κακά, μ੽ ਗν κρατηθોναι ਫ਼πઁ μηδενઁς ੮στε ਙλλ’ ਙττα 
πράττειν ਲ਼ ਘν ਥπιστήμη κελεύૉ, ἀλλ’ ੂκαν੽ν εੇναι τ੽ν φρόνησιν βοηθε૙ν τ૶ ἀνθρώπ૳; 
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Protagoras agrees that this is indeed how the many view knowledge—but he sides with 
Socrates, against the popular view, in maintaining that “wisdom and knowledge (σοφίαν 
κα੿ ਥπιστήμην) are the most powerful (κράτιστον) forces in human activity” (352d1).288  
By getting Protagoras to agree that wisdom and knowledge are sufficient for virtue 
and for virtuous action, generally, Socrates has managed to clear away most of the 
difficulties flagged in the previous section in one fell swoop. First, since Protagoras is 
prepared to admit that knowledge is sufficient for virtuous action, knowledge also turns 
out to be sufficient for courageous action. Second, since knowledge turns out to be 
sufficient for courageous action, Socrates has effectively isolated the appropriate source of 
courage: courage comes from the soul, not from the body. Not only this, but Socrates has 
also isolated the appropriate source of courage within the soul itself: it comes from 
knowledge, not from passionate emotions like anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear 
(352b7).289 And anyone who acts without knowledge is acting from ignorance. As it turns 
out, acting from ignorance is just what it means to be self-defeated: 
 
Self-defeat (τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι) is nothing other than ignorance (ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τઁ 
κρείττω ਦαυτο૨) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία). (358c3–5)290 
 
We are already familiar with the way in which moderation is nothing other than wisdom, 
but what are we to make of the claim that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom? 
 
288 This is consistent with his earlier claim that “wisdom is the greatest part” of virtue (330a1). 
289 At least if passionate emotions like anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear arise in the absence of knowledge. 
It seems possible that such emotional responses can be caused by knowledge. Cf. Phaedo 66c2 
290 ο੝δ੻ τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι αਫ਼το૨ ਙλλο τι το૨τ’ ਥστ੿ν ਲ਼ ἀμαθία, ο੝δ੻ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨ ਙλλο τι ਲ਼ σοφία. 
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In the discussion of ‘self-defeat’ in the Laws, it had been suggested that, by this 
expression, “we are all much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasure than by 
pain” (633e4). This seemed to suggest that self-mastery should also be more concerned 
with pleasure than with pain.291 But victory over pleasure had not been initially described 
as a kind of self-mastery. Rather, it had been described as a kind of moderation: the popular 
kind of moderation that can be possessed without wisdom (635e4–636e3). Popular 
moderation, as it turns out, has to be repeatedly practiced if it is to become perfect or 
exalted: 
 
So will anyone become perfect (τελέως) in moderation if they haven’t done battle against 
the many pleasures and desires that urge them to commit shameless and unjust actions—if 
they haven’t defeated (νενικηκώς) them by dint of reason (μετ੹ λόγου), effort, and skill, 
both in play and in earnest? (647d5–7)292 
 
The imperfect kind of moderation, described in this passage as the victory of reason in its 
“battle against the many pleasures and desires that urge people to commit shameless and 
unjust actions,” is exactly how self-mastery is described in the puppets passage, where self-
defeat is glossed as the defeat of reason in this sort of battle. 
Conveniently, this is also how self-defeat is described by the many in the 
Protagoras. Lack of restraint in the face of pleasure—yielding to it, or giving in to it, or 
being defeated by it—is what they refer to as “being overcome by pleasure” (353a1). This 
‘lack of restraint’ can be fruitfully contrasted with precisely the sort of ‘restraint’ that is 
modeled by the popular kind of moderation or self-mastery, which centrally involves 
 
291 Cf. Republic 389d7, 430e6 
292 Σώφρων δ੻ ਙρα τελέως ਩σται μ੽ πολλα૙ς ਲδονα૙ς κα੿ ਥπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντε૙ν κα੿ ἀδικε૙ν 
διαμεμαχημένος κα੿ νενικηκઅς μετ੹ λόγου κα੿ ਩ργου κα੿ τέχνης ਩ν τε παιδια૙ς κα੿ ਥν σπουδα૙ς 
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conflict between reason and feelings of pleasure, and which can be possessed without 
wisdom. But what can we say about the sort of moderation or self-mastery that is nothing 
other than wisdom? 
Recall my suggestion, in chapter three, that perfected or exalted moderation models 
the perfected or exalted kind of self-mastery—the kind of self-mastery that, like exalted 
moderation, would be “compelled to be wisdom” (710a5). This suggestion finds explicit 
support here in the Protagoras, where Socrates argues at length for the kind of self-mastery 
that turns out to be “nothing other than wisdom” (358c3). But we can now say even more 
about why this exalted self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom: it is because the ‘self’ 
that is doing the mastering is nothing other than wisdom: it is intellect. 
 
§7 CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT? 
Socrates is eventually able to secure Protagoras’ (reluctant) agreement that courage, 
like the rest of virtue, is wisdom (360e4). But he points out that they have effectively 
swapped answers to the original question: can virtue can be taught? Recall that Protagoras 
had originally maintained that virtue is teachable, while Socrates had been skeptical 
(319b1–328d3). Now it is Socrates who maintains that virtue is teachable, while Protagoras 
is skeptical (361c3). The dialogue thus concludes with an explicit dilemma about the 
teachability of virtue: 
 
1) If virtue is “wholly knowledge” (361b7), then virtue can be taught. 
2) If virtue is “anything other than knowledge” (361b5), then virtue cannot be taught. 
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Since Protagoras declines further discussion, the dialogue ends in an impasse (ἀπορία), 
with Socrates suggesting that the question of whether or not virtue is teachable can only be 
answered once it is determined “what virtue is” (361d2).293 
 
7.1 Answering the Question 
We are now prepared to answer that question. Perhaps the first thing to note is that 
virtue (like moderation and courage) comes in two varieties: popular and exalted. Recall 
that exalted virtue—like exalted moderation and courage—was discovered to be nothing 
other than wisdom or knowledge. This is the sort of virtue that Socrates has been arguing 
for throughout the Protagoras. Indeed, he is correct to maintain that (exalted) virtue is 
“wholly knowledge.”294 But exalted virtue turns out to be a more-than-human virtue. It is 
the sort of virtue that god most properly possesses (344c3), and which is only fleetingly 
possessed by a small number of good people. Recall, too, that popular virtue—like popular 
moderation and courage—was discovered to be distinct from wisdom or knowledge.295 
This is the sort of virtue that Protagoras has been defending throughout the dialogue. 
Indeed, he is correct to maintain that (popular) virtue is “other than knowledge.” But 
popular virtue turns out to be a less-than-human virtue. It is the sort of virtue that humans 
possess in common with children, and even some animals. 
 
293 Cf. Meno 71a2; Socrates circles back to Prometheus and Epimetheus (361d3, 320d1). It is notable that 
Epimetheus only assigns natural abilities to non-rational animals (321c1), while Prometheus steals craft-
wisdom from Athena and Hephaestus and assigns them outright to humans (321d4). Prometheus is unable, 
however, to assail “the high citadel that is the house of Zeus” (321d8). It is only later, when humans are on 
the brink of extinction (because they lack the ability to band together) that Zeus himself sends Hermes to 
distribute wisdom to humans (322c2). Notably, wisdom is not stolen; it is freely given. 
294 Cf. Phaedo 66a6, 69c2, 76c12, 79d6; Republic 505b9, 517c4–5 
295 Cf. Phaedo 69b6–7, 82b2; Republic 500d5–9 
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This distinction between popular and exalted virtue is precisely what explains why 
Socrates and Protagoras appear to have switched positions regarding the teachability of 
virtue. Protagoras had initially maintained that popular virtue is teachable, and Socrates 
had disagreed. Now, Socrates maintains that exalted virtue is teachable, but Protagoras 
disagrees. By distinguishing between these two kinds of virtue, we can see that they have 
not actually swapped positions—they have just been talking past each other. But while 
disambiguating ‘virtue’ gets us somewhat closer to determining whether or not it can be 
taught, it is not the only term that needs to be disambiguated. We also need to have a clearer 
sense of what is meant by ‘teaching.’ 
Clearly, an assumption shared by both Protagoras and Socrates is that knowledge 
is imparted through teaching. They also seem to agree that technical knowledge—the kind 
of knowledge that craftsmen possess—is paradigmatically teachable. Consider, then, the 
following passage from the Timaeus, which marks an important distinction between 
teaching and persuasion: 
 
If a significant distinction formulated in a few words were to present itself, that would suit 
our present needs best of all. So here’s how I cast my own vote: If intellect and true belief 
are distinct (εੁ μ੻ν νο૨ς κα੿ δόξα ἀληθής ਥστον δύο γένη), then these “by themselves” 
things entirely exist, these forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of intellect 
only (παντάπασιν εੇναι καθ’ αਫ਼τ੹ τα૨τα, ἀναίσθητα ਫ਼φ’ ਲμ૵ν ε੅δη, νοούμενα μόνον). But 
if, as some people think, true belief does not differ in any way from intellect, then all the 
things we perceive through our bodily senses (σώματος αੁσθανόμεθα) must be assumed to 
be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of intellect and true belief as 
distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not 
like the other. It is through teaching (δι੹ διδαχોς) that we come to have intellect, and 
through persuasion (ਫ਼πઁ πειθο૨ς) that we come to have true belief. Intellect always 
involves a true account (τઁ μ੻ν ἀε੿ μετ’ ἀληθο૨ς λόγου) while true belief lacks any account 
(τઁ δ੻ ਙλογον). And while intellect remains unmoved by persuasion (κα੿ τઁ μ੻ν ἀκίνητον 
πειθο૙, τઁ δ੻ μεταπειστόν), true belief gives in to persuasion (τઁ δ੻ μεταπειστόν). And of 
true belief, it must be said, all men have a share (πάντα ਙνδρα μετέχειν), but of intellect, 
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only the gods and a small group of people (νο૨ δ੻ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δ੻ γένος βραχύ τι). 
(51d2–e10, my emphases)296 
 
 
That intellect or knowledge is capable of being taught and that it is distinct from true belief 
are familiar claims that are repeated throughout the Platonic corpus.297 But I want to focus 
specifically on the claim that it is through teaching that we come to have knowledge, and 
through persuasion that we come to have true belief. This claim allows us to sufficiently 
disambiguate the question of whether virtue can be taught. What we really have are two 
very different questions, with two very different answers: 
 
1) Can exalted virtue be taught? Yes, because it is “wholly knowledge” (361b7) and we 
acquire knowledge through teaching. 
2) Can popular virtue be taught? No, because it is “other than knowledge” (361b5) and 
we acquire what is other than knowledge (i.e. belief) not through teaching, but through 
persuasion.  
 
Since each horn of the original dilemma in fact tracks a distinct sort of virtue, they are no 
longer horns of a dilemma. The dilemma has thus been dissolved, rather than resolved. But 
we now possess a satisfying and definitive answer to the original question: can virtue be 
taught? The answer is a qualified yes: the only sort of virtue that can be taught is the virtue 
that is wholly knowledge—exalted virtue. But exalted virtue is exceedingly rare: “only the 
gods and a small group of people” turn out to possess it—just as Socrates had staunchly 
maintained. By contrast, popular virtue and the true beliefs required for it come cheap: 
 
296 εੁ δέ τις ੖ρος ੒ρισθε੿ς μέγας δι੹ βραχέων φανείη, το૨το μάλιστα ਥγκαιριώτατον γένοιτ’ ਙν. ੰδε ο੣ν τήν 
γ’ ਥμ੽ν α੝τઁς τίθεμαι ψોφον. εੁ μ੻ν νο૨ς κα੿ δόξα ἀληθής ਥστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εੇναι καθ’ αਫ਼τ੹ 
τα૨τα, ἀναίσθητα ਫ਼φ’ ਲμ૵ν ε੅δη, νοούμενα μόνον· εੁ δ’, ੮ς τισιν φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθ੽ς νο૨ διαφέρει τઁ 
μηδέν, πάνθ’ ੒πόσ’ α੣ δι੹ το૨ σώματος αੁσθανόμεθα θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δ੽ λεκτέον ਥκείνω, διότι χωρ੿ς 
γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ਩χετον. τઁ μ੻ν γ੹ρ α੝τ૵ν δι੹ διδαχોς, τઁ δ’ ਫ਼πઁ πειθο૨ς ਲμ૙ν ਥγγίγνεται· κα੿ τઁ μ੻ν 
ἀε੿ μετ’ ἀληθο૨ς λόγου, τઁ δ੻ ਙλογον· κα੿ τઁ μ੻ν ἀκίνητον πειθο૙, τઁ δ੻ μεταπειστόν· κα੿ το૨ μ੻ν πάντα 
ਙνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νο૨ δ੻ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δ੻ γένος βραχύ τι. 
297 Cf. Republic 477e4; Gorgias 454d2–455b1; Meno 87c3, 97b ff. 
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nearly everyone turns out to possess it—just as Protagoras had staunchly maintained 
(323a1–b2, 324e1). 
 
7.2 Censuring Protagoras 
 
Protagoras claims to be a sophist, a wise person. He also claims to be virtuous, and 
capable of teaching virtue to others (317b6, 319a7, 348e2–349a2). But the popular sort of 
virtue he possess cannot be taught, since it turns out to be other than knowledge. At best, 
Protagoras instills true beliefs about virtue by means of persuasion.298 At worst, however, 
he instills false beliefs about virtue. This is precisely the worry that Socrates had originally 
expressed to Hippocrates: 
 
I wouldn’t be surprised, my friend, if some of these people [the sophists] did not know 
which of their products are beneficial and which detrimental to the soul (κα੿ τούτων 
ἀγνοο૙εν ੰν πωλο૨σιν ੖τι χρηστઁν ਲ਼ πονηρઁν πρઁς τ੽ν ψυχήν). Likewise those who buy 
from them, unless one happens to be a physician of the soul (τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν α੣ ੁατρικઁς ੭ν). 
So if you are a knowledgeable (ਥπιστήμων) consumer, you can buy teachings (μαθήματα) 
safely from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you’re not, please don’t risk what is most 
dear to you on a roll of the dice, for there is far greater risk in buying teachings than in 
buying food. (313d9–314a2)299 
 
 
Hippocrates has had a good, traditional upbringing: he already possesses what would be 
considered a high degree of competence in popular virtue. He now wants to be taught the 
sort of virtue that is modeled on technical knowledge—the exalted kind of virtue that is 
 
298 As we saw in the Laws, one sort of guardian possesses wisdom, while other sort of guardian only possesses 
true opinion (632c5). I had there argued that only those guardians who possess wisdom possess exalted virtue, 
while those guardians who merely possess true belief possess popular virtue. In the Republic, this tracks the 
distinction between guardians and auxiliaries (414b4). 
299 τάχα δ’ ਙν τινες, ੯ ਙριστε, κα੿ τούτων ἀγνοο૙εν ੰν πωλο૨σιν ੖τι χρηστઁν ਲ਼ πονηρઁν πρઁς τ੽ν ψυχήν· ੪ς 
δ’ α੢τως κα੿ οੂ ੩νούμενοι παρ’ α੝τ૵ν, ਥ੹ν μή τις τύχૉ περ੿ τ੽ν ψυχ੽ν α੣ ੁατρικઁς ੭ν. εੁ μ੻ν ο੣ν σઃ 
τυγχάνεις ਥπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστઁν κα੿ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ੩νε૙σθαι μαθήματα κα੿ παρ੹ 
Πρωταγόρου κα੿ παρ’ ਙλλου ੒τουο૨ν· εੁ δ੻ μή, ੖ρα, ੯ μακάριε, μ੽ περ੿ το૙ς φιλτάτοις κυβεύૉς τε κα੿ 
κινδυνεύૉς. 
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acquired and imparted through teaching.300 But this is precisely the sort of knowledge (and 
precisely the sort of virtue) that Protagoras does not possess. This is why Socrates takes 
Protagoras to task for claiming to teach it. 
Socrates’ criticism of Protagoras is perhaps nowhere on fuller display than in his 
exegetical treatment of Simonides. According to Socrates, Simonides did not believe that 
wise people should be overly-critical of those who are not ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ in the strict 
or exalted sense. It is enough, he says, if most people try to refrain from acting shamefully 
(345d4)—try to refrain from flouting popular views about virtue (347c4). This is because 
wise people understand that all mistaken views and actions are involuntary. As Socrates 
puts it: 
 
Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praised all who did nothing bad 
willingly, as if there were anyone who willingly did bad things. I am pretty sure that none 
of the wise men thinks that any human being willingly makes a mistake or willingly does 
anything wrong or bad. They know very well that anyone who does wrong or bad does so 
involuntarily. (345d6–e5)301 
 
 
This is why wise people will not be overly-critical. Indeed, they will often reconcile 
themselves to praising people who make mistakes. The wise person “accepts without any 
objection what is in between” (346d2) good and bad.302 They are “happy with an average 
person who does nothing shameful” (346d9). This, of course, turns out to be the sort of 
person who possesses popular virtue. But someone who possesses popular virtue is not 
actually good—rather, they are in between good and bad. Such a person is competent in 
 
300 Cf. Frede (1992) p. x 
301 ο੝ γ੹ρ ο੢τως ἀπαίδευτος ਷ν Σιμωνίδης, ੮στε τούτους φάναι ਥπαινε૙ν, ੔ς ਗν ਦκઅν μηδ੻ν κακઁν ποιૌ, ੪ς 
੕ντων τιν૵ν ο੄ ਦκόντες κακ੹ ποιο૨σιν. ਥγઅ γ੹ρ σχεδόν τι οੇμαι το૨το, ੖τι ο੝δε੿ς τ૵ν σοφ૵ν ἀνδρ૵ν ਲγε૙ται 
ο੝δένα ἀνθρώπων ਦκόντα ਥξαμαρτάνειν ο੝δ੻ αੁσχρά τε κα੿ κακ੹ ਦκόντα ਥργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ε੣ ੅σασιν ੖τι 
πάντες οੂ τ੹ αੁσχρ੹ κα੿ τ੹ κακ੹ ποιο૨ντες ਙκοντες ποιο૨σιν 
302 Cf. Phaedo 90a1, 113d ff. 
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virtue, but they are certainly no expert. Protagoras has been shown to be just such an ‘in 
between’ person. 
Now, the wise person would not usually be critical of someone like Protagoras. 
More often than not, they would simply reconcile themselves to praising him. But 
Protagoras represents himself as possessing exalted virtue: he claims to be both wise and 
good—an expert—and to make others wise and good as well (348e2–349a2). This is over 
the line: 
 
[I]f you spoke something even moderately reasonable and true […] I would never censure 
you. But the fact is you have lied blatantly yet with verisimilitude about extremely 
important issues (ν૨ν δ੻ σφόδρα γ੹ρ κα੿ περ੿ τ૵ν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκε૙ς ἀληθો 
λέγειν), and for that I do censure you (δι੹ τα૨τά σε ਥγઅ ψέγω). (347a1–3, my emphasis)303 
 
 
While these words are ostensibly spoken by Simonides to Pittacus, the veil is thin: Socrates 
would not normally be taking someone like Protagoras to task, but he has “lied blatantly 
yet with verisimilitude” about virtue, and for that he is being censured.304 Not only is 
Protagoras himself no expert in virtue, but—what is far worse—he deceives others.305 
 
7.3 The Role of Education 
 
We have now seen the way in which the distinction between popular and exalted 
virtue shows up as a dominant (though implicit) theme throughout the Protagoras, and 
how it helps to answer the unresolved dilemma about virtue with which the dialogue 
 
303 σ੻ ο੣ν, κα੿ εੁ μέσως ਩λεγες ਥπιεικો κα੿ ἀληθો […] ο੝κ ਙν ποτε ਩ψεγον· ν૨ν δ੻ σφόδρα γ੹ρ κα੿ περ੿ τ૵ν 
μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκε૙ς ἀληθો λέγειν, δι੹ τα૨τά σε ਥγઅ ψέγω. 
304 It is perhaps worth noting the similarity in names: Simonides/Socrates and Pittacus/Protagoras (358c7). 
305 Cf. Protagoras 358c7: “ignorance is to have a false belief and to be deceived about matters of importance.” 
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concludes. But a final question remains: how are popular and exalted virtue related to one 
another? 
Protagoras canvasses the many ways that popular virtue is acquired in his ‘Great 
Speech’ (325c6–326d2). It begins in early childhood (325c6), when parents seize on every 
word and action of their young children, pronouncing them good or bad, just or unjust 
(325d3). This education continues when these children are sent to school, where teachers 
pay more attention to their conduct than their lessons (325e1). When it comes to their 
lessons, they are given the works of good poets that contain “many passages describing in 
glowing terms good men of old, so that the child is inspired to imitate them and become 
like them” (326a2). Music teachers “arrange the scores and drill the rhythms and scales 
into the children’s souls, so that they become gentler, and their speech and movements 
become more rhythmical and harmonious” (326b1). These children are then sent off to 
athletic trainers “so that they may have sound bodies in the service of their now fit minds 
and will not be forced to cowardice in war or other activities through physical deficiencies” 
(326b6). When their formal education ends, they must finally be compelled to “learn the 
laws and to model their lives on them” (326d2). 
This should all sound very familiar. These turn out to be all of the ways that would-
be guardians are educated in the Republic (376e–412b). This education is also how popular 
virtue is inculcated in the Laws: 
 
I call education (παιδείαν) the initial acquisition of virtue in children (παραγιγνομένην 
πρ૵τον παισ੿ν ἀρετήν). If pleasure and love and pain and hatred develop correctly in our 
souls when we are not yet able to grasp the account (μήπω δυναμένων λόγ૳ λαμβάνειν), 
and when we do grasp the account they agree with it because they have been correctly 
trained by appropriate habits, this harmony is virtue in its entirety (α੢τη ‘σθ’ ਲ συμφωνία 
σύμπασα μ੻ν ἀρετή). But the part of virtue that consists in having properly nurtured 
pleasures and pains, so that we hate what we should hate and love what we should love 
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from beginning to end, if you separated this off in your account and called it education 
(παιδείαν), you would be exactly right, in my view. (653b1–c4)306 
 
 
One acquires correct beliefs through proper education, which is a sort of ‘persuasion’ that 
guides the feelings and emotions of children along the right paths before they are able to 
“grasp the account.” Someone so educated will eventually come to possess some degree of 
popular virtue—their education will minimize both the occasions on which (and the degree 
to which) their feelings and emotions come into conflict with their reasoned judgements.307 
But only someone who is able to sufficiently “grasp the account” will ever come to possess 
the full harmony between reason and emotion that the Athenian is prepared to call “virtue 
in its entirety,” and that we have been calling exalted virtue. This suggests that the 
acquisition of popular virtue is a necessary prerequisite for coming to possess exalted 
virtue—a suggestion which also finds confirmation in the Republic: 
 
Vice would never know either virtue or itself, (πονηρία μ੻ν γ੹ρ ἀρετήν τε κα੿ αਫ਼τ੽ν ο੡ποτ’ 
ਗν γνοίη), but virtue of a nature that is educated over time will develop knowledge of itself 
and of vice. (ἀρετ੽ δ੻ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόν૳ ਚμα αਫ਼τોς τε κα੿ πονηρίας ਥπιστήμην 
λήψεται). It is this person who becomes wise (σοφός) as it seems to me, not the bad person. 
(409d7–e1, my emphasis)308 
 
 
 
306 παιδείαν δ੽ λέγω τ੽ν παραγιγνομένην πρ૵τον παισ੿ν ἀρετήν· ਲδον੽ δ੽ κα੿ φιλία κα੿ λύπη κα੿ μ૙σος ਗν 
ੑρθ૵ς ਥν ψυχα૙ς ਥγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγ૳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δ੻ τઁν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τ૶ 
λόγ૳ ੑρθ૵ς εੁθίσθαι ਫ਼πઁ τ૵ν προσηκόντων ਥθ૵ν, α੢τη ‘σθ’ ਲ συμφωνία σύμπασα μ੻ν ἀρετή, τઁ δ੻ περ੿ τ੹ς 
ਲδον੹ς κα੿ λύπας τεθραμμένον α੝τોς ੑρθ૵ς ੮στε μισε૙ν μ੻ν ਘ χρ੽ μισε૙ν ε੝θઃς ਥξ ἀρχોς μέχρι τέλους, 
στέργειν δ੻ ਘ χρ੽ στέργειν, το૨τ’ α੝τઁ ἀποτεμઅν τ૶ λόγ૳ κα੿ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τ੽ν ਥμ੽ν 
ੑρθ૵ς ਗν προσαγορεύοις. 
307 The Myth of Er contains an extraordinary account of a man who lived a good life—but when given the 
choice of a new life, chooses the life of a tyrant (619b7–d1).
 
Socrates accounts for this terrible choice by 
claiming that he “shared in virtue by habit without philosophy (਩θει ਙνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετોς μετειληφότα)” 
(619c6). Cf. Republic 538d ff., where a worry is presented about the sort of person who has been properly 
educated but does not possess wisdom. 
308 πονηρία μ੻ν γ੹ρ ἀρετήν τε κα੿ αਫ਼τ੽ν ο੡ποτ’ ਗν γνοίη, ἀρετ੽ δ੻ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόν૳ ਚμα αਫ਼τોς 
τε κα੿ πονηρίας ਥπιστήμην λήψεται. σοφઁς ο੣ν ο੤τος, ੮ς μοι δοκε૙, ἀλλ’ ο੝χ ੒ κακઁς γίγνεται. 
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Only those who have been properly educated and so have come to possess popular virtue 
can ever hope to acquire the knowledge or wisdom that just is exalted virtue. In the same 
vein, only such wise and virtuous people will ever know themselves.309 
 With all of this in place, we are finally prepared to see that the Republic—far from 
being in tension with the Protagoras—represents the full working out of the solution to its 
concluding dilemma about virtue. For if Socrates wants to consistently maintain, as he 
seems to, that: 
 
1) Popular virtue is other than knowledge 
2) Popular virtue is necessary (but not sufficient) for the possession of exalted virtue 
3) Exalted virtue is wholly knowledge 
 
 
Then it must be the case that belief plays a central role in the acquisition virtue. Otherwise, 
the initial acquisition of popular virtue—the proper channeling of feelings and emotions in 
children—would be entirely unnecessary. The (false) dilemma that virtue is either “wholly 
knowledge” or wholly “other than knowledge” thus sets the stage for the complete account 
of virtue developed in the Republic. The account developed in the Republic splits the horns 
of this dilemma by demonstrating how feelings and emotions can be brought under rational 
control—that is, by demonstrating how someone can become self-mastered. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
309 As Gerson (2006) writes: “We are intellects. The valorization of human virtue without the recognition of 
this truth is not the solution to any important philosophical problem; it is the problem itself.” 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are finally in a position to answer the interpretive question with which we 
began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of 
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance, and what happens to this account in light of the 
argument for soul-partitioning found in the Republic? 
 
§1 PROTAGORAS & REPUBLIC 
In the Protagoras, Socrates claims that most people think that they can (and often 
do) act against their better judgement: 
 
They maintain that most people are unwilling to do (ο੝κ ਥθέλειν πράττειν) what is best, 
even though they know what it is and are able (ਥξઁν α੝το૙ς) to do it. And when I have 
asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are 
being overcome (ਲττωμένους) by pleasure or pain or are being mastered (κρατουμένους) 
by the things I referred to just now. (352d4–e2)310 
 
The many call the experience of acting against their better judgement ‘being overcome by 
pleasure.’ Socrates does not think that the experience they are describing is possible; he 
does not think that anyone can act against their better judgement. 
He argues instead that those who “make mistakes with regard to good and bad do 
so because of a lack of knowledge, and […] a mistaken act done without knowledge […] 
is one done from ignorance. So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’ is—ignorance in 
 
310 ἀλλ੹ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τ੹ βέλτιστα ο੝κ ਥθέλειν πράττειν, ਥξઁν α੝το૙ς, ἀλλ੹ ਙλλα πράττειν· 
κα੿ ੖σους δ੽ ਥγઅ ਱ρόμην ੖τι ποτε α੅τιόν ਥστι τούτου, ਫ਼πઁ ਲδονોς φασιν ਲττωμένους ਲ਼ λύπης ਲ਼ ੰν νυνδ੽ 
ਥγઅ ਩λεγον ਫ਼πό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους τα૨τα ποιε૙ν τοઃς ποιο૨ντας. 
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the highest degree” (357d6–e1).311 In other words, Socrates thinks that most people fail to 
do what is best because they are ignorant—not because their better judgement is somehow 
overcome. Against the popular view, he maintains that: 
 
[N]o one who knows (εੁδώς) or believes (οੁόμενος) there is something else better than what 
they are doing, something possible, will go on doing what they have been doing when they 
could be doing what is better. Self-defeat (τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι) is nothing other than ignorance 
(ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τઁ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία). 
(358b8–c5)312 
 
 
He immediately clarifies that “ignorance is to have a false belief and be deceived about 
matters of importance” (358c7). So whenever someone is ‘overcome by pleasure,’ 
according to Socrates, it is because they made a mistake—they acted on a false belief about 
what was best and so were ignorant about the right course of action. By maintaining that 
no one can act against their better judgement, Socrates seems to argue as if everyone were 
entirely guided by reason, and as if, therefore, the soul were simply rational.313 
 In the Republic, by contrast, Socrates no longer treats the soul as though it were 
simply rational—he partitions the soul, such that it is now possible for reason to be 
overcome by some opposing psychic force. The Socrates of the Republic thus seems to 
rehabilitate the phenomenon that the many had called ‘being overcome by pleasure’ against 
its purported denial by the Socrates of the Protagoras. He now seems to countenance the 
possibility of psychic conflict. 
 
311 Cf. Laws 689a5–b7, 689d4–e1 
312 ο੝δε੿ς ο੡τε εੁδઅς ο੡τε οੁόμενος ਙλλα βελτίω εੇναι ਲ਼ ਘ ποιε૙, κα੿ δυνατά, ਩πειτα ποιε૙ τα૨τα, ਥξઁν τ੹ 
βελτίω· ο੝δ੻ τઁ ਸ਼ττω εੇναι αਫ਼το૨ ਙλλο τι το૨τ’ ਥστ੿ν ਲ਼ ἀμαθία, ο੝δ੻ κρείττω ਦαυτο૨ ਙλλο τι ਲ਼ σοφία. 
313 Cf. Frede (1992), p. xxx: “Here in the Protagoras, Socrates seems to argue as if the soul just were reason, 
and the passions were reasoned beliefs or judgements of some kind, and as if, therefore, we were entirely 
guided or motivated by beliefs of one kind or another.” 
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We are finally prepared to see, however, that the Socrates of the Protagoras 
reinterprets putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance because he is only 
concerned with the sort of person who possesses wisdom or knowledge. A wise person will 
unfailingly act on their knowledge of what is best—they always follow the dictates of 
reason (352c5). This is why he claims that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom or 
knowledge (358c3). It is a kind of ‘mastery’ because reason or knowledge unfailingly rules. 
It is described as ‘self’ mastery because the self just is reason or knowledge: the self is 
intellect. So whether the soul turns out to be simple or composite in the Protagoras, 
knowledge rules with complete authority: the person who possesses knowledge cannot be 
‘overcome’ by anything. 
We are also prepared to see that, in the Republic, Socrates countenances the 
possibility of psychic conflict because he is initially describing the sort of person who lacks 
knowledge—someone who acts in accordance with belief, and so is subject to the distorting 
power of appearances.314 Such people inevitably experience psychic conflict, and they 
vacillate between being self-mastered and self-defeated. While such people sometimes act 
in accordance with true beliefs about what is best, they also sometimes act in accordance 
with false beliefs about what is best. While they are not perfectly self-mastered (as those 
who possess knowledge are), they could be said to be in the process of becoming self-
mastered if—through concerted effort—they repeatedly side with reason in such cases of 
psychic conflict.315 
 
314 Cf. Republic 431a ff. and 602c6–d6 
315 Cf. Laws 647d5–7 
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Consider the case of Odysseus: his reasoned judgement of what is best is ultimately 
able to overcome his passionate desire for revenge (441b2). Although he is initially 
conflicted about the best course of action, he sides with reason, against spirit. In this 
instance, at least, he is self-mastered. Now consider the case of Leontius: his reasoned 
judgement of what is best is ultimately overcome by his passionate desire for sexual 
gratification (439e6). Much like Odysseus, he is conflicted about the best course of 
action—but he sides with appetite, against reason, and so comes to regret his action. In this 
instance, at least, he is self-defeated. But note that both the self-mastery exhibited by 
Odysseus and the self-defeat exhibited by Leontius are the result of an internal conflict, in 
which reason was pitted against some other part of the soul. 
Nevertheless, the simple fact remains that in the Republic, no less than in the 
Protagoras, the self-mastery exhibited by those who possess knowledge is not the result 
of any sort of internal conflict. Those who attain harmony between the various parts of the 
soul in the Republic are, of course, the philosophers—those elite citizens who alone attain 
knowledge and so possess wisdom. The degree to which the possession of this knowledge 
so transforms and unifies them is astonishing: 
 
They regulate well what is really their own and rule themselves (τ૶ ੕ντι τ੹ οੁκε૙α ε੣ 
θέμενον κα੿ ਙρξαντα α੝τઁν αਫ਼το૨). They put themselves in order, are their own friends, 
and harmonize the three parts of themselves like three limiting notes in a musical scale—
high, low, and middle. They bind together those parts and any others there may be in 
between, and from having been many they become entirely one (κα੿ παντάπασιν ਪνα 
γενόμενον ਥκ πολλ૵ν), moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα੿ ਲρμοσμένον). Only then 
do they act […] regarding as wisdom (σοφίαν) the knowledge (ਥπιστήμην) that oversees 
such actions. And they regard the action that destroys this harmony as unjust […] and 
regard the belief that oversees it as ignorance. (443d3–e8)316 
 
316 ἀλλ੹ τ૶ ੕ντι τ੹ οੁκε૙α ε੣ θέμενον κα੿ ਙρξαντα α੝τઁν αਫ਼το૨ κα੿ κοσμήσαντα κα੿ φίλον γενόμενον ਦαυτ૶ 
κα੿ συναρμόσαντα τρία ੕ντα, ੮σπερ ੖ρους τρε૙ς ਖρμονίας ἀτεχν૵ς, νεάτης τε κα੿ ਫ਼πάτης κα੿ μέσης, κα੿ εੁ 
ਙλλα ਙττα μεταξઃ τυγχάνει ੕ντα, πάντα τα૨τα συνδήσαντα κα੿ παντάπασιν ਪνα γενόμενον ਥκ πολλ૵ν, 
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These individuals join what had previously been three into one, binding them together in 
such a way that, from having been many, they become “entirely one (παντάπασιν ਪνα), 
moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα੿ ਲρμοσμένον).” Such people, as the diction here 
seems to imply, are so radically unified that the several parts of their soul operate as a 
single entity, guided wholly by reason. For the composite soul that is ruled by knowledge 
in the Republic, then, psychic conflict is no more possible than it had been for the soul 
ruled by knowledge in the Protagoras. 
Any suggestion, then, that the Republic and the Protagoras are in tension with 
respect to their treatments of the soul, or with respect to the possibility of psychic conflict, 
is at best oversimplifying and distorting. The Socrates of the Protagoras is simply 
unconcerned with the sort of person who lacks knowledge: he is only interested in rejecting 
the popular view that someone in possession of knowledge can somehow be conflicted 
about the best course of action, or even act against their better judgement.317 This is no less 
true in the Republic. For when knowledge rules in the composite soul, such a person enjoys 
precisely the sort of psychic peace that Socrates had claimed they would in the Protagoras 
(356e1). In both dialogues, then, Plato consistently presupposes the hypothetical 
impossibility of acting against knowledge.318 He is prepared to maintain that those (rare) 
 
σώφρονα κα੿ ਲρμοσμένον, ο੢τω δ੽ πράττειν ਵδη […] σοφίαν δ੻ τ੽ν ਥπιστατο૨σαν ταύτૉ τૌ πράξει 
ਥπιστήμην, ਙδικον δ੻ πρ઼ξιν […] ἀμαθίαν δ੻ τ੽ν ταύτૉ α੣ ਥπιστατο૨σαν δόξαν. 
317 Indeed, there is even some evidence internal to the Protagoras that Socrates thinks someone who lacks 
knowledge, and so is only in possession of belief will experience something akin to psychic conflict. For 
someone who merely possesses belief will be susceptible to the power of appearances, which “makes us 
wander and exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret our actions and choices” (356c9). 
318 Cf. Republic 350d3: “We agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance.” 
Cf. Republic 351a3: “But, now, if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue, it will easily be shown to be stronger 
than injustice, since injustice is ignorance.” Cf. Republic 428b6: “Now, this very thing, good judgment, is 
clearly some kind of knowledge, for it is through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well.” 
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individuals who possess wisdom or knowledge cannot be forced by anything to act against 
its decrees. Such people will not experience psychic conflict: they are entirely unified by 
the knowledge or wisdom with which they self-identify. They are perfectly moderate, 
perfectly just, and perfectly courageous because they are perfectly wise. Their self-
knowledge is what allows them, finally, to be perfectly self-mastered. 
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